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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Afrimadona, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2018
Scot Schraufnagel, Director
This dissertation examines congressional influences in US foreign policy. As such, it
addresses the nature of inter-branch relations and the quality of checks and balances in the
American political system. An underlying assumption in the dissertation is that politics in the US
does not stop at the water’s edge. Put differently, the research recognizes the great potential
domestic politics plays in shaping US foreign policy. As the president’s partner in the lawmaking process, Congress is potentially one of the most important foreign policy actors.
Three empirical foreign policy cases are examined in this dissertation. In each of the
cases, I investigated how congressional dynamics shape foreign policy making process. In the
first case, I tested the arguments that ideology and congressional support affect presidential
decisions in engaging in the military intervention during a foreign policy crisis. I found empirical
support for these arguments. Specifically, when Congress becomes more conservative, the
president is more likely to command a military operation in a foreign policy crisis abroad. I also
found partial support for the effect of congressional support for the decision to become involved
in a foreign policy crisis. Especially interesting is that the president values the Senate support
higher than that of the House. The president is emboldened to engage in a military adventure
when he has strong backing from the Senate.

In the second case, I examined the impact of congressional support and party polarization
in Congress throughout the duration of legislated sanctions. This examination is based on the
argument that the president and Congress tend to see the use of sanction against another country
differently. The president generally wants shorter and less punitive sanctions, while Congress
wants longer and more punitive ones. Although the president has ample authority to terminate
the sanctions, the termination process is more complicated due to the legislative process entailed
in the legislated sanctions. The question then is under what conditions can the president
terminate the sanction. I argue that the legislated sanctions can be shorter when the president has
more support from Congress and the level of party polarization in Congress is moderate. While
some empirical evidence supporting the polarization arguments were observed in both the House
and the Senate, the empirical analysis for the congressional support revealed that the president
can successfully terminate sanctions only if he has more support from the Senate.
Finally, I also explored the effects of partisan preferences and partisanship on
congressional decisions to give foreign aid to foreign countries. Using literature of public
opinion and political psychology, I investigate whether the Democrats are more supportive of
development aid but averse to the military aid. The empirical analysis shows that they are.
However, the empirical support is found in the House only. An increase in the Democratic seats
in the House is associated with a general increase in the level of development aid but a general
decrease in the military aid.
All empirical observations in the dissertation demonstrate that Congress is still a potent
actor in American foreign policy. This is especially true for the Senate, which is constitutionally
endowed with some authority to be involved in foreign policy decision-making process. These

findings have some implications for the study of American foreign policy both theoretically and
methodologically.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines congressional influences on US foreign policy. As such, it
addresses the nature of inter-branch relations and the quality of checks and balances in the
American political system. An underlying assumption in the dissertation is that politics in the US
does not stop at the water’s edge. Put differently, the research recognizes the great potential that
domestic politics plays a significant role shaping US foreign policy. As the president’s partner in
the law-making process, Congress is potentially one of the most important foreign policy actors.
Historically, we know that Congress has played a central role in some foreign policy making
decisions. The division in the first Congresses between pro-British and pro-French factions, for
instance, shaped many early American foreign policy decisions. For instance, the funding
blockade by the pro-British Federalist leaders during the War of 1812, or what they called “Mr.
Madison’s War,” sharpened division in the national legislature and eventually led to the advent
of partisan politics in Congress (Hickey 2004). This is just one early example that politics, in the
US, does not stop at the water’s edge.
As Bruce Jentleson (2010) suggests, the absence of partisan politics during the early Cold
War period is an exception rather than the rule. The rule is that internal division within the
legislature often bled into foreign policymaking. Although in times of crisis, the president can
dominate the policy making process, it is common for executive dominance to occur only at the
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peak of a foreign policy crisis. Once the crisis recedes, internal differences in Congress,
normally, surface, and executive dominance begins to be challenged.
This dissertation provides tests of a series of empirical questions regarding the role of
Congress in the foreign policymaking process. Focusing on three distinct foreign policy issue
areas, I show that congressional dynamics can influence government decisions in these policy
domains. By summarizing existing theories and providing some unique theoretical insights
regarding certain aspects of congressional dynamics and foreign policy actions, the dissertation
aimed to not only explain how Congress can affect American foreign policy, but also add to the
ongoing debate about the role of domestic politics in shaping state behavior in international
relations, more generally.
In this introductory chapter, I provide an overview of the dissertation, covering the
general theoretical framework and case selection method that will be elaborated completely in
each of the subsequent empirical chapters. I will start with the general ideas of how the
American foreign policy has been approached in scholarly works hitherto. It will be followed by
a survey of literature on congressional influence in American foreign policy and elaborate on
research questions that have been left unanswered. In one of the subsequent sections, I focus on
the impact of congressional partisan dynamics and their potential to influence US foreign policy.
Specifically, I elaborate on how these congressional dynamics fit some observations that are
explored in the empirical chapters. The last two sections of this chapter are reserved for some
notes on the method of case selection and the chapter overview.

3
Understanding US Foreign Policy
Standard textbooks on US foreign policy mostly borrow the conceptual framework to
explain American foreign policy from James N. Rosenau (1971). To Rosenau, a country’s
foreign policy is shaped by five sources: external environment (the international system),
domestic/societal environment, the governmental structure of the foreign policy-making process,
the bureaucratic role of individual policy-makers, and the individual characteristics of the
decision-makers. However, as Brian Schmidt (2012) argues, Rosenau’s framework is only a
simplifying device that helps identify the multiple sources of state behavior. 1 Nevertheless,
Rosenau’s attempts to simplify fulfill one of the core functions of a theory – that is to enable us
to identify what to focus on as one delves deeper into explanation and elaboration. To provide
more substance to these base theories, it is necessary to turn to other established works either in
international relations or in other disciplines such as the study of domestic American politics.
Theorizing any policymaking is a daunting task given the multiple factors that can
simultaneously influence the decision-making process. This difficulty of constructing a theory of
American foreign policy is admitted by one of luminaries in the study of international relations,
Kenneth N. Waltz. In defending his Theory of International Politics (1979), Waltz argues that it
is impossible to construct a comprehensive explanation of foreign policy due to the complexity
of the process and the many domestic and international players that shape the process. Thus, the
best we can hope to achieve is to be able to describe likely systemic outcomes produced by the

1

Rosenau (1971) himself admits that he only offers a pre-theory rather than a ‘standard’ theory of foreign policy. In
this sense, he does not attempt to explain the relative importance of these multiple sources of foreign policy, nor does
he try to make causal statements and predictions on what source ‘causes’ what kind of actions. See Rosenau (1971).
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actions and interactions of states within the international system and how our expectations of the
outcomes vary as system attributes change (Waltz 1979, 71). 2
Despite the challenging task, many scholars continue to build their theories of American
foreign policy by tweaking existing theories of International Politics/Relations and by borrowing
insights from other disciplines in the political and social sciences. In explaining the five sources
of American foreign policy, for example, scholars modify International Relations theories and
blend them with some theoretical works in American politics to illuminate the causal
mechanisms linking explanation to policy outcomes. In this chapter, I follow this same tactic.
Below, I explain how the five sources of American foreign policy, elaborated by Rosenau, affect
policy outcomes using explanations found in both International Relations and American politics
literature.

Making a Unique Set of Arguments to Explain US Foreign Policymaking
The first source of US foreign policy is the international system. This explanation is
consistent with the systemic study of International Relations found in schools of thought such as
neorealism, neoliberalism, and social constructivism. Accordingly, when we explain American
foreign policy using this source, we can refer to these theories, depending on what aspect of the
international system we would like to focus on. Neorealism, for example, focuses on the impact
of the distribution of power in the international system on state behavior (Waltz 1979; Gilpin
1981). According to this theory, in an anarchic international system, states are forced to ensure

2

Waltz (1979, 71) himself does not consider his neorealist theory as a theory of foreign policy because he actually
does not predict particular types of state behavior from specific structural change in the international system. Instead
he tries to predict the international outcome produced by the actions and interactions of states within the international
system from the change in the attributes of the international system (i.e., the distribution of power).

5
their own survival by accumulating power. Power, using this train of thought, is the currency of
the international system. To understand the behavior of states in the international system, we
need to know the state’s power position in the distribution of global power because the
distribution of global power shapes state behavior. For example, changes in the US grand
strategy from hedging in the nineteenth century until World War II, to balancing in the Cold War
period, to unilateral foreign policy in the post-Cold War era can be explained by the changing
distribution of global power and the US changing position in the distribution of global power
(Layne 1998; Martel 2015; Thompson 2016; Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley 2008). The change in
the distribution of power since the US founding changed the orientation and form of US foreign
policy.
Deciding what causal argument can be used to explain how the distribution of the power
in the world shapes foreign policy is less straightforward. On this issue, structural realists are
divided into two primary camps. For the defensive structural realists, because the anarchic and
self-help international system does not provide incentives for states to be expansionistic, states
should maximize their security to ensure their survival (Van Evera 1998; Grieco 1997; Layne
1996, 1998; Taliaferro 2000; Waltz 1979). Therefore, states should pursue prudent foreign
policies, that is the policies that can warrant their survival without provoking others to do
something counterproductive to the initial intention to guarantee survival (Walt 2005). This
prudent foreign policy requires the accumulation of an appropriate amount of power and the
avoidance of expansionistic policies because expansionist foreign policies create fear on the part
of the other states and provoke counter-balance by other states.
On the other hand, for the offensive structural realists, the uncertainty inherent in the
anarchic international system requires states to maximize power to ensure their survival. While
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offensive realists share the structural realism assumptions about the anarchic and self-help nature
of the international system, the nature of the state actor, and survival as the ultimate interest of
states, they part company with the defensive camp regarding the level of uncertainty inherent in
the anarchic world and the best way for states to ensure their survival. To the offensive realists,
the asymmetric information problem does not allow states to be certain of the intentions of
others. Because states have never been sure of what others want in the future when the
distribution of power is in their favor, the best way to ensure state survival is to maximize power.
The most powerful state is the most secure state. While the global hegemony might be difficult,
with the US as the exception in the modern world history, regional hegemony is a possible goal
to be pursued by other states. In fact, this should be the main goal of states because the potential
threats often originate from neighbors. Offensive realism, claims its founder John Mearsheimer,
well explains the US expansionist foreign policy of the nineteenth century (Mearsheimer 2001,
2011).
Nevertheless, the distribution of power is only one of several attributes of the
international system that can, theoretically, affect US foreign policy. Another potentially
important systemic source of US foreign policy is the ideational factors such as global norms,
institutions, and international laws. These are the systemic factors emphasized by neoliberal
institutionalism and social constructivism. According to constructivists, norms play a central role
because they shape the identity, interest, and eventually the action of states (Checkel 1998; Hopf
1998; Ruggie 1997; 1998; Wendt 1992; 1994; 1999). Thus, foreign policy can be influenced by
the global norms of the day. For example, the belligerent foreign policy adopted by countries
until World War II cannot be separated from the fact that war was still a norm; that is, it was a
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typical policy of the day. Although war still occurs in some parts of the world, great power wars
do not.
International norms undoubtedly have shaped US foreign policy because they redefine
and constrain some policy options. Nuclear weapons, for example, are considered taboo
(Tannenwald 1999; 2005). Because of their destructive effect, the international community
through the United Nations and other international forums has attempted to delegitimize this
kind of weapon. International agreements on the nuclear bans have circumscribed “the realm of
legitimate nuclear use and restrict freedom of action with respect to nuclear weapon[s]”
(Tannenwald 1999, 436). The constraining effect of norms on nuclear weapons shaped the US’s
decision to not use this weapon in the Korean War and subsequent wars.
Although, as the current world hegemon, the US can dismiss global norms for the sake of
its national interests, as a democratic country, it cannot. Norms can affect state behavior through
the public pressure that eventually shape leaders’ positions on policy options. The US’s sanction
policy against South Africa in the 1980s, for example, was influenced in part by the norm of
global racial equality voiced by transnational activists. The global norm of racial equality voiced
by these groups shaped public discourse in the US that eventually helped redefine US interest
and policy in South Africa (Klotz 1995).
Despite the importance of the systemic variables in shaping US foreign policy, some
scholars argue that these variables affect US foreign policy only indirectly. Their effects are
mediated by unit-level variables, which are the elements within the state or individual policymakers. For example, neoclassical realists argue that the impact of structural change in the global
distribution of power can only be translated into foreign policy through the attributes inherent in
the policy-makers (e.g., their perception of the relative power of their country within the

3
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international system) or the attributes of the state-system such as the domestic structure and
foreign policy resources (Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009; Rose 1998; Wivel 2005; Zakaria
1992, 2001). This is why many foreign policy scholars tend to resort to domestic political
explanations when they attempt to elucidate American foreign policy.
According to Rosenau, the second source of American foreign policy is the
domestic/societal environment. Some International Relations theories (sometimes called Second
Image theories and Innenpolitik theories such as liberal internationalism, Marxism, and some
variants of constructivism) are considered appropriate analytical tools to explain this second
potential influence on American foreign policy. Notwithstanding their differences, they agree
that the state’s internal structure such as political and economic ideologies, domestic structures,
national character, partisan politics, and socio-economic variables can determine state behavior
in international relations.
The main assumptions of these Innenpolitik theories are that 1) the state is not a unitary
actor in the sense that state is not the single entity that tries to maximize its national interests.
There are competing actors with their own interests and they can challenge one another. 2) The
interests of the states are complex, and they can vary depending on the domestic and
international context. Thus, interests are situational. And 3) state interests are the product of the
competing interests of domestic and transnational actors. In other words, state interests will be
representative of the dominant actors in society (Moravcsik 1997)
These liberal assumptions have generated much scholarly work that attempts to explain
US foreign policy from the domestic political perspective. Among important works on American
foreign policy influenced by this liberal theory are the American democratic idealism model
3

See among others (Jervis 1976; Levy 1983; Zakaria 2001).
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(Bouchet 2013; Carothers et al. 2000; Clinton et al. 2011; M. Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi 2000;
Diamond 2008; Scott and Carter 2016; Scott and Steele 2005; 2011) and the political process
model (Wiarda 2009). The democratic idealism model focuses on the US promotion of
democracy policy. The US democracy promotion policy is based on the American conviction of
Democratic Peace Theory. 4 According to this theory, democracies tend to be peaceful (monadic
argument) because rational voters, on which the political destiny of the leaders depend, do not
support wars due to their cost. Because the risk of going to war is high when there is no domestic
support, a rational leader whose political position depends on the public will is less likely to risk
going to war (Quackenbush and Rudy 2009). Although democracies may fight non-democracies,
they do not fight each other (dyadic argument) because a democratic society does not see the
other democratic society as a threat (Doyle 2005; Russett 1995; Tomz and Weeks 2013) and
because democratic societies share democratic values with each other (Ikenberry 2008; Maoz
and Russett 1993; Owen 1994; Russett 1995). Additionally, complicated decision-making
procedures in democracies also constrain leaders from going to war (de Mesquita et al. 1999;
Pahre 2006). This conviction or belief in democratic peace can explain the US policy of
expanding the club of democratic countries either by peaceful means such as foreign aid
(Meernik James and Poe 1998; Scott and Carter 2017; Scott and Steele 2011) or by violent acts
such as the Iraq invasion in 2003 (Farrell and Von Hippel 2000; McCartney 2004;Von Hippel
2004)

4

The American belief in democracy is especially apparent in Bill Clinton’s 1994 State of the Union Address that
argued, “Ultimately, the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of
democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other…” See William J. Clinton: "Address Before a Joint
Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 25, 1994. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50409.
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Second, scholars also note the importance of domestic political actors in explaining US
foreign policy. Scholarly works in this area can be best summarized as the so-called political
process model. This model is based on the assessment that foreign policy, like domestic policy,
is shaped by powerful forces, interests and actors in the broader political system and cannot be
separated from it. This model views foreign policy as emerging from the interactions of hundreds
or even thousands of pressures and interest groups operating on foreign policy issues. Rather
than the purview of a handful of experts in various governmental units, foreign policy outcomes
involve a complicated political process and are subject to the influence of many actors. Foreign
policy is also unpredictable because it involves logrolling, political deal making, and partisan
politics. The interested groups usually build coalitions of like-minded individuals to be more
effective in advancing their cause. They also are involved in partisan politics such as election
campaigns, fund-raising, and lobbying to have their interests and influence translated into policy
decisions made by their preferred candidates (Newhouse 2009). Due to the great number of
actors involved, the decisions are usually a compromise (Wiarda 2009).
While most of the works in this area focus on the impact of public opinion on American
foreign policy (Hartley and Russett 1992; Holsti and Rosenau 1996; Jentleson and Britton 1998;
Mueller 1973; Risse-Kappen 1991) both in the short term and the long-term (Baum 2004; Brody
1991; Canes-Wrone 2006; Mueller 1973; Sobel 2001), some other works most specifically
investigate the role of domestic interest groups in shaping the US foreign policy. These include
internationally oriented business groups and experts (Jacobs and Page 2005; Milner and Tingley
2010) and minority ethnic groups (Haney and Vanderbush 1999; Newhouse 2009; Rubenzer and
Redd 2010; Vanderbush 2009).
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Although some of these domestic political actors can directly affect presidential decision
making in the foreign policy realm through public opinion (Sobel 2001; DeRouen 1995; Ostrom
and Job 1986; Mueller 1973), most of these actors shape foreign policy through Congress or the
legislative process (Milner and Tingley 2010; Milner and Tingley 2015; Rubenzer and Redd
2010; Newhouse 2009; Vanderbush 2009; Haney and Vanderbush 1999; Hartley and Russet
1992). This is unsurprising given that Congress is intended to represent the people and is
accessible to the general public and interest groups (the following section will address
congressional influence on US foreign policy).
The third source of American foreign policy is the governmental structures used in the
foreign policymaking process. As part of the liberal theoretical framework, analysis of
governmental structure assumes that the state is a non-unitary actor. The foreign policy decision
making process is distributed across governmental units or agencies, each of which has its own
organizational culture and procedures. Graham Allison’s organizational model seems to be an
appropriate analytical tool to analyze this influence on American foreign policymaking, and the
main argument of this school of thought is that the government sees foreign policy issues from
organizational sensors. Government defines policy responses and their consequences as
organizations process information (Allison 1969, 698). The way organizations process
information depends on the culture, structure and standard operating procedures developed in
these organizations. Thus, the policy output of the governmental units is the product of
organizational cultures and routines.
Scholarly works on the governmental structure of the foreign policymaking process
mostly center on the role of presidential leadership (Barber 2009; Bock 1987; Corwin 1957;
Edwards and Wayne 2013; Garrison, Rosati, and Scott 2013; George 1980; Melanson 2005;
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Pfiffner 2011; Preston 2001; Strong 2005). These works attempt to explain, for instance, how the
decision-making structure created by each of the US presidents affects the way foreign policy is
made (Barber 2009; Hermann and Preston 1994; Preston 2001). Some other works focus on the
National Security Council as the president’s foreign policy advisory team in foreign security
matters (Daalder and Destler 2008; Inderfurth and Johnson 2004; Preston 2001; Rothkopf 2006;
Shoemaker 1991) and the National Economic Council as the president’s advisory team for
international economic policy (Destler 1980, 1989, 1996, 1998).
The fourth potential influence on American foreign policy is the bureaucratic roles played
by individual decision-makers. This potential source of American foreign policy can be
understood using Allison’s bureaucratic model (Allison 1969; Allison and Halperin 1972;
Allison and Zelikow 1999). This model sees foreign policy as a product of a bargaining process
among governmental agencies with different interests. The model implies three assumptions.
First, there is no overarching master plan and decisions emerge from political struggle and
bargaining among groups (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001). Thus, foreign policy decisions
emerge through an abstract political space rather than a formal decision procedure that relies on a
formal chain of command. The actors in the bureaucratic politics model are key individuals
representing their organizations, each of whom is trying to maximize the organizations’ interests,
agendas, and goals. Second, the model assumes there are multiple organizations and
bureaucracies that compete to advance their interests and influence foreign policy in their favor.
Finally, the way the policy issue is perceived by the actors depends on the position of the actors.
For example, during the US Cuban missile crisis, the Department of Defense (DoD) often
clashed with the Department of State on how to approach the problem. While the DoD and the
military supported a more aggressive approach, the State Department tended to approach the
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issue diplomatically. Not only are the interests of the agencies different; the way the agencies see
the issue is also different. While Robert McNamara as the Secretary of Defense saw the Cuban
missile installation as a strategic issue and the military saw it as a challenge and a chance to
“cleanse the Western Hemisphere of Castro’s Communism,” the State Department and some of
Kennedy’s closest advisors, including his brother Attorney General Robert Kennedy, viewed it
from the diplomatic perspective, that is in terms of the relations between the US and Soviet
Union (Allison 1969, 712-715).
Finally, the last potential source of American foreign policy is the characteristics of
individual decision-makers. Examining US foreign policy from this perspective, scholars mostly
look at how the belief system and personality traits of American leaders shape the foreign policy
decisions they make. Two clusters of works, generally, focused on this causal argument. First is
the operational code analysis approach. This method is used to investigate the belief system of
individual leaders (Houghton 2014; Schafer and Walker 2006; Walker 1990). Two prominent
figures in this genre are Alexander George and Ole R. Holsti. George is the one who laid the
systematic foundation for the use of operational code for studying foreign policy. He
reformulated the operational code method by categorizing belief systems into two types:
philosophical and instrumental beliefs. While philosophical beliefs concern general philosophy
about the nature of political life embraced by leaders (perception about the world,
optimism/pessimism about the future and belief about the controllability of historical
development and view of the predictability of the future), the instrumental beliefs deal with more
practical and strategic questions in the context of political action (George 1969, 199-216). The
two sets of beliefs are closely related. The way national leaders view the world and perceive each
other fundamentally affect their policy choices in approaching each other (Walker 1990, 407).
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George’s reconceptualization of an operational code was widely used by many scholars
to assess the belief systems of American leaders and link these beliefs to their general approach
to foreign policy. Earlier applications include Holsti (1970), who analyzed John Foster Dulles’
belief system, and David McLellan (1971), who studied Dean Acheson’s belief system. These
two studies found that Dulles and Acheson had contrasting beliefs regarding the Soviet Union.
While Dulles was prone to embrace an anti-Soviet rhetoric, Acheson seemed to show a more
prudent way of thinking. Although he still saw the Soviets as an adversary, he did not attribute
this adversarial relation so much to ideological contestation as to the strategic behavior of the
Soviet Union. Therefore, he tended to have a more nuanced approach to US/Soviet relations
because he believed that strategic behavior was subject to change and was simply a response to
strategic constraints. Thus, he believed that peaceful co-existence with the Soviet Union was a
desirable policy.
The study of operational code or belief systems has expanded especially since the 1970s
(Houghton 2009, 111). Scholars use this method to describe a huge variety of leaders and explain
their particular actions in dealing with various foreign policy issue areas. Among leaders who
have been analyzed by scholars are John F. Kennedy (Marfleet 2000); Henry Kissinger (Walker
1977); Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson
(Rosenberg 1986); Mao Zedong (Feng 2005); Fidel Castro and Kim Il Sung (Malici and Malici
2005); Bill Clinton and Tony Blair (Schafer and Walker 2006); Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres
(Crichlow 1998); George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1999); and
Vladimir Putin (Dyson 2001). Many interesting findings have been reported by these studies.
Stephen Walker’s (1977) work on the operational code of Henry Kissinger, for example, found
that Kissinger’s bargaining strategy in his effort to pull the US out of the Vietnam War can be
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explained by his philosophical and instrumental beliefs. His realist proclivity, as indicated by his
personal bias toward realist statesmen like Klemens von Metternich and Viscount Castlereagh,
contributed to his realistic approach to US policy in Vietnam. In his collaborative work with
Lawrence Falkowski (Walker and Falkowski 1984), Walker attempted to expand operational
code analysis to four pairs of US presidents and Secretaries of State (Truman/Marshall,
Eisenhower/Dulles, Kennedy/Rusk and Johnson/Rusk). Walker and Falkowski found a close link
between these leaders’ early socialization experiences; their need for power, achievement, and
affiliation; and their types of operational code.
According to this line of reasoning, their types of operational code eventually determined
their bargaining tactics when dealing with crises (Walker and Falkowski 1984). Further analysis
of the four presidents done by Rosenberg (1986) found that although the Cold War mindsets
were ubiquitous in the four presidents, the way Kennedy understood the world around him was
different from the other three presidents. While the other three presidents tended to be dogmatic
and understood the world, especially the US-Soviet relations, in the ideological perspective,
Kennedy was more pragmatic in that he placed the relationship between the two countries within
a strategic context. Rosenberg’ analysis of Kennedy’s operational code indicates that Kennedy
was closer to Acheson in the way he viewed foreign policy crisis.
While those scholars used operational code to study the belief systems of leaders, some
other scholars used a general psychological approach for studying leaders’ personality traits.
Among the earlier studies that specifically focused on leaders’ personality and foreign policy
decision making is Friedlander and Cohen’s (1975), who analyzed the relationship between
personalities and the belligerent behaviors of fourteen leaders. They also connected the
childhood experiences of these leaders with their belligerent behavior as adults. Barber’s ([1972]
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2009) study of US presidents is an earlier work as well as one of the most influential and
important contributions to the study of leaders’ personality and leadership style. His
categorization of leaders as active-passive and positive-negative, however, has attracted some
criticism as being too simple. Fitting a person within a particular category based on his/her
general trait description might be easier. But some unusual policies a leader made sometimes
complicate the analysis. One example given by McDermott is Barber’s categorization of
Theodore Roosevelt as a passive-positive leader. On closer observation, Roosevelt’s attempt to
pioneer anti-trust legislation and bring greater democracy to the American economy might not be
appropriately considered as passive (McDermott 2004, 234).
Margaret G. Hermann is also an innovative and productive scholar in this area of study.
Her studies of leaders’ personality traits through content analysis of their public speeches
allowed her to compare large numbers of leaders. She also explored a more complex structure of
leaders’ personality components, including beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal
style (Hermann 1980). In a collaborative work with Paul Kowert (Kowert and Hermann 1997),
she linked leaders’ personality traits to their risk propensity. She subsequently modified and
expanded her identification of leaders’ personality traits into seven components: belief in one’s
ability to control events, conceptual complexity, need for power, distrust of others, in-group bias,
self-confidence, and task orientation (Hermann 2002). Hermann’s method of at-a-distance
content analysis to assess personality traits was then used by Stephen B. Dyson (2006) to
evaluate Prime Minister Blair’s personality and his decision to attack Iraq.
Of all these sources of American foreign policy, the current research is best situated in
the domestic political model because I focus on the role of Congress in shaping the foreign
policymaking process. Yet, before proceeding to some theoretical explorations of the role
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Congress plays in shaping some foreign policy decisions, I survey some scholarly works that
focused on the role of Congress in US foreign policymaking.

Congressional Influence on US Foreign Policymaking
Perhaps the most significant domestic political actor that can shape American foreign
policy is Congress. Congress, by virtue of the Constitution, was intended to be the dominant
foreign policy actor (Carter 1998). Most literature on Congress’ foreign policy roles discusses
the influence of Congress on presidential decisions such as the presidential use of force (Gowa
1998; Howell and Pevehouse 2005; 2007a; Kartzmann 1990; Kriner 2006; 2010; Meernik 1993;
1995; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Stoll 1987), foreign aid, immigration and foreign trade (Milner
and Tingley 2010; 2015; Epstein and Halloran 1996; Lohmann and Halloran 1994; Sherman
2002). Still some others examine the direct legislative activities of Congress in the US foreign
policy process (Carter 1989; Carter, Scott, and Rowling 2004; DeLaet, Rowling, and Scott 2005;
DeLaet and Scott 2006; Johnson 2006).
The research on congressional influence on US foreign policy generally is clustered into
two camps. The first camp is the proponent of congressional power (Carter and Scott 2004;
Carter and Scott 2009; Scott and Carter 2002; Howell and Pevehouse 2007a; 2007b; Kriner
2006; 2010; Kriner and Shen 2014). Although this view is supported by relatively small
empirical evidence, some scholars suggest that Congress does have some influence on
presidential decision-making in the realm of foreign policy. For example, Howell and Pevehouse
(2005; 2007a) show that partisan composition in Congress can affect the presidential use of
force. When Congress is controlled by the opposition, the president is less likely to order the use
of military force abroad. Congress through legislation, appropriation, hearings, and public
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appeals can increase the cost of the President’s military adventurism. In anticipation of this, the
president is discouraged from the political gamble (Howell and Pevehouse 2007a). Similarly,
Epstein and O’Halloran’s (1996) investigation of US trade policy from 1890 to 1990 found that
different compositions of Congress affect the likelihood that Congress will delegate discretionary
authority to the president that eventually affects the trade policy. When Congress is controlled by
the opposition, Congress is less likely to delegate discretionary authority to the president, and
this makes it difficult for the president to pursue a more liberal trade policy. These works suggest
that Congressional dynamics shape presidential foreign policy choices, be it a military policy or
an international economic policy.
The second camp is the opponent of congressional influence. Scholars in this camp view
a more limited congressional power when dealing with foreign policy. For example, DeRouen
(1995) failed to find evidence that Congress had successfully challenged the president’s military
policy since the Vietnam war. Despite the Congressional enactment of the War Power Resolution
in 1973, DeRouen showed that presidents are less constrained by this congressional check. It is
the public opinion rather than congressional power that can restrain the presidents in their
security policy.
Stoll’s (1987) analysis of the President-Congress relations from 1946-1982 found that
rather than constraining the president, Congress precisely tended to support the presidents in
their military adventurism abroad. Congress tended to rally behind the presidents on some
international issues shortly after the presidents engaged in use of force overseas. This finding
suggests that Congress tends to succumb to the president when the country is in crisis. Although
some scholars indicate that Congress attempts to check the presidential foreign policy powers
through some legislation (e.g., war power resolution), these attempts often failed to produce the
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desired effect. Some scholars like Katzmann (1990), Fisher (2000) and Weissman (1995) all
agree that this congressional check fails.
While Congressional submission to the presidents on security issues or during security
crises might not surprise us given that the presidents and the executive agencies in charge of the
issues control the policy process, Congressional acquiescence turns out to be apparent in general
foreign policy issues. It is this observation that has led to the so-called “Two Presidencies” thesis
(Wildavsky [1966] 1998). This thesis argues that in American politics , there are two
presidencies: one for domestic affairs and the other for foreign and defense policy. This idea was
put forward by Aaron Wildavsky in 1966 after examining the facts that most of the presidents’
foreign and defense policies proposals enjoyed higher approval rates by Congress as compared to
the lower approval rates for domestic policies proposals. Wildavsky then concluded that “since
World War II, Presidents have had much greater success in controlling the nation’s defense and
foreign policies than in dominating its domestic policies” (Wildavsky [1966] 1998, 23).
Since then, most scholars tested the thesis and found mixed evidence for the arguments.
Cohen (1991), for example, found that from 1861 until Kennedy’s administration, presidents
were more able to control the agenda in foreign policy than in domestic issues. This makes sense
given that presidents are advantaged by his position as commander-in-chief and the sole
representation of the nation in the international community. In addition, as argued by CanesWrone, Howell, and Lewis (2008, 4-5), presidents in the modern era have more knowledge about
foreign policy affairs than Congress. This knowledge ranges from the relevant players around the
world, the status of ongoing negotiation to covert operations. This informational advantage is
enabled because it is the executive agencies under presidential control that conduct day-to-day
operations related to foreign affairs. They report all information about these activities to the
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presidents. The presidents also have the privilege of accessing confidential information not easily
shared with members of Congress.
In contrast, members of Congress often lack information about foreign affairs. Although
they attempted to develop expertise in specific foreign policy areas, they find it difficult to keep
up with the presidents regarding the latest and/or confidential information about foreign policy
issues. Furthermore, members of Congress also have less incentive to know a lot about foreign
policy issues. They are concerned with foreign affairs as long as those issues affect their
constituents directly or the issues become a national concern that pushes them to act. This is in
contrast to the domestic policy arena. In the domestic policy arena, members of Congress have
direct access to any information and can directly see the effect of different policies. They are also
helped by interest groups concerned about particular issues to garner information and do an
independent assessment for them. With this informational gap between presidents and Congress
on foreign policy issues, “presidents can better tailor the presentation of facts to suit their
interests on these issues.” (Canes-Wrone, Howell and Louis 2008, 5). Although presidents might
not be able to convince members of Congress about their actions regarding foreign policy issues,
with the lack of information at hand, members of Congress cannot challenge presidents
effectively. Thus, if presidents issue executive orders related to foreign policy issues, Congress is
less likely to challenge them by passing resolutions revoking the orders. A president’s ability to
structure and manipulate the foreign policy agenda is also obvious when he deals with the public.
Cohen’s (1991) finding that presidential leadership effects are more lasting in foreign policy
issues than economic or civil rights issues is one piece of evidence supporting this argument.
However, several authors disputed the two presidencies thesis. Lee Sigelman (1979), for
example, argued that congressional support for the presidents on key foreign policy roll-calls
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tends to diminish over time to the extent that the level of foreign policy support equals the
domestic one. This occurred from both the presidents’ party and the opposition party. While
support from the opposition party was huge for presidents’ foreign policy positions from 1957 to
1972, since 1973 this support has dwindled. Sigelman further argued that increasing the
informational capacity on the part of Congress may contribute to its more aggressive role in
foreign and defense policy legislation. Also, increasingly the ideological or issue-conscious
orientation of some members along with the growing interconnectedness between foreign and
domestic issues can also explain greater congressional assertiveness in foreign and defense
policies.
Furthermore, Richard Fleisher and his co-authors’ (Fleisher et al. 2000) observation of
roll-call votes for foreign and defense policy also suggests that the absolute level of support for
minority presidents on foreign and defense issues has declined since the second Reagan
administration. This decline occurred at the same time as growing partisanship in foreign policy
decision making in Congress (Fleisher et al. 2000, 4). To these authors, members’ strategies to
win public support can also explain this greater congressional involvement in foreign policy.
Taking a position on controversial foreign policy issues may help garner more support from
some constituents concerned about the issues. However, the authors also remind us of not
construing the arguments as indicating presidents’ weakening positions to influence foreign
policy. Instead this is to show there are some conditions that enable each branch to influence the
other. Fleisher’s findings are supported by Schraufnagel and Shellman (2001). Using more
extensive data and a refined measure of presidential support, they found that there is no
systematic support received by the White House in the foreign policy realm. Despite some
support from the opposition, the support is not consistent and is temporal in nature.
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The challenge against the Two Presidencies thesis suggests that Congressional influence
has encroached on foreign policy. This is in accord with Scott and Carter’s (Carter and Scott
2009; Scott and Carter 2002) observation that Congress has been increasingly assertive on
foreign policy issues, especially since the Vietnam War. While the activity of Congress on
foreign policy issues might have declined since the mid-1980s, congressional assertiveness is
still robust (Carter and Scott 2009, 17). This assertiveness to a significant extent can constrain
the presidents in making foreign policy. When Congress is more assertive and watchful of any
foreign policy actions done under the leadership of the presidents, the executive branch might be
more careful and take Congress into account in devising their foreign policy. This is because any
congressional responses to the policy can derail the foreign policy currently underway.
Because Congress has been increasingly important in shaping US foreign policy, any
congressional dynamics can be expected to affect the direction of US foreign policy. While some
of these congressional dynamics might induce the presidents to take some particular foreign
policy actions, some other dynamics might discourage them from doing the same foreign policy
actions. The problem is what kind of congressional dynamics can we expect to influence what
foreign policy actions and how do these dynamics shape these foreign policy actions. These are
the puzzle I investigated in the current research.
Research Questions
To elaborate on the puzzle raised above, the main question raised in this research is: what
kinds of congressional dynamic can shape the US foreign policy? And how do these
congressional dynamics influence the US foreign policy? To answer these two questions, I
focused on three empirical cases in US foreign policy. The first case is the US military
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intervention in foreign policy crises. In this case, I tested whether congressional ideology and
congressional support for the president affect the president’s decision to engage in military
intervention during a foreign policy crisis. In the second case, I examined the impact of party
polarization in Congress and the level of congressional support for the president on the duration
of legislated sanctions. Finally, I examined the politics of foreign aid allocation. In this case, I
tested whether the partisanship influenced variation in the amount of particular types of foreign
aid. To be more specific, I examined:
1. Ideology, Congressional Support and Military Intervention in a Foreign Policy Crisis:
a. How can ideology influence the presidential decision in conducting a military
intervention in another country’s foreign policy crisis?
b. How can congressional support affect the presidential decision in conducting a
military intervention in another country’s foreign policy crisis?
2. Polarization, Congressional Support and the Duration of Legislated Economic
Sanction:
a. How can party polarization in Congress impact on the duration of legislated
economic sanctions?
b. How can congressional support for the president influence the duration of
legislated economic sanctions?
3. Party Control, Partisanship and Foreign Aid Allocation:
a. How can changes in Democratic control in either chamber of Congress affect the
variation in the amount of development aid provided to foreign countries?
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b. How can partisanship moderate the impact of Democratic control in either
chamber of Congress on the amount of development aid provided to foreign
countries?
c. How can changes in the Democratic control in either chamber of Congress affect
the variation in the amount of military aid provided to foreign countries?
d. How can partisanship moderate the impact of Democratic control in either
chamber of Congress on the amount of military aid provided to foreign countries?
e. How can changes in the Democratic control in either chamber of Congress affect
the variation in the amount of political aid given to foreign countries?
f. How can partisanship moderate the impact of Democratic control in either
chamber of Congress on the amount of political aid?

Purpose and Significance of the Research
As suggested above, the purpose of the research was to identify some congressional
dynamics that can be expected to shape US foreign policies and explain how these congressional
dynamics influenced foreign policies. By doing this, it was expected that this dissertation would
contribute to the understanding of US foreign policy and international relations field in two
ways. First, it provides a direct test of whether congressional dynamics matters in US foreign
policy. This contribution is considered significant given the lack of systematic investigation on
the relationship between congressional dynamics and US foreign policy actions, especially in the
area of the military intervention and sanctions. Second, more specifically this dissertation sheds
light on what particular types of congressional dynamics shape the US foreign policy and how
these dynamics shape the foreign policy actions. As seen in the empirical chapters, while some
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congressional dynamics can constrain executive foreign policy decisions, other dynamics can
embolden the presidents to take action. This dissertation specifies what kinds of dynamics can
constrain and embolden certain types of foreign policy actions.

Congressional Dynamics and the U.S. Foreign Policy
Before examining how Congress shapes US foreign policy, I discuss what I mean by
congressional dynamics. The simple dictionary definition of dynamic refers to “a force that
stimulates change or progress within a system or process” (Oxford Online Dictionary 2018).
Applied to this research, congressional dynamics is simply defined as changes in the
congressional process and/or institution over time that may affect its policy output and its
relations with other branches, especially the president.
In this research, I focus on four variables of congressional dynamics. First is the chamber
ideology. Ideology, simply put, is “the widely shared and systematic beliefs about how the world
does and should work” (Gries 2014, 5). Ideology plays central role in the policy-making process
because ideology shapes the members’ policy positions on a range of issues. While traditionally,
ideologies have pushed both Democrats and Republicans away from each other on many
domestic economic, social and political issues, this is also the case for the foreign and defense
policy realm regardless of the nature of the issues (low vs. high politics issues) as reported by
McCormick and Wittkopf (1992). As shown in Chapter 2, chamber ideology affects both
security and political economic issues (DeLaet and Scott 2006; Fleck and Kilby 2006, 2010;
Lindsay 1991; Meernik and Oldmixon 2008; Milner and Tingley 2010; Peake 2016; Rosenson,
Oldmixon, and Wald 2009).
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The second congressional dynamic that strongly affects the congressional foreign policy
position is party polarization. In this dissertation, party polarization is defined as the gap in the
means of the party’s DW-NOMINATE scores on the first dimension, that is the liberalconservative scale (Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 2015). 5 While there are a lot of scholarly works
on the impact of party polarization in Congress on the domestic policy and congressional
performance in general (e.g., Binder 1999; 2003; Dodd and Schraufnagel 2009; 2017; Jones
2001; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; Theriault 2008), there are only a few works on the
impact of polarization on US foreign policy (e.g., Bafumi and Parent 2012; Parent et al. 2008;
Chaudoin, Milner, and Tingley 2010; Hurst and Wroe 2016; Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007,
2010; Peake, Krutz, and Hughes 2012). Unfortunately, rather than examining the effect of this
polarization on a particular foreign policy action, scholars tend to focus on the debate about
whether polarized roll-call votes in foreign policy issues exist (with the exception of Peake et al
2012). Chapter 3 provides the direct test of the impact of party polarization in Congress on the
duration of legislated sanctions.
The third congressional dynamic considered here is partisanship. Partisanship is
measured as different partisan preferences on particular issues and the degree of partisan voting
behavior shown by the legislators. This latter concept is best represented by the so-called Party
Unity Scores, that is the percentage of roll-call votes in which at least 50 percent of Democrats
vote against at least 50 percent of Republicans. This measures the intra-party cohesion and inter-
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DW-NOMINATE scores measure the average ideological positions (based on the ideal points of members) of each
of the parties on a liberal-conservative continuum (first dimension). As seen in Chapter 3, I also weigh this
polarization measure by the degree of internal party cohesion using Party Unity Scores of each of the parties. Party
Unity Scores for each of the parties is measured as the percentage of members voting together with their own party
in party unity votes (votes where majority of the members in one party (at least 50% of the members) vote for a
position opposed by the majority of the members from the other party). This weighted DW-NOMINATE mean
difference represents the idea that polarization should measure not only the ideological difference between the two
parties but also the internal cohesion of the two parties. See Poole and Rosenthal (2015).
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party differences. Most earlier studies on the effect of partisanship on the US foreign policy tend
to resort to the concept of bipartisanship, measured as the percentage of foreign policy votes in
which the majority of both parties agree with each other and agree with the president’s position
(McCormick and Wittkopf 1992). Conceptually, this is the reverse of the Party Unity Scores
measure. Using this measure, scholars examine whether partisanship encroaches on US foreign
policy, especially the presidents’ foreign policy decisions (McCormick and Wittkopf 1992;
Trubowitz and Kupchan 2007; Trubowitz and Mellow 2005; 2011; Chaudoin, Milner and
Tingley 2010).
The problem in this research is that scholars tend to confuse polarization, partisan
preferences, and partisanship. When they discuss polarization, they measure it using bipartisan
roll-call votes that best capture the partisanship. Although the two measures overlap
conceptually, they are technically different. This is implied in most of the literature on American
politics. While polarization, at least that proposed by Poole and Rosenthal (2007), is based on
ideological differences between the two parties; the measure of partisanship is based on the
percentage of roll-call votes in which the majority of members of either party agree with one
another but disagree with the opponents.6 Like the polarization literature, most studies on
(bi)partisanship in foreign policy also focus on the examination of whether (bi)partisanship exists
in some foreign policy issues. Different from these works, the current work sought to investigate

6

Polarization and partisanship measure different things: polarization measures the ideological difference between
the two parties, while partisanship measures the internal cohesion of the party. Nonetheless, polarization and
partisanship are closely related, especially since the 1970s. This is because ideological inclination is increasingly in
line with party identification. The Democratic party is increasingly liberal, while the Republican party is
increasingly conservative. Technically, the difference (distance) between the DW-NOMINATE median scores of the
two parties measures the levels of polarization. Meanwhile, the internal cohesion in each of the parties’ voting
records measures the level of partisanship. This technical difference captures the possibility that a member can vote
for a policy position based on his/her ideological position (shaped by the district’s ideology) even if his/her party’s
formal position is against the policy position (e.g., McCain’s position on an Obama Care vote).
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the impact of partisanship on one of the most important foreign policy instruments, that is
foreign aid.
Finally, I also explored the effect of congressional support on the presidential foreign
policy decisions. Some scholars show that congressional support lent to the presidents can
embolden presidents to engage in particular foreign policy actions such as the use of force
(Howell and Pevehouse 2005, 2007a; Kriner 2010). In Chapters 2 and 3, I show that the effect of
congressional support is not only limited to risky foreign policy behavior such as military policy
but is also expanded into other policy areas such as sanction decision.
How do all of these dynamics influence US foreign policy in general and presidential
foreign policy choices in particular? Ideology can shape US foreign policy and presidential
foreign policy choices because it has a clear causal direction on some policy positions. For
example, literature on the political psychology and political attitude (Carney et al. 2008; Gerber
et al. 2010; Gries 2014; Jones et al. 2017; Jost 2006; Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Federico, and Napier
2009; Bonanno and Jost 2006; Rentfrow et al. 2009) show that liberals are more inclined to
values such as humanitarianism, multilateralism, social justice, and freedom. On the other hand,
the conservatives are more inclined to values such as nationalism, unilateralism, order, and
stability. These different values lead them to prefer different policy positions on some issues. For
instance, as some public opinion surveys reveal (Busby and Monten 2012; Gries 2014; Holsti
and Rosenau 1996; Smeltz, Daalder, and Kafura 2014), Republicans are more supportive of a
military approach in US foreign policy. By contrast, the Democrats are more supportive of
multilateral and cooperative approaches in foreign policy. Because the ideological preferences of
liberal and conservative are obviously different in some foreign policy issues, we can expect that
a change in the dominant ideology in Congress will have some implications for foreign policy in
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general and presidential foreign policy choices. This, for example, is shown in Chapter 2. When
Congress is more conservative, the presidents are more courageous about using military
instruments when dealing with a foreign policy crisis overseas. In contrast, when Congress is
more liberal, the presidents are hesitant to command military engagement abroad.
Party polarization in Congress also has some foreign policy consequences. While
ideology has some impact on the direction of a foreign policy action (e.g., conservative members
tend to support military intervention while liberal members tend to reject it), polarization affects
the probability that a policy can be produced or approved. As some scholars (e.g., Barber and
Mccarty 2015; Binder 1999; Binder 2003; Jones 2001; Mccarty 2007) observe, high polarization
can lead to policy gridlock because the two parties cannot compromise their policy positions. An
extremely polarized Congress can obstruct its policy productivity in that Congress finds it
difficult to approve a policy proposal and, thus, fails to produce the policy.
However, these scholars usually assume that policy productivity is linearly related to the
level of polarization. This might not be the case because as Dahl (1967) suggested a long time
ago, political outcomes are the products of political conflicts. 7 Therefore, assuming that the
absence of political polarization (no inter-party conflicts) or a low level of political polarization
is a pre-requisite for the policy productivity of Congress may not be correct. Very low political
polarization indicated by a very high intra-party difference can be problematic because it
complicates the process of formulating the party’s policy agenda and advances their collective
interests (Dodd and Schraufnagel 2009, 2012, 2017). As Rohde (1991) observed, high intra-party
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Dahl (1967) argues that conflict is the inherent nature of a democracy. Conflicts arise due to the democratic
dilemma. On the one hand, by nature, human beings have different views. On the other hand, democracy entails the
liberty to express these different views. Thus, “to condemn all political conflict as evil is to condemn diversity and
liberty as evils. If you believe that some diversity is inevitable, and that liberty is desirable, then you must
hold, logically, that political conflict is not only inevitable but desirable” (Dahl 1967, 270).
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policy conflicts lead members to hesitantly empower their party leaders, which eventually
inhibits the leaders’ ability to devise a partisan policy. Thus, Congress’s policy productivity can
be interrupted when political polarization is at either of the ends of the polarization continuum.
By contrast, when parties are moderately polarized as indicated by sufficiently internal
cohesivity along with external heterogeneity, party members are willing to bestow their leaders
with limited resources and authority that eventually enable them to formulate partisan agenda
and negotiate their differences with the opposition party (Dodd and Schraufnagel 2012). Policy
productivity can be maximized under this situation. The empirical support for this non-linear
relationship between the level of political polarization in Congress and its productivity level is
explained in Chapter 3 on the sanction duration.
Like political polarization, partisanship can also cripple the policy productivity of
Congress. Partisanship is closely related to political polarization in the sense that partisanship
can worsen the ideological differences between parties, thus it contributes to the polarizing
process. Yet the impact of partisanship on the policy outcome can be best explained by the
debate between Conditional Party Government (CPG) theory (Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 2000)
and Pivotal Politics theory (Krehbiel 1998). According to CPG theory, when both intra-party
homogeneity and inter-party heterogeneity are high, members are more likely endow their party
leadership and the party institution with strong power and greater resources. Under this situation,
party control will be stronger, and the majority party provided with these greater power and
resources will skew the policy outcome to their preferred position. However, these conditions are
more likely to occur in the House than in the Senate because the House is the majoritarian
institution in which the majority party can exert its control to shape the outcome at the expense
of the minority.
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However, as Krehbiel (1998) indicates, the ability of the majority party to skew the
policy outcomes to the median of the majority party’s ideal point might be constrained when
partisanship is greater. As long as there is no supermajority party in both chambers (defined as
controlling sixty seats of the Senate or two-third seats of the House) and both the presidency and
Congress are controlled by different parties, high partisanship might lead to gridlock. Under this
situation, the majority party should negotiate and compromise its policy preference in order for
the Congress to produce a policy. Otherwise, the status quo outcome will remain.
Applied to foreign aid cases, as explained in detail in Chapter 4, the expectation of
pivotal politics theory seems to be borne out. Higher partisanship appears to constrain the
majority party to deflect the policy outcome in its favor. When partisanship is high, both parties
are forced to compromise their position on the amount of aid so the degree of an increase or
decrease in the amount of particular aid they propose declines as partisanship becomes stronger.
Thus, partisanship can moderate the impact of party preference on the policy outcome.
Finally, congressional support can affect foreign policy due to some institutional
advantages owned by Congress. For instance, as explained by Howell and Pevehouse (2005),
Congress has the power of the purse (power to appropriate funds), which allows it to affect a
president’s foreign policy plan. This is especially true for military policy. Congress can cut off
military funding or refuse to appropriate needed funding that will materially affect the course of
military actions. Besides Congress can also impose burdensome requirements on the president’s
military plan, which can dissuade presidents from continuing the plan.
When Congress is controlled by the president co-partisans, congressional resistance to a
president’s foreign policy plan diminishes and encourages the president to move forward with
the plan. Less congressional resistance means the president does not have to worry about the
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budgetary support for his foreign policy agenda. Similarly, when the president has a history of
good relationships with Congress, the president might feel less restricted in implementing his
foreign policy agenda.
In contrast, when the Hill is controlled by the opposition party, the president might find it
difficult to implement his foreign policy agenda successfully. The opposition will eagerly
complicate the president’s foreign policy plan, either by restricting the scope and duration of the
policy or by establishing firm reporting requirements. The opposition will use all the power it has
over the structure, budget, and control of the foreign policy actions that will eventually affect the
implementation of the policy (Grimmett 2007; Lindsay 1999). This is especially true in the use
of force policy. The War Power Resolution, for example, came out during the divided
government era when Congress was controlled by the Democratic opposition.
Because Congress can affect the prospect of foreign policy action, the president takes the
congressional dynamics seriously when devising his foreign policy strategies. However,
congressional dynamics affect not only the presidential foreign policy choices but also US
foreign policy in general. This is because Congress itself can have a direct-legislative influence
on the foreign policy (Carter and Scott 2009) such as sanction legislation or foreign aid
appropriation. In the current research, I show how these congressional dynamics affect both the
presidential foreign choices (the use of force in a foreign policy crisis) and US foreign policy in
general (sanction ad foreign aid policy).

Some Notes on the Methodology: Case Selection
This work is built on earlier studies on American foreign policy in addition to borrowing
some theoretical insight from the literature on American politics. The literature of American
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politics is especially helpful due to its extensive elaboration of congressional dynamics and its
explanation on how these dynamics shape domestic policy. By extending these theoretical and
empirical works on the relationship between congressional dynamics and domestic policy to the
realm of foreign policy, I contribute to the ever-growing literature on the domestic political
explanation of US foreign policy in general and the study of congressional foreign policy in
particular (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2012; Fearon 1998).
To understand the impact of congressional dynamics on the US foreign policy actions, I
focus on three cases: US military intervention in a foreign policy crisis, legal economic sanctions
(legislated sanctions), and foreign aid allocation. These cases represent the two areas of the
International Relations discipline: international security (Buzan and Hansen 2009; Nye and
Lynn-Jones 2007) and international political economy (Frieden and Lake 2000; Gilpin 2001).
The examination of congressional influence on US crisis behavior is interesting because this is a
hard case to test congressional influence on US foreign and defense policy. In crisis policy, the
executive is usually given greater control over the policy and Congress is thought to defer to the
presidential foreign policy authority (Lindsay and Ripley 1993, 19). This is because most
legislators believe that in critical situations, national interest can be best served by strong
executive leadership. The rally around the flag effects usually occurring after military action
(Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gartner and Segura 1998; B. W. Jentleson and Britton 1998; Bruce W.
Jentleson 1992; Mueller 1973; Oneal and Bryan 1995) can also discourage legislators from
taking critical response to the presidential military policy that would leave them open to public
blame and electoral punishment.
While the first case, military intervention policy, represents examination of congressional
influence in the realm of international security policy, the second and the third cases represent
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examinations of congressional influence in the realm of international political economic policy.
Like military intervention policy, legal economic sanctions are also hard cases. The sanction
policy is a hard case because in most sanction acts, presidents are given broad authority to waive,
suspend and terminate them. Thus, presidential power and preferences should determine the
length of sanctions more than congressional dynamics. In addition, as Milner and Tingley (2015,
61) claim, sanctions have less clear ideological bases. Both liberals and conservatives might be
opposed or in favor of this policy for different reasons. But they do not consistently support or
oppose this policy. Thus, there is no clear ideological position on sanction policy. Therefore,
Congress is typically not expected to play a significant role in this policy. However, as shown in
the chapter on sanction duration, congressional dynamics does matter in influencing the duration
of these legislated sanctions. This indicates that even for this hard case where presidents should
exert more influence, Congress is still powerful.
Finally, foreign aid policy can be considered an intermediary between the hard and easy
cases. Again, based on Milner and Tingley’s (2015, 49-50) categorization, military aid is the
hard case because it has minimal and indirect distributional consequences on local economies. In
addition, the material effects from military aid programs do not produce concentrated economic
gains and losses for some domestic economic groups so the pressures for members of Congress
to influence the decision regarding this type of aid on behalf of their district’s interests is
minimal as well. This might lead to the expectation that Congress might not be influential on this
type of aid. The incentive to become involved in the aid is further reduced because military aid is
the type of aid over which there is likely a limited ideological division between liberal and
conservative (Milner and Tingley 2015, 62). However, as I demonstrate in Chapter 4, this is not
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the case. Ideological differences on this aid are clear, and different party control in the House has
an obvious impact on variations in the amount of military aid.
Meanwhile, development aid might be an easy case because this type of aid has large
concentrated distributional consequences. Although it accounts for only a very small fraction of
the American economy, some domestic economic groups gain some benefits from the flow of
this aid. Milner and Tingley (2010) even found that it has distributional impact on the districts as
well. Furthermore, development aid is very ideological because it entails the taxation and
redistribution of money through a centralized governmental system of the donor country. Thus,
right-wing conservatives are likely to oppose development aid as an inappropriate role of the
government, while liberals are likely to support it (Noel and Therien 1995; Therien and Noel
2000; Milner and Tingley 2015; Greene and Licht 2017). Due to its distributional consequences
and ideological attachment, congressional dynamics should affect variation in the amount of
development aid. Yet although congressional involvement can be expected for this type of aid,
scholars have not extensively elaborated on how congressional dynamics shape this type of aid.
This is the contribution offered by the current research.

Chapter Overview
This dissertation consists of three empirical chapters, all of which are loosely
interconnected. They are connected by one theme, that is Congressional influence on the US
foreign policy. They are loosely connected, however, because each of them deals with different
issues involving varying degrees of presidential control and authority in foreign policy decisions.
Presidential control and authority is considered at its maximum in the case of military
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intervention and its minimum in the case of foreign aid allocation. Presidential authority is at its
medium in the case of legislated sanctions.
The second chapter discusses the role of Congress in shaping president’s decisions to
conduct military intervention in a foreign policy crisis. In this chapter, I test the argument that
congressional support and ideology matter in a president’s military intervention policy. More
specifically, I test two hypotheses. First, presidents are more likely to conduct military
intervention in a foreign crisis when they have congressional backing. Second, presidents are
more likely to conduct military intervention in a foreign policy crisis when the chambers are
controlled by the conservatives. I analyze the relationship between the two congressional
dynamics and the probability of military intervention in each legislative chamber separately.
While the support for the second hypothesis is found in both the House and the Senate, the
support for the first hypothesis only exists in the Senate. The importance of Senate support in
foreign policy is especially important given that the institutional rules of the Senate do not allow
easy support for the president (e.g., the filibuster rule that enables even a single senator to derail
any legislation). In addition, the prominent role of the Senate in foreign affairs also makes
presidents seriously consider its support when they make foreign policy decisions.
The third chapter discusses how congressional polarization and congressional support for
the presidents affect the duration of legislated sanctions. Legislated sanctions are enacted by
Congress through law. Drawing on theoretical insights from the moderate polarization thesis, I
tested the argument that there is a non-linear relationship between the level of party polarization
in Congress and the duration of legislated sanctions. This non-linear relationship between party
polarization and sanction duration is because both low and high polarizations are problematic for
party cooperation. While high polarization can prevent inter-party effort in reaching a policy
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consensus, very low polarization can also be problematic because it hinders the internal
consolidation of parties, thus making it difficult for the party to push a policy agenda forward.
Applied to the case of legislated sanction, I argue that both low and high degrees of party
polarization can complicate the process of ending a sanction because the lack of internal support
within a party can discourage a legislator from proposing a sanction termination scheme or
giving support for a president’s decision to end the sanction. On the other hand, high inter-party
difference can also prevent legislators from reaching an inter-party consensus to end a sanction.
Using the most recent version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data, I
found support for this hypothesis.
In addition, I also tested the hypothesis that congressional support for presidents can help
them end the sanctions earlier. Institutionally, presidents and Congress have different policy
preferences regarding sanction duration. Because presidents are held accountable for foreign
policy, general welfare, and national security, they tend to think of an economic sanction in
terms of broader national interest. This sometimes requires a more flexible diplomacy toward
another country. In contrast, legislators are not held accountable for any policy outcomes,
including foreign policy. They are assessed by their constituents based on their policy positions
(whether they support the policies espoused by their constituents). Therefore, legislators tend to
support policies favored by their constituents or pressure groups. These different institutional
roles lead the president to prefer shorter and less punitive sanctions, while Congress prefers
longer and more punitive sanctions (Tama 2015; 2016). Despite the different preferences
between the two institutions, we know that presidents’ positions are usually supported by their
co-partisans in Congress. Therefore, I argue that presidents’ efforts to end sanctions are more
likely to succeed if they have more co-partisans in Congress. Testing this hypothesis in each

38
legislative chamber separately, I found support for the Senate model. Again, this further supports
the argument employed in Chapter 2 that the Senate plays a significant role in shaping a
president’s foreign policy choice.
In the last empirical chapter, I analyze the impact of partisanship on variation in the
amount of three types of foreign aid: development aid, military aid, and political aid.
Partisanship is defined as two things: party differences in attitude toward particular aid and
partisan voting behavior. Drawing on scholarly works in partisanship, ideology, and political
psychology on partisan differences in foreign policy issues, I tested the argument that the
Democratic Party is more supportive of development aid but less supportive of military aid. I
also tested the argument that the impact of Democratic control on the surge of development aid
and the decline of military aid diminish as the partisan behaviors of the two parties in Congress
become stronger. Using USAID data on foreign aid, I found support for the arguments.
Especially when partisanship is at its mean level or above, the impact of party control on foreign
aid disappears, leading us to conclude that partisanship moderates the effect of party control. As
theory on the impact of partisanship on the policy preference discussed above suggests, a high
level of partisanship compels both parties to compromise their policy positions, thus reducing the
ability of the majority party to skew policy outcomes to its preferences.

CHAPTER 2
CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT, IDEOLOGY, AND THE US MILITARY INTERVENTION
IN A FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS
In this chapter, I test competing claims regarding the influence of congressional dynamics
on US foreign policy. This chapter investigates under what congressional situations US
presidents are more likely to use military force as a foreign policy instrument. Because there are
a lot of instances of the use of military forces abroad, this chapter especially focuses on the use
of military force in a foreign policy crisis. This is because foreign policy crisis provides
opportunities for the US to use force. However, since the responses to these opportunities are not
always militaristic, this raises a puzzle that led to the current research. Thus, the main question
asked in this chapter was “why does the US become involved militarily in foreign policy crises.”
As the focus of the research is the impact of the congressional dynamic on the US president’s
foreign policy decisions, I analyzed US military involvement in a foreign policy crisis from the
presidential perspective in the sense of how a president considers Congress when deciding to
conduct military intervention in a foreign policy crisis.
Investigating US military intervention in a foreign policy crisis is important for at least
two reasons. First, a foreign policy crisis is the most frequent type of hostile interaction in global
politics (Brecher 1993, 1). The fact that the US was involved in some of the crises while not in
others is an intriguing puzzle. Yet, it is surprising that there is little research that has
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been conducted on the US involvement in a foreign policy crisis. Second, investigating US
intervention in a foreign policy crisis is a good choice to test congressional influence on
presidential foreign policy actions, the main theme of this project. This is because the decision in
a foreign policy crisis lies fully on the hand of the president. Because the president is the
commander-in-chief, he has the power to deploy the military force. Thus, in crisis situations,
presidential power is at its maximum (Lindsay and Ripley 1993, 19). In addition, a crisis
situation can also help the president to justify his military plan. However, since the funding for
the military adventure is under the authority of Congress, the presidents might not have a free
hand in this adventure. The presidents should calculate the potential support and anticipate any
challenge they might face in deciding to militarily intervene in a foreign policy crisis.
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the following section, I elaborate on the
definition of foreign policy crisis and the literature on US involvement in a foreign policy crisis.
Then I explore the theoretical explanations of congressional influence on presidential decisions
to command military operations in a foreign policy crisis. In the third section, I explain the
method and data collection processes followed by the results. Finally, I summarize the answers
to the puzzle and speculate on the alternative explanation for the findings in the conclusion
section.

US Involvement in Foreign Policy Crisis
Before delving into the literature on US involvement in a foreign policy crisis, it is
important to define what a foreign policy crisis is. According to Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000,
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Some works on US involvement in a foreign policy crisis include the following: (Brands 1987; Brecher and
Wilkenfeld 2000; Butler 2003; Huth 1998; James and Hristoulas 1994; James and Oneal 1991; Prins 1999).
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3), a foreign policy crisis occurs when there are three necessary and sufficient conditions
stemming from the changing internal and external environments of a state. These three
conditions are actually more of a perception rather than a reality held by the key decision makers
of the state actor. The three conditions are 1) a threat to one or more basic values; 2) an urgency
to respond to the value threat (time pressure); and 3) a heightened probability of involvement in
military hostilities.
While foreign policy crises can erupt from changing both the internal and external
environment of a state, an international crisis emerges when there is “a change in type and/or an
increase in intensity of disruptive interactions between two or more states, with a heightened
probability of military hostilities that in turn destabilizes their relationship and challenges the
structure of an international system.” (Brecher 2008, 7). While some scholars tend to treat
foreign policy crisis and international crisis similarly (Hermann 1972; Lebow 1981), this
research follows Brecher (2008) by distinguishing the two types of crisis. The key distinction of
the two types of crisis is the recognition of the internal sources of a crisis. While foreign policy
crises can erupt from the internal environment of a state (e.g., Austrian 1934 crisis triggered by
the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss by Austrian Nazis) with some external ramification, an
international crisis arises from existing disruptive interactions between states (e.g., a series of
Kashmir crises erupting from adversarial relationship between India and Pakistan).
The key necessary and sufficient conditions of a crisis should help distinguish it from
other types of hostile inter-state relations. For example, although crises often come along with
conflict, conflict is a more general term that characterizes relationships among parties. As Gurr
(1980, 1-2) defines, “Conflict phenomena are the overt, coercive interactions of contending
collectivities.” Conflict only requires two conditions: 1) mutually hostile actions among the

42
parties and 2) the use of coercion to control the opponent. Thus, conflict is broader and more
general in scope than crisis. Conflict encompasses insurrection, revolution, and riot as well as
rivalry, crisis, and war (Brecher 2008, 6).
Crisis is also closely related to protracted conflict or rivalry because crisis often occurs in
adversarial relationships between rivals. As explained by Diehl and Goertz (2000, 222-223),
rivalry is a type of inter-state relationship characterized by repeatedly disruptive interactions
between countries. As rivalry is fraught with disruptive interactions, crisis can occur when these
disruptive interactions heighten in intensity, leading to a higher probability of military hostility
that, by definition, is a crisis.
However, among the three defining conditions of a foreign policy crisis―perception of
value threat, time pressure, and probability of war, the most crucial is the heightened expectation
of war. Heightened expectation of war indicates that the perception of value threat is dire, and
the time pressure increases substantially. Therefore, the probability of war is a pivotal condition
of a foreign policy crisis. In reality, both foreign policy and international crisis are indicated by
value threat, action demonstrating resolve, and overt hostility. These are the main indicators on
which the International Crises Behavior database is constructed (Brecher et al. 2016)
When all three indicators of crisis are felt by leaders of a country, the country is said to
be a crisis actor. The responses of the crisis actor to the crisis it faces will determine if the crisis
escalates to a war or terminates peacefully. When the crisis actor responds to the crisis using
violent military actions, the crisis can descend into military clash or war (e.g., July 1914 crisis
leading to World War I). When the crisis actor is creative enough to solve the crisis, the crisis
can de-escalate and terminate peacefully (e.g., Berlin Blockade, 1948-49).
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Although a crisis actor is, by the definition, the main participant of the crisis, the
outsiders can be participants in the crisis as well. This is especially true for the great powers
owing to the scope and nature of their national interests. For example, the US was a third-party
intervener in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958, which is a tension between the mainland China
(People’s Republic of China) and Taiwan (Republic of China). The US sent the US Navy
Seventh Fleet to the strait because of US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. The alliance
between the countries drove the US to become involved in the crisis.
As indicated in the International Crisis Behavior data, among the great powers, the US is
the most frequent third-party intervener in any crisis (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000). Even
compared to its superpower rival during the Cold War, the Soviet Union, the US level of
involvement in a foreign policy crisis is higher overall. While the global orientation of American
foreign policy is often cited as the overarching explanation for the US’s higher level of
intervention in a foreign policy crisis (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000, 203; Ulam 1974, 408),
there are at least four other reasons for American military interventions found in the literature. 9
First, US military intervention in a foreign policy crisis was driven by some strategic reasons
such as containing communist influence, assisting the allies, or geographic proximity (Butler
2003; Huth 1998; Prins 1999). Second, US intervention in a foreign policy crisis can also be
affected by normative factors such power disparity between the target and the attacker; the
violent trigger suffered by the target state; and the severity of the crisis (Butler 2003; Brecher
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The works cited here are limited to the US military intervention in international and foreign policy crises only.
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others see Howell and Pevehouse (2005, 2007a); Meernik (1994); Mueller (1973); Ostrom and Job (1986).
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and Wilkenfeld 2000; James and Oneal 1991). The likelihood that US involvement can help to
mitigate the crisis is also part of this normative explanation (Butler 2003; Brands 1987/1988).
Third, the US intervened in a foreign policy crisis to promote democratic agenda
(Hermann and Kegley 1998; Meernik 1996; Peceny 1995). Meernik’s (1996) study, for example,
found that the US military intervention was closely related to the agenda of democracy
promotion. Countries that experience the US military intervention tend to see democratic growth.
He also found that the US ground forces played an important role in shaping democratization.
Although somewhat different from Meernik’s (1996), Peceny’s (1995) analysis suggests that
democracy promotion and liberal policies are important agenda in US military intervention.
While initially the US strategy during military intervention is conditioned by strategic and
security factors, the pressure from the liberal Congress often compels the president to switch to
liberal policies during the intervention. A pro-liberalization policy is important to legitimize the
intervention underway. Thus, Congress plays an important role in shaping the policy during the
intervention.
Finally, the US military intervention in a foreign crisis is also related to some domestic
factors. For example, Yoon (1997) finds that worsening domestic economic situations and
election years constrained the US presidents from engaging in military interventions. However,
later works (Meernik 2000; Prins 1999) reveal that domestic economic problems can lead
presidents to intervene in a crisis. Similarly, Huth’s (1998) findings also suggest that election
year is a critical period for military intervention.
However, while almost all the research explores the impact of domestic political
variables on the likelihood of US military intervention in international crisis, few of them
investigate the impact of congressional dynamics in shaping this intervention decision (Brule
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2008; Carey 2001; Peceny 1995; Prins 1999). Most of the literature on US military intervention
10

in international or foreign policy crises that take into account congressional dynamics focus on
the impact of congressional support in terms of divided government and the number of the
president’s co-partisans on the military intervention. Their analysis of congressional support,
however, returns mixed results. While some of them find the substantial impact of congressional
support on the presidential decision to command military force (Brule 2008), others failed to find
the significant effect of Congress (Prins 1999).
Whereas some scholars have paid attention to the role played by congressional support in
influencing a president’s decision to use military force in a foreign policy crisis, less attention
has been given to the role of congressional ideology in shaping this decision. This is unfortunate
given that ideology plays an important role in shaping legislators’ position regarding military
intervention (Hildebrandt et al. 2013). In this chapter, I re-examine the impact of congressional
support on the presidential decision to engage in military intervention in a foreign policy crisis,
but I also extend the investigation to another congressional dynamic hitherto neglected in the
study of US military intervention, that is congressional ideology. Before proceeding to the
empirical exploration on the impact of these congressional dynamics on the presidential decision
to command military force in a foreign policy crisis, I elaborate on some theoretical link between
these congressional dynamics and the presidential decision to conduct military intervention in a
foreign policy crisis. Based on this theoretical exploration, I generated some hypotheses to be
tested in the empirical analysis.
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Congressional Support, Ideology and US Military Intervention

Constitutionally, Congress is the dominant player when it comes to foreign affairs. While
the Constitution expressly granted foreign affairs powers to the three branches of government,
Congress was mandated with the dominant role (Koh 1991). This is especially true in
authorization of hostilities against foreign nations. The Constitution assigned Congress the major
role (Weissman 2017, 133).
While the practice conformed to the constitutional expectation in the early years of
American history, presidential dominance began to surface at the turn of twentieth century when
the presidents began to unilaterally send troops to China, Central America, and the Caribbean in
the name of US national interest. However, Congress still played a significant role during this
period, as evident in the decision to enter World War I, the passage of legislation on US
neutrality in the 1930s, support of military aid to the United Kingdom under the lend-lease
policy, and declaration of war against Japan in 1940s (Weissman 2017, 133).
It is during the early period of Cold War that Congress began to yield foreign policy roles
to the president. The emergence of the Soviet Union as the rival superpower allowed the
president to amass greater foreign policy powers by commanding military, diplomatic and
intelligence resources to defend the nation against the communist threat. Equipped with greater
access to these resources, presidents were able to command the use of military forces or covert
paramilitary operations in some countries without meaningful resistance from Congress. But the
mounting casualties of the Vietnam War sent a signal to Congress that the president cannot be
entrusted with managing foreign policy without congressional scrutiny. The Vietnam War
convinced Congress that presidential foreign policy power needs to be checked and this led
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Congress to reassert its constitutional power by passing the War Powers Act in 1973 to check
presidential use of force.
The assertiveness of Congress to some extent helps to constrain the White House in
making foreign policy decisions. The Cold War consensus, which saw congressional deference
and marked the bipartisan era, immediately faltered when Congress began to reassert itself (e.g.,
(Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1985; Holsti and Rosenau 1984; Melanson 2005). Although the White
House still retained some leadership roles, its leadership by and large was increasingly
challenged by Congress (Carter and Scott 2009, 15). As Drischler (1986, 193) observed, the
Vietnam and other domestic political messes of the 1970s has reinvigorated Congress and this
has led back to an era of “shared enterprise arrangement.” This congressional assertiveness
continued to hold in the post-Cold War era when the “intermestic” issues and increasing
constituency pressures provided members of Congress more incentives to challenge the
executive dominance (Aldrich et al. 2006; Conley 1999). Furthermore, the changing nature of the
global security environment of the 1990s along with the cracks in the foreign policy consensus
increasingly pave the way to more assertive Congress.
While congressional assertiveness is obvious in international economic policies due to
the distributive nature of the policies (e.g., see Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994; Milner and
Rosendorff 1996 for trade policy), it is less clear in the military policy (Milner and Tingley
2015). Although the 1973 War Power Resolution was seen as the epitome of congressional
assertiveness, almost all scholars agree that it fails to achieve what Congress intended. Even if
every president since Nixon, regardless of the party, has refused to recognize its constitutionality,
Congress is still reluctant to challenge this defiance (Kartzmann 1990, 35). This leads scholars to
doubt congressional capacity as the executive balancer (Irons 2005; Fisher 2000).
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Despite the pessimistic view of Congress’s ability to check presidential war power, a
closer look at the relationship between the two branches reveals that the White House often made
foreign policy decisions with some anticipated congressional reactions in their minds (Lindsay
and Ripley 1993). The presidents consider Congress very seriously because Congress can affect
the course of policy actions they made. After all members of Congress are very creative in
finding avenues to influence the president’s decisions to send troops abroad. As explained by
Howell and Pevehouse (2005; 2007a), there are at least three ways Congress can affect
president’s belligerent foreign policy. First, because Congress has the power of the purse (power
to appropriate funds), it can affect a president’s foreign policy plan. This is especially true for
military policy. Congress can cut off military funding or refuse to appropriate needed fund that
will materially affect the course of military actions. Besides, Congress can also impose
burdensome requirements on the president’s military plan that dissuade presidents from
continuing the plan (Auerswald and Cowhey 1997).
However, exertion of this congressional power to a significant extent depends on who
controls the Hill and the history of cordial relations between the president and Congress. When
Congress is controlled by the president’s co-partisans, congressional resistance to a president’s
foreign policy plan will diminish and this will encourage the president to move forward with the
plan. Less congressional resistance could mean that the president does not have to worry about
budgetary support for his foreign policy agenda. Similarly, when the president has a history of
good relationships with Congress, as indicated by the congressional support for his positions in
the past, the president might feel less restricted in implementing his foreign policy agenda.
In contrast, when the Hill is controlled by the opposition party, the president might find it
difficult to implement his foreign policy agenda successfully. The opposition eagerly
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complicates the president’s military plan either by restricting the scope and duration of the
conflict or by establishing firm reporting requirements. The opposition will use all the power it
has over the structure, budget, and duties of the armed forces that will eventually affect the
course of military campaign (Grimmett 2001; Lindsay 1999a). After all, the War Power
Resolution came out during the divided government era when Congress was controlled by the
Democratic opposition.
Second, Congress can affect presidential foreign policy decisions through public appeals
or dissent. When a president launches a controversial foreign policy action such as military
action, members of Congress often engage in public debate commenting the efficacy of this
foreign policy action, raising concern about the cost involved, and expressing doubt about the
plan laid before the American public. They put the president on notice. This can undermine the
credibility of the foreign policy action made by the president and potentially can lead the policy
action to go awry (Schultz 1998). When the policy does go awry, the opposition can publicly
challenge the president through hearings, further complicating the policy action underway.
Under this situation, the president needs strong backing from his co-partisans in Congress. When
the president has large congressional support due to his co-partisans controlling both chambers
of Congress or due to his strongly amicable relationship with Congress, congressional opposition
to his foreign policy plan might not be that strong and this can help maintain the credibility of his
resolve in the foreign policy action.
Finally, Congress can also affect a president’s foreign policy plan or action through its
power to move public opinion (Berinsky 2007; Zaller 1992). Some scholars show presidential
approval ratings tend to increase when Congress supports presidential decisions. In contrast,
when the critical voices predominate in Congress, public support for the president diminishes.
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Thus, the rally round the flag effects are affected by congressional support (Brody 1991; Lian
and Oneal 1993). In addition, media outlets tend to approach Congress to find information about
foreign policy implementation abroad. This is because Congressional members are thought to be
more open and critical to issues whose views are interesting to the media. Information from
Congressional members is sought, especially when there is debate about the issue within the
Washington community (Groeling and Baum 2008).
Furthermore, Congress can directly inform the public’s understanding of past policy
actions. When the policy actions run off the plan, the opposition party may raise criticism that
may affect the prospect of the president to secure the next election. If the opposition party is
large enough to cause a significant number of voters to vote against the president and his party,
the president and his party can be ousted from office. Anticipating this potential challenge to his
fortune in the next election, the president may be discouraged from engaging in certain policy
actions and choose another options.
Because Congress can affect the prospect of a foreign policy action, the president will
take the congressional support seriously when devising the foreign policy strategy. When the
president has a base of support in both the House and the Senate, the president is more likely to
continue his military intervention policy. Otherwise, he will be constrained from executing the
plan. This leads to my first hypothesis on the relationship between the congressional support and
the likelihood of engaging in the military intervention in a foreign policy crisis:
Hypothesis 1: the president is more likely to conduct military intervention in a foreign policy
crisis when he has larger congressional support.
Just as congressional support is important for encouraging a president to continue his
military intervention policy, congressional ideology is equally essential for the president move
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forward with his plan. Chamber ideology is especially important to undergird the weak support
from his own party. When the president losses the support for his military policy from his own
party in Congress, he can still pursue his military plan as long as there is some support from the
opposition. The bipartisan support emboldens the president to implement the policy. Yet the
president can only expect this bipartisan support provided the chambers (his own co-partisans
and the opposition) embrace his hawkish ideology.
Research on the role of ideology in congressional foreign policy has demonstrated that
ideology plays an important role in shaping members’ position on foreign policy issues.
Lindsay’s (1991) observation of Congressional voting on the Strategic Defense Initiative
revealed that the ideology of the members rather than the economic interests of the constituents
mattered more in influencing their positions on the issue. While economic interests sometimes
affected the members’ vote for higher spending, the result was not robust. On the other hand,
ideology, especially the degree of the member’s hawkishness, robustly shaped his/her support for
higher defense spending. This result applied in both the Senate and the House. This result is in
line with Carter’s (1989) findings. Focusing on senators’ decisions to support Reagan’s defense
budget proposal, Carter found that ideology along with partisan affiliation was a strong predictor
of the senators’ support. As predicted, Reagan received more support from conservative senators.
The impact of ideology on the senators’ support for Reagan’s defense budget proposal was
greater in procurement issues than non-procurement ones. Quite surprisingly, the impact of
ideology was even greater than expected the economic benefits of the budget.
Not only does ideology produce a substantial impact on congressional votes on the
defense budget issue, in broader foreign policy issues, it also matters. An earlier study conducted
by McCormick and Wittkopf (1992) comparing congressional votes on high politics (national
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security and foreign policy) and low politics (foreign aid and trade) issues found that ideology
along with partisanship are consequential in congressional voting across all issue areas (low and
high politics). Their multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) suggests that ideology is an
even more important predictor than partisanship. The impact of ideology was even greater during
the post Vietnam War era. Their finding on the importance of ideology is supported by more
recent studies. For example, Meernik and Oldmixon’s (2008) examination of all foreign policyrelated roll-call votes in the Senate from 1979-2000 found that the ideological congruence
between the senators and presidents is a strong predictor of the senators’ support for the
president’s foreign policy positions. A more recent study on presidential decision to use force for
humanitarian intervention in Somalia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Bosnia during the Clinton
Administration also shows ideology matters. In general, more liberal members of Congress are
more likely to support humanitarian intervention (Hildebrandt et al. 2013).
The impact of ideology was also obvious in other direct-legislative actions such as
members’ decision to sponsor/co-sponsor bills and the treaty consideration/ratification process.
Examining senators’ bill sponsorship/co-sponsorship supporting Israel, Rosenson, Oldmixon,
and Wald (2009) found that the frequency of bill sponsorship/co-sponsorship increased along
with senators’ level of ideological conservatism. Similarly, in the treaty ratification process,
DeLaet and Scott (2006) and Peake (2016) show that ideology is strongly influential. DeLaet and
Scott’s (2006) observation of congressional vote for an arms control treaty found that more
conservative senators were less likely to vote for an arms control treaty. Peake’s (2016)
investigation on the treaty ratification process also found that ideological polarization contributes
to a longer duration of the treaty process. Change in ideological polarization from the lowest to
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the highest was expected to increase the duration time for processing the treaty by about 178
days or around six months.
The impact of ideology is also apparent in economic issues such as trade and foreign aid
(Ehrlich 2009; Milner and Judkins 2004; Milner and Tingley 2010; 2011). For instance, Milner
and Tingley (2011) found that ideology determines legislators’ positions on trade policy.
Conservative legislators on average were more supportive of trade liberalization than the liberal
members. But these conservative members were less likely to support foreign aid (Milner and
Tingley 2010; 2011). Their findings confirm Milner and Judkins’s (2004) previous work on
ideological division in trade policy in developed economies. As they predict, right (conservative)
parties are more likely to support free trade policy than the left ones. While Ehrlich’s (2009)
analysis of roll-call votes on trade liberalization failed to find a significant impact of ideology on
the legislators’ positions on free trade policy in general, he found that conservative members
were more likely to support free trade with Andean countries. Thus, ideology generally still
shapes foreign economic policy.
All these works suggest that ideology is consequential in shaping legislators’ positions on
foreign policy issues. The works also suggest that more conservative members are also more
supportive of hawkish foreign policies. This implies that the larger the number of conservative
members in both chambers, the larger the base of support for hawkish foreign policy. And
because military intervention in a foreign policy crisis is one form of hawkish foreign policy,
more conservative members means larger support for military intervention policy. This leads to
my second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: the more conservative the chambers (the House and Senate), the more likely the
president is to conduct military intervention in a foreign policy crisis.
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Research Design
Methodologically, this research was a theory testing enterprise. It tested congressional
effect on US foreign policy actions. For this purpose, I used the International Crises Behavior
Data Version 11 from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project currently hosted by Duke
University (Brecher et al. 2016). This data set contains information for all crises during the 1918
to 2013 period. The datasets include information on 470 international crises and 1,036 foreign
policy crises. There were 35 protracted conflicts. This data set contains 80 variables divided into
three groups: crisis dimensions (42 variables), contextual variables (14 variables), and actor
attributes (24 variables). Because the phenomenon of interest is US military intervention in a
foreign policy crisis, I excluded the observations in which the US was the crisis actor in a crisis. I
was not interested in how the US handled its own crises. Instead I was interested in the
conditions under which the US became involved in a foreign crisis elsewhere in the world.
The dependent variable in the model is whether the US became involved militarily in a
foreign policy crisis. This variable was dichotomously coded. The value of 1 indicated the US
direct military intervention in the crisis while the value of 0 was non-intervention. This variable
was recoded from the ICB variable of USINV (US INTERVENTION). The original scale of the
US intervention variable ranged from 1 to 9. I collapsed the values of 1-7 (non-involvement,
neutrality, political involvement, economic involvement, propaganda involvement, covert
involvement, and semi-military involvement) into the value of 0, indicating the US non-military
intervention. I recoded the value of 8 (direct military intervention) into the value of 1, denoting
the US direct military intervention. I dropped the observations with a value of 9 (the US as a
crisis actor) because of their irrelevance to the research question. Of the 793 cases of foreign
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policy crises since World War II, the US was the crisis actor in 68 cases, or 8.58 percent of the
time, and engaged in direct military involvement in 95 cases, or 11.98 percent of the time. While
the US mostly became involved in political intervention (278 cases or 35 percent), and semimilitary involvement placed second in the US’s most active types of crisis involvement (143

Ac
to
r

D
ire
ct

M
ili
ta
ry

C
ris
is

In
vo
lv
em
en
t

em
en
t
In
vo
lv

S
em
i-M
ili
ta
ry

tI
nv
ol
ve
m
en
t
C
ov
er

In
vo
lv
em
en
t

P
ro
pa
ga
nd
a

In
vo
lv
em
en
t

E
co
no
m
ic

al
In
vo
lv
em
en
t

P
ol
iti
c

N
eu
tra
lit
y

N
on
-In
vo
lv
em
en
t

0

10

Percent
20

30

40
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Figure 2-1. Types of U.S. involvement in foreign policy crisis.

11

Due to the availability of the data for the predictor variables, the temporal dimension for the research is limited
from 1954 to 2013. Thus, the number of observations dropped to 458 cases. But the proportion of US direct military
intervention in the data did not change significantly (11.6).
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There are two main independent variables here: first, an indicator of the level of partisan
support in Congress a president enjoys and, secondly, each chambers’ ideological makeup. The
former is a latent variable extracted using factor analysis from three distinct indicators. The first
is the percentage of seats in each of the chambers controlled by the president’s party. This is
simply measured by dividing the number of the president’s co-partisans in each chamber by the
total number of legislators in the chamber. The data on party composition in Congress were
obtained from the Brookings Vital Statistics on Congress compiled by Ornstein et al. (2017).
Second, following Howell and Pevehouse (2007a), I used what is called the president party
power, calculated as follows:
ChamberPresidentPartyPower
= [(%PresidentParty) ∗ (PresidentPUS
− [(%OppositionParty) ∗ (OppositionPUS

)]
)]

The percent president party and the percent opposition party were respectively measured
by dividing the number of the president’s co-partisan (opposition) in each chamber by the total
number of legislators in the chamber. Meanwhile, the president’s opposition Party Unity Scores
(PUS) were measured as the percentage of the president’s opposition party members voting
together with the majority of their party on party unity votes. Party unity votes are those rollcalls on which at least 50 percent of members of president’s party vote against at least 50 percent
of the members of the opposition party (Ornstein et al. 2017; Poole and Rosenthal 2007). The
party unity scores measure the level of cohesion of each of the parties in each of Congresses.
Because party unity votes were measured for the whole congressional sessions, we could not
observe the measure until the session ended. And because a military intervention occurs
sometime during the congressional sessions, I used the previous period of party unity scores
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(previous Congress session) to avoid the simultaneity problem. Data on party unity scores are
originally published by the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports and compiled by Ornstein
et al (2017) in the Brookings Vital Statistics on Congress.
Finally, I used the presidential batting averages in the Congress preceding the foreign
policy crisis. Presidential batting averages are measured by dividing the number of successful
congressional roll-call votes that support the president’s stated position by the total number of
roll-call votes on which the president had taken a clear position. The data were also obtained
from the Brookings Vital Statistics on Congress. As Hypothesis 1 suggests, I expected there
would be a positive association between the latent measure of congressional support and the
likelihood of military intervention in a foreign policy crisis. This should be the case for the level
of support the president was receiving in each legislative chamber.
The second primary independent variable is the chamber ideology. Just as the
congressional support variable, this was also a latent variable consisting of three components.
The first component was the average ideological positions of the chambers’ committees. These
variables measured how liberal or conservative both the House and the Senate committees were
on average. The ideological scores were based on the members’ voting records (DWNOMINATE) developed by political scientists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal (Poole and
Rosenthal 2015). A positive score denotes a conservative ideology, while a negative score
denotes a liberal one. Scores closest to zero reflect the most centrist ideologies, while more
extreme scores reflect stronger conservative or liberal ideologies. The data for all years studied
were compiled by Ornstein et al. (2017) in the Brookings Vital Statistics on Congress.
The second variable is the average ideological position of each chamber’s partisan caucus
or conference. These variables measured the level of conservatism of each of the two major
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political parties on average in both chambers during each year studied. Like the variable of the
chamber’s committee ideology, this variable was also measured based on Poole and Rosenthal’s
DW-NOMINATE scores and compiled by Ornstein et al. (2017) in the Brookings Vital Statistics
on Congress. The last variable is the ideological positions of the Senate Foreign Relations and
the House Foreign Affairs committees. Again, the variables also measured how liberal or
conservative the foreign affairs-related committees were in both chambers. The data were also
obtained from the Brookings Vital Statistics on Congress.
To avoid spurious relationships between the dependent variable and the main
independent variables, I included some control variables typically used in the study of
presidential use of force. First, as some studies show, presidents are more likely to engage in use
of force when the economy is in trouble (Fordham 1998; James and Oneal 1991). To account for
this diversionary argument, I included the misery index, which consists of unemployment and
inflation rates. The data on unemployment and inflation were obtained from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis Economic Data Bank (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2018a), which are
originally collected by U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. While data on unemployment are
straightforward, the data for inflation should be calculated based on the consumer price index
(CPI) as regularly published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Because CPI is “a measure of
the average change over time in the prices paid by urban consumers for a market basket of
consumer goods and services” and inflation is “the overall general upward price movement of
goods and services in an economy” (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013) we can calculate inflation
as follows: 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 =

∗ 100. To avoid the simultaneous relationship between

the misery index and the decision to engage in the military intervention, I used one-quarter lag of
the misery index (i.e., the misery index for the period of one quarter before the crisis occurred).
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Second, related to the diversionary use of force thesis, some scholars also suggest that
presidential decisions to engage in military intervention or force use abroad are associated with
the president’s popular support. As Ostrom and Job (1986) argued, presidents are more likely to
command the use of force abroad when their popularity is declining. To account for the
presidential popularity in the decision to engage in military intervention in foreign policy crisis, I
also included presidential approval rates. The data were obtained from the Presidential Job
Approval database of the American Presidency Project hosted by the University of California,
Santa Barbara (Peters and Woolley 2018).
Third, historically, Congress, especially the House, is often controlled by the Democrats.
Of 36 congressional sessions since 1945 to 2017, Democrats controlled the House about 70
percent of the time. Because the dominance of the Democrats in the House (and in Congress
generally) is an established fact, failure to control for this variable might subject the models to
omitted variable bias. Thus, it was important to include this control in the model. 12 The variable
Democratic-controlled Congress was coded dichotomously. I assigned the value of 1 if the
Democrats were a majority party in both the House and the Senate and the value of 0 otherwise.
The data were obtained from the Brookings’s Vital Statistics on Congress.
The fourth control variable is election period. As some research (Yoon 1997) suggests,
presidents are less likely to intervene in a foreign policy crisis when the crisis occurs during the
election year. This is because the presidents are thought to be more cautious that their risky

12

A sensitivity analysis confirms this omitted variable bias. Because Democratic-controlled Congress has negative
significant relation with the latent variable of both House and Senate ideology, and the variable of democraticcontrolled Congress and the latent variables of House and Senate ideology have different impacts (in direction) on
the decision of military intervention where the former has negative coefficient, while the latter has a positive one,
omitting the democratic-controlled Congress variable will overestimate the impact of ideology on the decision of
military intervention. See Wooldridge (2013, 87-92) for an econometric explanation on omitted variable bias.
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military adventure will be counter-productive to their electoral goals. Even though the president
might not seek reelection, he has an interest in seeing his co-partisan win the election to help
maintain control of his party. Because the failure of his military gamble can affect the odds of his
party’s electoral victory, he might be deterred from engaging in the military intervention if the
foreign policy crisis occurs in the election year. Thus, I expected a negative association between
the election year and likelihood of military intervention. Election was the dummy variable with
the value of 1, which indicates the three quarters preceding the election period and the value of 0
otherwise.
The fifth control variable is the president party. This variable whether Republican
presidents, seen as being more conservative, are more likely to engage in military intervention in
a foreign policy crisis. As some studies (Busby and Monten 2012; Gries 2014; Holsti and
Rosenau 1996; Rathbun 2008; Wiarda 2009) show, Republicans are more hawkish than the
Democrats. Generally, they are more likely to take a hardline position in foreign affairs, while
Democrats are more supportive of the accommodationist position in foreign affairs. This
president party variable was also coded dichotomously, where the value of 1 indicated the
Republican party (Republican presidents), while the value of 0 was the Democratic party
(Democratic presidents).
To capture the effect of the international system on the likelihood of military intervention
in a foreign policy crisis, I used three standard control variables, i.e., the US hegemonic power,
world disputes, and the period of the Cold War. The US hegemonic power was measured using
the percentage of international military capabilities held by the US and derived from the
Correlates of War Capabilities dataset (Small and Singer 1990). According to the dynamic power
differential theory (Copeland 2000), the declining powers tend to be more aggressive because
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they fear future uncertainty. Faced with commitment problems (Fearon 1995), the declining
states are more likely to be aggressive to prevent any rising power from being dominant, thus
conquering the declining hegemons in the future. In this research, it was hypothesized that the
US expected to be more actively involved in international conflict when its hegemonic power
showed a declining trend. In addition to showing its assertiveness and commitment to
maintaining the global stability, it also shows its fear of the future uncertainty of the crisis,
leading it to intervene in the crisis. Thus, I expected negative association between the US
hegemonic power and the likelihood of the intervention.
The variable of world disputes simply refers to the number of non-US militarized
interstate disputes. This measures the opportunity for the US to use military force (Howell and
Pevehouse 2005, 2007a; Meernik 1994). Thus, it was expected that there would be a positive
association between the number of non-US MID and the likelihood of US intervention in a
foreign policy crisis. The data on non-US MID were obtained from the Correlates of War
Project Militarized Interstate Disputes Dataset (Palmer et al. 2015). Finally, I also included the
period of the Cold War to capture the systemic effect of superpower rivalry, which saw frequent
interstate conflicts (Howell and Pevehouse 2007a).
While all those control variables captured the possible factors that could affect the use of
force, I also needed to account for the specific factors related to the crisis. As some scholars
suggest, factors such as the triggers of the crisis, the power disparity between the crisis actor, and
the triggering entity (states and non-state actors), Russian/Soviet intervention in the crisis, US
allies’ involvement as the crisis actor, and the regime type of the crisis actors all contributed to
the US decision to intervene in a crisis (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; Brecher 2008; Butler
2003; Prins 1999). The first two crisis variables captured the just war arguments (Butler 2003).
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According to Butler, the US is more likely to intervene in an international crisis when there are
some reasons for just intervention inherent in the crisis. Two important just causes for a war are
the direct violence in the crisis trigger and the power disparity between the trigger and the target
states. When these conditions existed in a crisis, the US was more likely to intervene. Thus, I
expected a positive association between these two variables and US involvement in the crisis.
The last three variables represented the so-called crisis saliency hypothesis (Prins 1999).
To Prins, When Russia/Soviet was involved in a foreign policy crisis, or when the US ally was a
crisis actor, or when the non-democratic states were involved in a crisis, the US tended to see the
issue being involved in the crisis was salient and pertinent to the US global interest. Thus, the US
was more likely to get involved as well in the crisis. I, therefore, expected a positive association
among all the three variables and the US involvement in the crisis.
Finally, to account for unobserved factors related to each of the presidents, I included
presidential fixed effects term. This fixed effect term controlled much of the unexplained
variation that was specific to the presidents, such as their perception of the crisis, ideology,
variation in their advisory system, and so on.
Because my dependent variable was a binary choice, I employed probit model analysis
estimated using maximum likelihood estimator. I estimated this model:

Pr(int = 1) = Φ β + β CongressIdeology + β CongressSupport +

+

β Control

β PresFE

Where Φ indicates the cumulative density function of the normal probability distribution
with mean 0 and the variance 1. I clustered the standard error using congressional session
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because I have repeated measures of congress-level variables as the main predictors. Thus, it is
very likely that the decisions to intervene in a foreign policy crisis within a particular
congressional session are related to one another because they are affected by the congressional
dynamic of the same quantities. If this is so, then failure to cluster the standard errors would
render the hypothesis testing unreliable because I overestimated the precision of my parameter
estimates and subjected my analysis to type I error.

Results and Analysis

The factor analysis results presented in Table 2-1 and 2-2 provide information about the
latent measures of both ideology and congressional supports in both chambers. As seen in both
tables, Factor 1 is strongly associated with the measure of ideology. The factor loadings of this
factor and all variables of ideology are high, ranging from .8 to .9. In contrast, Factor 2 is
strongly associated with measure of congressional support. The factor loadings of this factor and
the variables of congressional support are also high, ranging from .7 to .9 for the House and from
.8 to .9 for the Senate. Although in each of the models, there is one variable with large
uniqueness, the variances of these variables accounted for by their two factors are reasonably
high. Thus, the factors can usefully represent the latent measures of ideology and congressional
supports.13

13

The Factor Analysis models presented here use oblique rotation to simplify the factor structure. I use oblique promax
rotation because I believe that there is a correlation between the two factors. For example, level of conservatism
increases as Republican congressional support increases. Using oblique promax rotation allows us to account for this
correlation. See Bartolomew et al. (2008); Tabachnick and Fidell (2015).
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Table 2-1
Factor Analysis Model: House
Factor 1

Factor 2

Uniqueness

House Ideology
House FA Ideology [t-1]
House Ideology [t-1]
Ave.House Comm.Ideology [t-1]

.9720318
.9688887
.9315909

.0690229
-.0336616
.0069319

.0569161
.0569493
.1327185

Presidential Support in the House
President party House (%)
President Party Power House [t-1]
Presidential Victory House [t-1]

.0331879
.0630104
-.1264144

.9463333
.9812923
.751208

.1064067
.0391095
.4104689

Note: The Values are promax-rotated factor loadings

Table 2-2
Factor Analysis Model: Senate
Senate Ideology
Senate FR Ideology [t-1]
Senate Ideology [t-1]
Ave.Senate Comm.Ideology [t-1]

Factor 1

Factor 2

Uniqueness

.8649814
.9612915
.9513394

.0680385
-.0818549
-.0357479

.2640277
.0466898
.0839385

.1726397
-.0530148
-.1243833

.8091442
.9635546
.9276529

.3554756
.0541266
.0909535

Presidential Support in the Senate
Presidential Victory Senate [t-1]
President Party Power Senate [t-1]
President party Senate (%)
Note: The Values are promax-rotated factor loadings

Switching now to the main effect, Figure 2-2 shows the coefficient plot for the main
parameter estimates. As seen in the graph, both the variables of ideology and congressional
support are positively related to the decision regarding military intervention. While both
variables are significantly related to the presidential decision in military intervention for the
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Senate model, only ideology is significantly related to the decision of military intervention for
the House model. This suggests that the House and the Senate have different internal dynamic
that eventually exert different influences on the intervention decisions.
The House and Senate

The Senate

The House

1.28
Chamber
Ideology

.358
Congressional
Support

Chamber
Ideology

1.15

Congressional
Support

.842

0

.5

1

1.5

2

Note: The Models only show the main coefficients
Complete results are shown in appendix

Figure 2-2. Models of congressional dynamics and the US military intervention
in a foreign policy crisis.
Substantively, holding all other control variables at their means, an increase of one
standard deviation in the measure of ideology in the House changes the predicted probability of
the president engaging in military intervention in a foreign crisis by 0.087 or an increase almost
9 percent. That is to say, as the House becomes more conservative, indicated by a larger ideology
score, the president has been more likely to take military action. In the Senate, one standard
deviation increase in the measure of ideology predicts the probability of the president deciding a
military intervention in a foreign crisis by a 0.085, holding all other control variables at their
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means. While the impact of ideology on the presidential decision to conduct military intervention
in a foreign policy is slightly lower in the Senate than in the House, the impact of congressional
support is much stronger in the Senate than in the House. In the Senate, one standard deviation
increase in the measure of congressional support for the president increases the predicted
probability that the president conducts military intervention in a foreign policy crisis by more
than 4 percent (0.042). In the House the same level of increase in the measure of congressional
support for the president only pushes the predicted probability of military intervention by 1.5
percent (0.015). Figure 2-3 visualizes the different effects of ideology and congressional support
in the presidential decision to conduct military intervention in both the House and the Senate.

Congressional Support Effect
the House and Senate

0

0

.2

Pr(Military Intervention = 1|X,β)
.2
.4
.6

Pr(Military Intervention = 1|X,β)
.4
.6
.8

.8

Ideology Effect
the House and Senate

-2

-1

0
House

1

2
Senate

3

-4

-2

0
House

2

4

Senate

Figure 2-3. Predicted probability of military intervention due to changes in the chamber’s
ideology and congressional support.
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Generally, while the second hypothesis is supported by the empirical data in which the
ideology of the congressional members matters for the president when he plans to become
involved in a foreign policy crisis elsewhere in the world, the first hypothesis on the role of
congressional support is only partially supported. Whereas congressional support in the Senate
matters for the president when deciding a military intervention, congressional support in the
House is barely significant for the president to get involved in a foreign policy crisis. These
results suggest that president takes the Senate more seriously when it comes to the policy of
military intervention in a foreign policy crisis.
The importance of the Senate in foreign policy process is not surprising due to the
presence of the Foreign Relations Committee widely regarded as the “ranking” committee in
both the Senate and the Congress (McCormick 1993). As the premier committee in Congress, it
has been deeply involved in foreign policy process and has taken a more activist decisionmaking role in affecting US foreign policy, especially in the post-World War II. As McCormick
(1993, 115) observed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can affect policy beyond the
normal legislative and oversight functions of most other committees.
Another structural feature of the Senate that makes congressional support in the Senate
important is the presence of filibuster. This is one of the defining features of the US Senate.
Filibuster allows any senator to delay almost any measure or nomination on the floor of the
Senate for strategic gain (Koger 2017, 311). Only when there is enough vote can this filibuster be
prevented. Yet, because the requirement of three-fifth of its membership (sixty senators) is
difficult to achieve (i.e., require significant majority in the Senate), collective force in the form
of bipartisanship is always required to preempt this filibuster. Otherwise, the policy obstruction
by a senator can be expected to derail foreign policy decision made by the executive.
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Thus, because the institutional features of the Senate enable even a single senator to
affect the foreign policy action of the president, congressional support becomes essential for the
president. The president needs to make sure that his foreign policy actions, especially those
involving the use of force that requires funding from Congress are fully supported by most
members. This is especially true in the Senate due to its institutional feature.

Conclusion
This chapter seeks to empirically examine the conditions under which the presidents are
more likely to engage in military intervention in a foreign policy crisis. Focusing on
congressional influence on the presidential decisions regarding military intervention, this
research hypothesizes that the presidents are more likely to get involved in a foreign policy crisis
when they anticipate supports from members of Congress. The presidents are also expected to
willingly engage in a foreign policy crisis when they knew that legislators adopt more
conservative stance on foreign policy issues. Testing these two hypotheses using International
Crisis Behavior data from 1945 to 2013, I find support for these hypotheses. Breaking down the
empirical analysis into the House and the Senate, I observed that while the presidents take
ideological factors in both the House and the Senate into account when making decision to
intervene, they only take the Senate support seriously in making this decision. Part of the
explanation for why congressional support in the Senate matters more than that in the House is
the institutional feature of the Senate that allow even a single senator to derail the foreign policy
actions made by the president.
The findings are expected to contribute to wider debate about congressional influence in
foreign policy making process. While many scholars doubt the potency of Congress in foreign

69
policy, some others precisely see Congress as a powerful actor. This is especially true more
recently when Congress has been increasingly well-informed about foreign policy thanks to
greater access it opens to foreign policy think tanks and epistemic community in addition to
wider coverage of media on foreign policy issues.
Despite the fact that president and the executive agencies are still the most important
foreign policy actors, the findings suggest that Congress is also a powerful foreign policy actor.
The many avenues of influence that its members have allow these members to directly or
indirectly influence the policy-making process. This forces the president to take Congress
seriously when they make a foreign policy decision.
There are two distinguishing contributions of this research to the wider debate on the role
of Congress in foreign policy making process. First, it highlights the importance of congressional
ideology in shaping the presidential decisions. While many scholars tend to see the importance
of ideology only in direct-legislative process (e.g., roll-calls), I find that congressional ideology
in general matters in the president’s mind. Because the president always anticipates the reaction
from Congress to any policy decision he makes, he needs to make sure that his policy is
supported by Congress so that the policy can be successfully executed. The cost of policy failure
in security-military realm can be so dire that the congressional support is important. Because
president makes a policy in a situation of anticipated reaction, he will adjust any policy he
devises in line with the policy mood or ideology in Congress.
Second, this research offers more nuanced interpretation of congressional influence, that
is, different chambers affect foreign policy differently. This is especially true regarding
congressional support. So far, most American foreign policy scholars treat the House and the
Senate as a single entity and examine Congress as a unity actor. This way of analysis suffers
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from the lack of attention to the internal dynamic within each of the chambers. This research, in
contrast, breaks the analysis down into chambers to see if the variables of interest (ideology and
congressional support) affect the presidential decision similarly between the two chambers. I find
that especially for the measure of Congressional support, the Senate matters more than the
House. Though I suggest the difference in institutional features of the chambers might explain
the difference, more intensive explorations are needed to clarify this suggestion. This opens
some avenues for future research to investigate this conjecture.

CHAPTER 3
PARTY POLARIZATION AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS
Economic sanction has been one of the most important instruments of American foreign
policy. The non-violent nature of the instrument has made it a cheaper and safer foreign policy
option for achieving US foreign policy objectives in the world (Baldwin 1985). This has
increasingly attracted American foreign policymakers, leading to its increasingly frequent use,
especially in the post-Cold War era (Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014). In fact, since the end
of World War II, the US has been the most frequent user of economic sanctions. According to
the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data, which covers 1945 to 2005, of
1,412 cases of economic sanctions identified, more than 50 percent of them (739) involved the
US as either the primary sender or a participating sender. Moreover, the use of economic
sanctions by the US has been increasing, especially since the end of the Cold War in the early
1990s. Again, the TIES data show that of 739 economic sanctions imposed by the US since
1945, almost two-thirds of them (430) were launched since 1990 (Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi
2014). Based on its frequency, economic sanction can be thought of as the primary tool the
American government uses to influence other states’ behavior.
While a wealth of research has been conducted to determine why the US imposes an
economic sanction against a foreign country (Drury 2000; 2001; Drury 2005; Hufbauer et al.
2009; Huffbauer and Oegg 2003; Martin 1992; Whang 2011), rarely do these works examine the
legislated sanctions, that is sanctions enacted by Congress through law. Scholarly ignorance of
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legislated sanctions is partly due to their understanding of the nature of legislated sanctions. For
instance, Milner and Tingley (2015, 51, 61) argue that because sanction policy has weak
ideological bases and small distributive consequences, presidents rather than Congress are
expected to have more influence on this foreign policy instrument. Weak ideological bases and
small distributive consequences of economic sanctions do not galvanize pressure groups to lobby
Congress and fight for this policy. Furthermore, the opt-out clauses authorizing the president to
waive, suspend, and even terminate sanctions contained in most of the legislated sanctions
increasingly undermine congressional influence over this policy. There are some cases in which
the president and executive agencies disregard the congressional mandates on imposing
sanctions against some countries (Hufbauer et al. 2009; Martin 1993). This has led some scholars
to question the effectiveness of congressional influence in sanction policy (Drezner 1999; Whang
2011).
However, as Jordan Tama (2015, 2016) shows, legislated sanction is a potent foreign
policy tool. Despite some weaknesses scholars perceive in the legislated sanctions, he argues that
the White House tends to carry out these congressional mandates. The executive acquiesces to
this kind of sanctions even when it often disagrees with these sanctions. As Tama (2016, 10)
demonstrates, of the 37 bills of sanction opposed by presidents but approved by Congress,
presidents only vetoed seven of them and reluctantly signed the other 30 bills. In some of these
bills signed by the presidents (14 bills), the presidents expressed dissatisfaction with the
provisions.
Tama suggests that congressional dynamics in legislated sanctions matter in shaping
presidents’ decisions to yield to this congressional mandate. Especially important in these
decisions is bipartisan support for the sanctions. Presidents are less likely to challenge Congress
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directly when the sanctions are supported by the majority of legislators because challenging
(vetoing) these legislated sanctions can carry a political cost (Tama 2016, 5). However, while
Tama focuses on the presidential decisions to sign the legislated sanctions, he does not touch on
the question of why presidents terminate the sanctions. If most of the legislated sanctions contain
the opt-out provisions authorizing the White House to waive, suspend and even terminate the
sanctions and the presidents often oppose the sanctions, why do the presidents not end the
sanctions quickly? Why do presidents terminate some sanctions quickly while leaving the others
longer? In short, what explains the variation in these legislated sanctions? This is the puzzle,
untouched by Tama, that I would like to address in this chapter. If congressional dynamics
matter in influencing presidential decisions to acquiesce to congressional decisions on the
legislated sanctions, as suggested by Tama, one might also conjecture that some congressional
dynamics should also matter in the presidential decisions to terminate the legislated sanctions.
Thus, in this chapter I examine whether congressional dynamics also are consequential in
shaping the termination of the legislated sanctions.
In this chapter, I argue that variations in the duration of legislated sanctions are affected
by the degree of party polarization in Congress and the congressional support lent to the
presidents by the legislators. Invoking the moderate polarization thesis, I specifically argue that
the duration of legislated sanction is shorter when Congress is moderately polarized or presidents
can get large and solid support from legislators. I elaborate on some theoretical justifications for
these arguments (the impact of polarization and congressional support) and test them using TIES
data. Yet, before proceeding to the theory and empirical analysis, I review scholarly works on
sanctions and show how these works under-emphasize the role of Congress in the US sanction
policy, the lacunae I intend to fill in in this chapter.
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Previous Work on Congress and Economic Sanctions
Let me begin by defining what economic sanctions are, or are not. Following the lead of
Morgan, Bapat, and Krustev (2009, 95), an economic sanction in this research is defined as any
action taken by a state to limit or end some part of its economic relations with a target country in
an effort to change the behavior of the target country in line with what the sender country wants.
Thus, the key elements of an economic sanction are the presence of one or more senders and one
target; the aim of the sanctions is to change the policies of the target; and the actions taken by the
sender involve policies that affect economic relations between the sender and the target. Policies
such as tariffs, export controls, embargoes, import bans, travel bans, asset freezes, cuts in
humanitarian aid, and economic blockades are all forms of economic sanctions.
However, while policies like import tariffs and export controls are also part of ordinary
international economic policies, they are regarded as part of economic sanctions if they are
aimed at changing the policies of a target country. For example, President Jimmy Carter’s ban on
grain sales to the Soviet Union following its invasion of Afghanistan can be considered an
economic sanction because it involved a political aim of changing the Soviet policy. On the other
hand, tariff and export control policies made for domestic political or economic reasons such as
helping domestic manufacturers or fulfilling domestic demand for certain foreign products are
not considered economic sanctions.
Generally, literature on sanctions revolves around several big themes. First, scholars
examine the initiation of economic sanctions. In this theme, scholars investigate why an
economic sanction is used as a foreign policy instrument against a particular country (Cox and
Drury 2006; Drezner 1999; Drury 2000, 2001; Drury, James, and Peksen 2014; Drury 2005;
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Fisk 2000; Hufbauer et al. 2007; Lektzian and Souva 2007; Lenway 1988; Lektzian and Souva
2003). Because sanctions are one of the three main foreign policy instruments 14 aimed at
changing the behavior of target states, scholars generally found that use of sanctions is related to
the response of the target states to the demand of the senders. For example, Drezner (1999);
Drury (2000; 2001; 2005); Lektzian and Souva (2007) all suggest that sanctions are more likely
to be initiated when the senders resisted the demands of the senders, which eventually leads to
higher tension in the extant political conflicts. In addition, scholars also found the impact of
regime type on the sanction initiation. However, they part company on the likelihood of sanction
use in conflicts between democracies. While Drury, James and Peksen (2014) found that the
likelihood of sanctions increases in conflicts between democracies, Letkzian and Souva (2003;
2007) found otherwise.
The second theme of scholarly works on sanctions investigates variation in the duration
of economic sanctions. The representative works in this area include Bolks and Al-Sowayel
(2000); Lektzian and Souva (2001); McGillivray and Stam (2004); Hatipoglu (2014) and Allen
(2005). Most of these works focus on the effect of domestic political institutions on the duration
of economic sanctions. For instance, Lektzian and Souva (2001); Bolks and Al-Sowayel (2000)
and Allen (2005) all agree that sanctions imposed on democratic targets tend to be shorter than
those imposed on non-democratic targets. This is because the policy-making process with
democratic targets is more constraining, thus impeding the target’s leaders from developing
countermeasure policies. For this reason, the democratic targets are more likely to yield, and this
will end the sanction immediately (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000). However, scholars are at odds
with each other on the effect of leadership change in the sender states. According to Allen
14

The other two are diplomacy and military force. See Baldwin (1985)
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(2005), a change of leadership in the sender states can shorten the duration of sanction because
the sender will concede quickly. However, for McGillivray and Stam (2004), leadership change
can only affect the duration of sanction if it occurs in non-democratic states. Thus, regime type is
more consequential than the status of the country (sender or target) in moderating the effect of
leadership change on the duration of economic sanctions.
The third theme in studies on sanctions concern the effectiveness of sanctions (e.g.,
Baldwin 1985; Dashti-Gibson, Davis, and Radcliff 1997; Doxey 1980; Lenway 1988;
McGillivray and Stam 2004; Rogers 1996; Allen 2008a; Bapat et al. 2013; Eland 1995; Hufbauer
et al. 2007; Martin 1992; McLean and Whang 2010; Morgan and Schwebach 1995; Olson 1979).
This is the theme on which most debates on economic sanctions revolve. Some findings are that
sanctions selectively target against the ruling elite (Eland 1995; Huffbauer, Schoot, and Elliot
1990; Morgan and Schwebach 1995), sanctions that impose higher costs (Bapat et al. 2013;
Doxey 1980), sanctions conducted covertly (Olson 1979), and sanctions supported multilaterally
(Martin 1992; Allen 2008; Bapat et al. 2013; McLean and Whang 2010) are more likely to be
effective. Yet some other scholars indicate that the effect of these variables on the success of
sanctions may depend on some other condition. For example, Lektzian and Souva (2007) found
that the effect of the cost of a sanction on the success of a sanction is conditional to the target
regime. For democratic targets, the cost of sanctions can effectively force the target to change its
policy and, thus, can lead to the success of the sanction policy. But this may not apply to
autocratic regimes. Despite a wealth of findings on the success of sanctions, other scholars
question the effectiveness of sanctions as the foreign policy instrument. To them, sanctions
rarely, if ever, work as intended (Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Pape 1997, 1998; Peksen 2009;
Preeg 1999).
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Notwithstanding the abundance of literature on economic sanctions, few of them focus on
the US economic sanction policy. For those examining the US sanction policy, most focus on the
debates regarding the effectiveness of sanctions. However, some scholars have begun to study
adoption, including an investigation of the role played by Congress in taking up a particular
sanction. Considering Congress and sanction adoption, scholars are generally divided. Martin
(1992) and Huffbauer and his co-authors (Huffbauer et al. 2009; Huffbauer and Oegg 2003;
Huffbauer, Schoot, and Elliot 1990), for example, suggest that Congress has been the main driver
of sanction policies since the 1970s. They note that the trend has been increasing, especially
since the end of the Cold War when US foreign policy shifted focus from East-West tensions to
intrastate wars and ethnic conflicts in the developing world. The activities of some ethnic
constituencies and human-rights interest groups who lobby Congress, arguably, have led the
legislature to be more assertive in advancing economic sanctions as a foreign policy instrument
to shape other countries’ policies, especially regarding human right’s practices (Martin 1992;
Huffbauer and Oegg 2003). Economic sanctions against the nation of Cuba is one examples of
how congressional frustration with the perceived lack of executive leadership led the legislature
to take a more active role in prolonging sanctions in the 1990s (Fisk 2000).
However, other scholars have considerable reservations about the importance and
influence of Congress on sanction policy. Despite their different takes on the role of domestic
politics in shaping sanction policy, Drury (2000; 2001; 2005) and Whang (2011), for example,
suggest that presidents are the main driver of economic sanctions. Both authors tend to dismiss
the congressional effects in their models and consider the president’s approval rating as the main
domestic political explanation for sanction decisions. Whang (2011) clearly argues that Congress
plays a relatively weak role in foreign policy making for two reasons. First, it is the president
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rather than Congress who is generally perceived by the public as being accountable for foreign
policy making. This framing gives the sense of ownership to a president for a specific foreign
policy agenda. In short, foreign policy is widely regarded as the realm of the executive branch.
Second, Congress is disadvantaged institutionally in foreign policy making because these
policies require fast decision-making and considerable bargaining capabilities. Burdened with
large numbers of members, one cannot expect a quickly adapting decision-making process in
Congress. For these reasons, Wang argues we cannot expect Congress to play a significant role
in foreign policymaking, not the least of which is economic sanctions.
In a seeming contradiction to both Drury and Whang and despite his balanced analysis
about the role of Congress in sanction policy, Hatipoglu (2014) argues that Congress often takes
the lead in crafting US foreign policy and the broader US foreign agenda. As a crafter of US
foreign policy, Congress often challenges the president, and Hatipoglu uses the creation of
economic sanctions legislation as an example of legislative involvement. He notes that by putting
sanctions into law, Congress ties the hand of the president and makes it difficult for the chief
executive to lift the sanction. This is exemplified by the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 and the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act that Senator Chris Dodd (D-CT) argued restricts
the flexibility of the president to deal with Cuba even when political change might happen there.
Empirically legislated sanctions are statutory, and the repeal process involves writing a new law,
which is inherently more complicated than simply issuing an executive order. Executive
sanctions put in place unilaterally by the president can be undone by the same or next president
at any time, assuming they are holding the chief executive office. We also know, empirically
legislated sanctions, on average, last longer than presidential sanctions (Hatipoglu 2014).
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Hatipoglu’s (2014, 432) research on the comparative duration of economic sanctions
found the probability that presidential sanctions end after one year is 20 percent and the
probability of legislated sanctions ending after the first year is only 10 percent. Although the
ratio in the probability of sanction termination between the two kinds of sanctions narrows over
time, the difference is still wide. After five years, the probability that legislated sanctions remain
in place is around 70 percent, while the chances a presidential sanction will remain in place are
about 40 percent.
While Hatipoglu’s research provides a strong foundation for my research, the current
inquiry is different in two important aspects. First, Hatipoglu’s focus was the comparative length
or duration of economic sanctions imposed by Congress, the president, and international
organizations. Second, although he provides a theoretical basis for his expectation that
congressional sanctions will last longer and also provides descriptive analysis that confirms his
suspicions, he did not test any causal arguments. For instance, he discussed the impact of
pressure groups on congressional sanctions but did not provide an empirical test of their
influence versus other possible explanations. In the current research the focus is not on the
comparative lengths of sanctions initiated by different actors. Instead I focus, specifically, on
variation in the duration of statutory sanctions or sanctions approved by Congress. There is a
considerable amount of variation in the length of legislatively authorized sanctions to explain, as
noted above. This research uncovers explanations for variation in the length of sanctions
imposed by the legislative branch in the United States.
By exploring congressional sanctions through careful empirical testing, I focused more
directly on the dynamic nature of congressional-presidential relations while also testing
institutional dynamics within Congress itself as possible alternative explanations for sanction
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duration. Most specifically, the current research attempted to learn whether congressional party
system polarization might be a primary causal mechanism for explaining variation in the
duration of legislatively approved economic sanctions. In the following section, I briefly
elaborate on the proposed arguments linking congressional polarization, presidential support, and
variation in the duration of legislated sanctions.
Effect Polarization and Presidential Support in Congress on Economic Sanctions
As noted earlier, this research is focused on legislated economic sanctions or sanctions
enacted by law. While most legislated sanctions give the president some authority to impose,
waive, or even terminate sanctions, the termination process is not as simple as the termination of
sanctions based on an executive order. Because legislated sanctions are statutory, they require
inter-branch agreement for their termination. These sanctions simply cannot be amended or
repealed without congressional approval. However, even if the president is granted authority to
terminate a sanction in originating legislation, it is always the case that the president must report
to Congress to justify the termination and issue a presidential determination after consulting
Congress.15 Thus, all pathways to terminating a legislated sanction involve Congress in one way
or another. Yet the degree of congressional involvement may vary from one sanction to the next.
Because of congressional involvement in terminating a legislated sanction, congressional
dynamics and the pattern of the President-Congress relations ought to affect the termination
process. Among the most notable congressional dynamics that might shape the termination of a
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As an analyst of Council on Foreign Relations puts it, “fundamentally, the embargo is law, and without
Congress’s backing, the heart of U.S. economic sanctions will remain in place” (quoted in Schroeder 2014). For the
process of terminating legislated sanctions, see for example, Rennack (2016); Rennack and Sullivan (2017);
Rennack (2000).
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sanction is party system polarization in the legislature and the level of support a president has in
Congress (Martin 2000).
Party polarization in this research is defined as the ideological gap between the two major
parties in Congress manifest in their different policy preferences and measured by their disparate
voting behaviors.16 To explain the relationship between legislative polarization and the duration
of economic sanction, I resorted to the moderate polarization thesis developed by Dodd and
Schraufnagel (2009, 2012, 2017). The moderate polarization thesis argues that Congress can
maximize its legislative productivity when it is moderately polarized. While high polarization
can prevent inter-party efforts to reach a policy consensus, very low polarization can also be
problematic because it hinders the internal consolidation of parties, thus making it more difficult
for the majority party to push a policy agenda forward. Applied to the case of legislated
sanctions, I argue that both low and high degrees of party polarization can complicate the process
of ending a sanction because 1) the lack of intraparty support can discourage majority party
leaders from proposing a sanction termination scheme and 2) high inter-party differences can
prevent legislators from reaching a consensus to end a sanction in a legislative process, which
requires supermajority in the form of cloture in the Senate and a veto over-ride in both chambers.
To use the moderate polarization thesis, which has received empirical support, one must
assume that ending a sanction is analogous to passing new laws, which is a fairly safe
assumption given that lifting a Congress-imposed sanction is normally done using the same exact
process as other law-making efforts. That is, because sanction termination will often require a
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Political polarization or party polarization is one of the most frequent terms used in the study of contemporary
American politics. Despite its frequent use, scholars rarely define it formally. Most definition or discussion on the
term refers to statistical facts that both voters and elites have different positions along the left-right or liberalconservative ideological spectrum. See for example, Fiorina and Abrams (2008); Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz
(2006); McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006); Theriault (2006; 2008) among others.
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new law or at least an amendment to some law that is contemporaneously being considered by
the bicameral legislative process in the US, the decision to terminate a sanction is perfectly
analogous to a new law or statutory policy change. Overall, sanction termination very nicely fits
the logic used to elaborate or explain legislative productivity put forth in Dodd and Schraufnagel
(2009; 2012; 2017). What I offer is another test of their thesis.
When party polarization is low―characterized by high intraparty differences along with
high inter-party similarities, an inter-party coalition is the norm. However, too great an intraparty
difference might pose a problem because “political parties can have limited capacity to structure
policy conflict and push alternative policy agendas forward” (Dodd and Schraufnagel 2017, 20809). Although it is easier for legislators to find supporters in the opposition party, low intraparty
cohesion complicates coalition building and the formulation of a party’s policy position. Only
when intraparty cohesion increases to some moderate level can the capacity to build larger
coalitions be realized in a legislative environment defined by enduringly high inter-party
similarity. Now cross-party cooperation can manifest to address the majority’s agenda, born of a
reasonable level of intraparty cohesion. This amalgam of moderate conflict ought to ensure the
larger majorities to pass a bill or end a sanction required in a super-majoritarian legislature.
However, when polarization increases beyond some median level indicated by everincreasing inter-party differences along with intra-party cohesiveness, cross-party coalition
building becomes more difficult. Under this situation it would, theoretically, be difficult to end a
sanction because the super-majoritarian requirements of Senate cloture and overriding a
presidential veto (Krehbiel 1993; 1998) create the need for larger bipartisan coalitions to pass a
bill or end a sanction. This is especially true when the majority party size is limited in either
chamber (Binder 1999; Jones 2001). Cross-party coalitions are necessary so that when
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polarization is high in one or the other chamber, the types of super-majoritarian support required
will prevent the passage of a bill to end a sanction.
To use the moderate polarization thesis to explain gridlock requires one to assume that
the political parties will have different positions on whether a sanction should be terminated or
not. For example, the Democratic Party may be more concerned about the issue of human rights.
From 1945 to 2005, Congress imposed eleven different sanctions based on human rights
concerns. Of these eleven sanctions, nine were imposed when both chambers were controlled by
Democrats. Six of these sanctions were lifted when Republicans controlled at least the House of
Representative.17 This suggests the two parties may have different preferences regarding these
sorts of sanctions. While Democrats supported sanctions to correct the target’s human rights
practices, Republicans tended to oppose it.18
However, although Democrats may take a harder line on the issue of human rights
abuses, this does not suggest that Democrats are necessarily avid supporters of durable economic
sanctions. Depending on the issue, Republicans can be the proponent of the tougher sanctions.
For example, Republicans were strong critics of President Obama’s proposal for the restoration
of diplomatic relations with Cuba. When the Obama Administration announced this plan, several
Republican senators, including Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Marco Rubio (R-FL), criticized the plan
(Bordelon 2014; Siddiqui 2015). The Republican opposition was rooted not only in its dislike of
the Castro regime and Communism but also in the constituency pressure put on it (Fisk 2000;
Hatipoglu 2014). While the Democrats also disapproved of the Castro regime, their concern
about human rights issues associated with long-standing sanctions led them to support the
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The calculation is based on Threats and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data.
It is interesting to note that during the relatively low polarization of Congress in the 1970s, both Democrats and
Republicans cooperated to impose sanctions based on human rights abuses (see Martin 1992, 102-110).
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Obama plan. In all, there is considerable anecdotal evidence to suggest major differences in party
preference on the issue of sanctions, enough difference to gain utility from the use of the
moderate polarization thesis.
Given the previous discussion on the value of the moderate polarization thesis, I proposed
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: There is non-linear relationship between party polarization and the
duration of legislated sanction. If polarization stays low, a slight increase in polarization
can help legislators to collaborate to end the sanction and the duration of legislated
sanction is expected to be shorter. However, when polarization is high, a slight increase
in polarization can lead legislated sanctions to last longer.
Additionally, much research suggests the president and Congress are often at odds with
each other on the topic of economic sanctions (Tama 2015; 2016). Not only is it possible for the
president and Congress to disagree over the duration of a sanction, they often diverge on the
punitive level of a given economic restriction. As Tama (2015) observed, presidents, on average,
want shorter and less punitive sanctions, while Congress wants longer and more corrective
sanctions. The differences in their preferences may originate from the different institutional roles
they play. Because presidents are held accountable for foreign policy, the general welfare, and
national security, they tend to think of an economic sanction in terms of the broader national
interest. This sometimes requires more flexible diplomatic options in international relations. In
contrast, legislators are less likely to be held accountable for foreign policy outcomes. Instead
they are assessed by their constituents based on their policy positions (whether they support the
policies espoused by their constituents). Therefore, legislators tend to support policies favored by
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their constituents or pressure groups and, historically, exhibit less concern for national
interests.19
The potential for the president and Congress to have different preferences can lead to
conflict between the two branches of government in the US. Importantly, considering the subset
of sanctions this research is focused on, in order for the president to be able to shorten or end a
sanction, he will need support from members of Congress. Because support for the president is
more likely to come from the president’s co-partisans in Congress, a greater number of the
president’s co-partisans in the legislature is likely to affect the duration of sanctions. This leads
to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The duration of a legislated sanction is more likely to be shorter when
there is a larger number of members from the president’s party in the two legislative
chambers.
Importantly, because of differences in their institutional features, I expected the effect of
these two variables―polarization and presidential co-partisan in Congress―on the duration of
legislated sanctions to be different across chambers. Because of its higher-profile and direct
institutional role in foreign policy making, the effects of the Senate dynamic on the duration of
legislated sanctions should be stronger than House dynamics. The Senate plays a more important
role in foreign policy making because it has advice and consent authority over treaties and its
approval is essential for the officers in the foreign services nominated by the president. But
moreover, it is the filibuster rule that makes the Upper Chamber more relevant. This rule allows
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Many studies document cases on how pressure groups exert their influence on members of Congress regarding
legislated sanctions. See, for example, Fayazmanesh (2003) on US sanctions against Iran, Fisk (2000); and Haney
and Vanderbush (1999) on US sanctions on Cuba, among others.
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any senator to hold the floor as long as he or she wishes unless cloture is invoked, which requires
a supermajority of sixty votes (Sinclair 2006, 186). The filibuster rule necessitates the
supermajority support in the Senate for policy change, which, in turn, makes Senate polarization
and partisan support for the president more consequential.
In addition, the Senate’s amending rules enable senators to offer any and as many
amendments as they please to almost any bill, and those amendments need not be germane
(Sinclair 2017). The legislated sanction is one of many examples of this issue-linkage strategy
used by senators to advance their policy preferences. For example, in early 1970s, Senator
Edward Kennedy (D-MA) introduced an amendment to Section 32 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 that called on the president to deny aid to countries that violated human rights. Knowing
that the Senate has legislative responsibilities in the policy areas of foreign relations and foreign
aid authorization bills, Senator Kennedy seized the opportunity to raise the human right issues
pervasive in the developing world, especially in post-coup Chile in 1973. Although this
amendment stated only “the sense of the Congress” and thus was not binding for the executive, it
prompted a series of laws tightening American economic assistance to developing countries. It is
the addition of Section 116 to the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975
by Congress that formally tied economic as well as military aid to human-rights concerns.
Removing the non-coercive “sense of the Congress” language, the section clearly prohibited
development aid to particular classes of government (Martin 1992, 103).
Finally, the Senate foreign relations jurisdiction also extends to international financial
institutions.20 Again, this provides ample opportunity for the Senate to affect economic sanction

20

In the House, this jurisdiction has been given to the Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee, see
(McCormick 1993).
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policy by linking the sanction to the operation of financial institutions. This is exemplified by the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 championed by then-chair of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helm (R-NC). Not only did this sanction legislation impose
trade and foreign aid restriction on Cuba, it also banned financial support from international
financial institutions such as the World Bank (Fisk 2000; Rennack and Sullivan 2017).
Furthermore, legislated sanctions also affect private financial institutions. For example, the
Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) had to pay a fine of US$ 100 million in 2004 for breaching
US sanctions by sending funds to Cuba, Iran, Libya, and Yugoslavia. One year later, the
Algemene Bank Nederland-Amsterdamsche en Rotterdamsche (ABN-AMRO) bank also was
fined US$ 80 million for violating Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions when the
New York and Chicago branches of the bank cleared checks and processed wire transfers that
involved Iranian and Libyan parties (Meltzer and Ross 2013; Norton Rose Fulbright 2009).
All this suggests a broader influence for the Senate in designing and promulgating
economic sanction policy. The allowance of issue-linkage strategies in its amendment rules and
the broader jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (the Senate committee
responsible for foreign aid and economic sanctions against foreign nations) make the Senate
influence in economic sanctions more obvious and significant, and this is why I expected the
Senate dynamics to have greater influence on the duration of economic sanctions.
Research Design
Because the research investigated the relationship between party polarization and the
duration of economic sanction, the dependent variable used in this research was the observed
length in months since the economic sanction went into effect until it was lifted. The data came
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from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanction (TIES) Data version 4.0 (Morgan, Bapat,
and Kobayashi 2014). The data consisted of 739 cases of economic sanctions imposed by the US
from 1945 to 2013. Figure 1 shows the distribution of these cases. As shown in the Venn
diagram, of the 739 cases of economic sanctions imposed, there were only 428 cases in which
the imposing agency or branch of government could be clearly identified. Congress was regarded
as imposing the sanction if it adopted a resolution or passed a law regarding the sanction
(Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014). Most legislative-imposed sanctions were decided solely
by Congress (35 cases or 8%), yet another 29 cases (7%) were jointly imposed by Congress and
the bureaucracy. Thirteen cases (3%) were imposed jointly by Congress and the White House,
and only six cases, or one percent, were jointly imposed by Congress, the bureaucracy, and the
White House. So of the 428 cases, only 83 cases (35 + 29 + 13 + 6), or 19 percent, involved
Congress directly.
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Figure 3-1. U.S-imposed economic sanctions based on the imposing actors.

As noted, one of my two primary predictor variables is an indicator of the level of party
polarization. There are two measures commonly used by scholars to account for polarization.
First, is the difference in party means of DW-NOMINATE scores and the second is Party Unity
Scores (Ornstein et al. 2017; Poole and Rosenthal 2007). The data on DW-NOMINATE and
Party Unity Votes are available at Poole and Rosenthal’s voteview webpage. The difference of
party DW-NOMINATE means is simply the absolute difference between the average Republican
DW-NOMINATE score and the average Democratic DW-NOMINATE score on the liberalconservative dimension. This calculation was completed for each biennial Congress to obtain
Congress-specific values. Party Unity Scores were measured as the percentage of all roll-call
votes in a specific Congress in which at least 50 percent of the Democratic Party caucus voted in
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opposition to at least 50 percent of the Republican conference (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). Both
measures of polarization were calculated using each Congress as the unit of analysis and
chamber specific values were readily obtained.
It is important to recognize that the two measures, just discussed, actually accounted for
different patterns in party polarization. While the absolute value of the difference in the party
mean DW-NOMINATE scores are, generally, thought to measure the ideological distance
between the two parties, Party Unity Scores measure the internal cohesion of each of the parties
in addition to their divergence from each other. 21 To comprehensively measure polarization in
both chambers, we can actually combine these measures so the new measure of polarization can
capture both the ideological difference between both parties and their internal cohesion.
Polarization can be very extreme if the two parties are not only ideologically distant from each
other but also internally cohesive. Thus, I created a chamber polarization measure as: 22
𝐶ℎ. 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟 = 𝑎𝑏𝑠 μ(

.

)

𝑥 𝑃𝑈𝑆(

)

− μ(

.

)

𝑥 𝑃𝑈𝑆(

)

Where μ refers to the party’s mean of DW-NOMINATE score on the first dimension (liberalconservative scale) and PUS are Party Unity Scores of the party that measure its internal
cohesion level.
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The difference between the two measures is evident in the modest correlation between party difference in DWNOMINATE averages in the Senate and the Senate Party Unity Scores (r = .29; n = 69). There is a somewhat
stronger correlation between party difference in DW-NOMINATE means in the House and the House Party Unity
Scores (r = .46; n = 69). The correlations are based on DW-NOMINATE and Party Unity Scores from the 79 th to
113th Congresses.
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Because both DW-NOMINATE and Party Unity Scores are computed based on all the votes within a
congressional session, we cannot see the level of polarization or party cohesion until the session ends. Therefore, to
compute the effect of congressional polarization on the duration of sanction for each time span (one year) in my
time-varying covariate models, I used one-year lag values of both DW-NOMINATE and Party Unity Scores. See,
for example, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) for a discussion of the data structure of time-varying covariate
duration models and Poole’s voteview homepage (Poole and Rosenthal 2015) for the calculation of DWNOMINATE and Party Unity Scores.
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Next, to capture congressional support for the president, a unique measure was
constructed that was a slight variation of the legislative potential for policy change (LPPC) score
developed by Brady et al. (1979). I adjusted the score by substituting the president’s party and
the opposition party for the majority and the minority party (Howell and Pevehouse 2007a), thus
the indicator was calculated as
𝐶ℎ. 𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐶 = (%𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) 𝑥 𝑃𝑈𝑆

_

− (%𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) 𝑥 𝑃𝑈𝑆

_

The measure tells us that if the president’s party is large and unified and is confronting a small
and fragmented opposition, the president should be empowered and, in this case, be able to
terminate a sanction quickly if he chooses to do so.
To avoid spurious associations, I also included several standard control variables that
others have found can affect the duration of an economic sanction. First, some works suggest
that democratic dyads are less likely to sanction each other (Cox and Drury 2006; Lektzian and
Souva 2003) and that when they impose sanctions, these sanctions will likely be shorter (Bolks
and Al-Sowayel 2000) and trade relations will return to pre-sanction levels faster than nondemocracies (Lektzian and Souva 2001). To control for this regime effect, I assumed that the US
is a democracy for the entire time period of the study and included a dummy variable that
considered the regime type of the target nation. When the target’s POLITY IV score was 6 or
higher, I coded the target as a democracy and assigned the value of 1, indicating that the case is a
democratic dyad. With other cases when the target was considered a non-democracy, this
variable was assigned the value of “0.” The data on POLITY IV measure were obtained from the
Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016).
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Second, as Olson (1979) argues, the sender is more likely to impose an economic
sanction on weaker countries because a sanction policy is more effective when there is a larger
difference in the relative military and economic power between the sender and target state. This
argument is supported by Huffbauer and Schoot (1983), who also found that sanctions imposed
on a weaker target are more effective in forcing the target to capitulate. To control for the US
tendency to select weaker targets, I also included the variable of target Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) as a measure of the target’s economic size. 23 My test was not perfectly analogous, but
nonetheless it seemed reasonable to test whether the size of the target nation GDP has an effect
on sanction duration. The expectation was that the larger the target GDP, the longer the sanctions
would last because they would not give in as quickly. The data on GDP were obtained from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank 2017).
The third control variable included was the total of trade volume between the US and the
target state. This variable accounts for the possibility that Congress will be more likely to impose
sanctions on countries with which the US has a more significant trade relationship (Drury 2005;
Hufbauer and Schott 1983). Because a robust trading partner is particularly vulnerable to
sanctions, it may be more likely to yield when it becomes the target of a sanction. To control for
this, I included a variable that tapped the trade volume between the US and the target nation and
expected that the larger the trade volume the quicker one of the parties would yield and thus the
shorter the duration of an economic sanction.

23

Although some scholars prefer using the target’s GDP per capita as a measure of target’s economic power (Drury
2005), I hold that GDP alone is better because it measures the size of an economy, thus more appropriately
reflecting the country’s economic performance and power in the global economy. GDP per capita better measures
the prosperity of a country’s society. Importantly, the choice of measurement strategy here does not change overall
model results in a significant manner. For a discussion of the correct measure of GDP to use in different
circumstances see Krugman and Wells (2013, 201).
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Fourth, some research has also found that when two close allies sanction each other, the
duration of the sanction tends to be shorter (Dresner 1999; Hatipoglu 2014). This is because the
two allies expect minimal conflict in the future. When the chance of future conflict is reduced,
the target state is more likely to capitulate to the sender’s demand (Dresner 1999). To control for
the effect of an alliance on the duration of an economic sanction, I included a variable scored 1 if
the target was a US ally and the value of 0 otherwise. The data were obtained from the Alliance
Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) version 3.0 (Leeds et al. 2002). I expected a negative
association between alliance status and the duration of an economic sanction imposed by the US.
Fifth, the cost incurred by the target will strongly affect the likelihood of a target’s
capitulation to the demand of the sender. When the cost is high, the target is more likely to
succumb to the sender’s demand, thus shortening the duration of a sanction. Conversely, when
the cost is low, the target will be resilient and stand up to the demands of the sender and this will
prolong the sanction (Hufbauer and Schott 1983). To control for this cost effect, I incorporated
another dichotomous variable scored 1 if there is a major cost incurred by the target and the
value of 0 if there is not. The definition of a major cost was determined by the TIES data set
(Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi 2014). I expected a negative association between this variable
and the duration of an economic sanction.
Sixth, interstate interactions are often shaped by the type of issues a dyad is facing or
dealing with (Gibler 2007; Hensel 1996). Presumably, different issues will affect the duration of
an economic sanction (Hatipoglu, 2014). Generally, conflicts involving security-related issues
are more contentious and difficult to settle. As Hatipoglu (2014, 437) speculated, targets less
easily succumb to the demands of the sender on issues related to their political influence.
Therefore, when a sanction is imposed on a target state on the matters of high politics, the
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duration of the sanction is longer. The data were, again, obtained from the TIES data set
(Morgan, Bapat, and Kobayashi, 2014). The variable of a high political issue was also coded
dichotomously with 1 assigned to high political issues defined as those related to political
influence, military behavior, regime destabilization, territorial disputes, strategic materials,
alliance politics and weapons of mass destruction. I assigned the value of 0 to issues other than
these.
Seventh, I included the US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in the year under
consideration, as this growth indicator should account for the influence of the US economic
health on sanction duration. Because economic sanctions cost the US economy as well, the
health of the American economy should be considered by legislators in deciding to end or keep a
sanction in place. When the US economy performs well, as indicated by higher GDP growth, the
politicians might not care as much about the cost of the sanction to the US economy. Thus, they
will let the sanction stay in place. In contrast, when the economy is in trouble, politicians might
think of loosening or lifting the sanction in the hope of lessening the economic burden the
sanction entails. Thus, I expected a positive association between the US economic growth and
the duration of economic sanctions. The data on the U.S economic growth were obtained from
the National Income and Product Accounts Tables (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2018b).
Eighth, because the aim of the sanction is to change the policy or the behavior of a
country, the sanction should be terminated when the target country acquiesces. Thus, the
duration of a sanction will be affected by whether a target country capitulates to the demands of
the sender. Sanctions will last longer if the target resists the sender’s demands. When the target
fulfills the sender’s demands, the sanction will be terminated. The TIES data set has a variable
called Final Outcome that lists several possible outcomes of the sanction. I recoded this variable
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and assigned the value of 1 when the target acquiesced to the sender and the value of 0
otherwise.
Ninth, to account for other congressional dynamics, I also included a variable divided
government that was dichotomously coded. The value of 1 indicates that the opposition controls
one of the chambers of Congress and the value of 0 otherwise. When the opposition controls
either chamber of Congress, the president will be challenged, and his decision to end a sanction
is expected to be more difficult to implement. Finally, to capture the effect of presidential
activism in their early periods in the office, I also included a variable to capture the presidential
honeymoon period. This is the period when the president is usually treated well by members of
Congress that eventually enables the president to make major policy changes. The variable was
also coded dichotomously. I designated a value of 1 to the first Congress in the presidential term
in office and a value of 0 to any subsequent term. This variable helped control for the possibility
the president might loosen a sanction imposed in a previous presidential administration.

Model

Because the dependent variable is the observed length of sanction duration imposed by
the US Congress, an event history analysis or duration model is the most appropriate technique
to use. As Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) argue, the event history analysis is used when
“the dependent variable measures the duration of time that units spend in a state before
experiencing some event” (2004, 1). Thus, whenever a researcher is interested in modeling the
relationship between the length of the observed duration and the covariates of theoretical interest,
an event history model is the best choice. Although the nature of the continuous measure of the
dependent variable enables it to be modelled using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) technique,
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the use of OLS is very limited due to two distinctive features of the duration data: 1) the strictly
positive metric of the dependent variable (because negative or zero length makes no sense) and
2) the possibility some observations are right-censored, that is the condition of a unit does not
change even at the time the observation period ends. While the former makes OLS returns
negative predicted values due to non-normal error, the latter poses selection issues to the OLS
estimates and renders these estimates biased and unreliable (Beck 1998, 193).
Because my main interest in this research was to explain variation in the duration of
economic sanctions imposed by the US Congress and whether congressional polarization
contributed to this variation, I explicitly inferred the duration dependency of the model. For this
reason, parametric models estimated using maximum likelihood methods were most appropriate.
The main challenge in the use of maximum likelihood method, however, was the need to specify
the distribution of the dependent variable along with its expected value and variance given the
covariates (Beck 1998). In the context of an event history analysis, it was necessary to specify
the baseline distribution of the hazard function, which is the probability that the event occurs at
time t independent of any factors or covariates. Failure to correctly specify this distribution
would bias the estimates.24

24

One can also use a semi-parametric Cox model using partial likelihood estimation that does not require
specification of the distribution of the baseline hazard if one is simply interested in the relationship between the
covariates and the hazard rate. Yet the main drawback of the Cox model is that it is very limited in the sense that it
cannot be extrapolated beyond the last observed failure time in the data set; thus, it cannot be used for making
predictions and generalizations in other settings (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 89). Secondly, due to its
relaxation of the functional form of the baseline hazard, it cannot be used to test the dynamic of duration in the sense
that longer sanctions tend to bolster the target to increasingly resist the sender and, thus, further lengthen the
sanction. In the jargon of the event history model, Cox does not allow us to test whether the event of interest
indicates a positive or negative dependence duration. Third, while specifying the distributional form of the baseline
hazard function is challenging, models with correct distributional form are more efficient than the semi-parametric
Cox model. Because we can test the appropriateness of the distributional form of the baseline hazard, distributional
specification is not a challenge anymore. Furthermore, the Cox model is based on the restrictive proportional hazard
assumption due to the relaxation of the distributional assumption of a time-variant but unit-invariant baseline hazard
and the unit-specific but time-invariant component. Failure to meet this proportional hazard assumption biases the
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To select the best model from a range of parametric models, I used the Akaike
Information Criteria (AIC) as suggested by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) computed as
𝐴𝐼𝐶 = −2(𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿) + 2(𝑐 + 𝑝 + 1), where c is the number of covariates in the model and p
denotes the number of structural parameters in the model. From these criteria, I found that the
Weibull parametric model is the best one because most of the Weibull models I specified have
the lowest AICs. Preliminary graphical analysis also suggests that Weibull is an excellent
choice.25
In the Weibull model, the hazard is specified as ℎ(𝑡) = λ𝑝(λ𝑡)

, where 𝑡 > 0, λ >

0, 𝑝 > 0. If 𝑝 > 1, the hazard rate is monotonically increasing with time; when 𝑝 < 1, the
hazard rate is monotonically decreasing with time; when 𝑝 = 1, the hazard is flat, taking a
constant value λ; thus, the model reduces to the exponential one. 26 The survivor function for the
Weibull can be computed as 𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑒

(

)

. For the substantive interpretation, we can compute

changes in the mean of survival time when the predictors of interest (polarization and partisan
support) change from some values to others (e.g., from 25 th percentile to 75th percentile). The

estimate. Statistical diagnostics conducted to test this assumption show that the assumption is not met by the data.
Although one can specify a non-proportional hazard model by including the interaction term between the covariates
and analysis time (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001), specifying the non-proportional hazard Cox model will fail to
converge. Diagnostic tests using residual analysis also show the parametric model, especially using a log-logistic
distribution or Weibull, is better than the Cox model.
25
Graphical analyses suggest that log-logistic and Weibull are the best candidates. However, the martingale-like
residual analyses show that the relationship between polarization and sanction duration indicate nonlinear
relationships. Although one can fit log-logistic models to the data, log-logistic models are problematic because they
fail to identify the appropriate model specification. I turned to the Weibull models because it helped me identify the
model specification. When the non-linear Weibull are used, the residual analysis using martingale-like residuals
return results that suggest the specifications are correct. Yet because the hazards of polarization are not proportional,
I used non-proportional hazard Weibull models by including the interactions between covariates and the 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒).
26
In fact, the exponential distribution is a special case of the Weibull distribution.
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expected mean of survival time can be computed as 𝐸(𝑇) =

, where λ = 𝑒

( 𝑿)

and Γ is

the gamma function.27
Finally, because some cases of economic sanctions are decided during the same
congressional session, I expected these cases would be exposed to the same risks. To correct for
the standard errors due to non-independent cases within the same congressional session, I
clustered all the cases within each congressional session.

Results and Discussion
Summarizing the duration of economic sanctions from 1950 to 2013, 28 the estimate
shows a 25 percent chance the sanctions will terminate within 31 years, 50 percent chance the
sanctions will terminate in 44 years, and 75 percent chance that they will terminate in 49 years. 29
Figure 3-2 shows the Kaplan-Meier survivor function between the two subgroups in the variable
of chamber polarization. These variables are standardized and re-categorized into two subgroups
in which the scores above the mean (𝑥 > μ) indicate high polarization, while the scores below or
equal to the mean (𝑥 ≤ μ) denote low polarization. As the graph reveals, the two subgroups
within each of the variables (House and Senate polarization measures) have different shapes of

27

Although some scholars reported the median survival time because the duration distribution is often skewed, I
reported the mean of survival time in this paper because the median and the mean do not differ much. However, if
one is interested, it is possible to also report the median duration for the Weibull model, computed as 𝑡(50) =
𝑙𝑜𝑔(2) .
Although the TIES data only observed the sanction instances from 1945 to 2005, 2013 is the last period of
sanction episode observed in the TIES data.
29
This is not surprising given that sanction on Cuba has endured more than fifty years. To compute the summary
statistics for the duration model in Stata see Hamilton (2013, 288).
λ

28
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survivor function. This indicates that the proportional hazard assumption was not met. Thus, I
30

needed to specify the non-proportional hazard Weibull model by including the interaction terms
of the predictors and the analysis time.
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Figure 3-2. Kaplan-Meier survival functions for low and high polarization in the House
and the Senate.
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Another way to test the proportional hazard assumption for the Weibull distribution is to run log-rank test
comparing subsets of the predictors of interest. Comparing low polarization and high polarization suggests that we
should reject the null of hypothesis of equality of survivor functions between the two subsets of polarization
categories. Furthermore, we can also check the appropriateness of the non-proportional hazard Weibull test using the
likelihood ratio tests comparing the proportional hazard and non-proportional hazard models. In this research the LR
tests returned very small p-values, suggesting that non-proportional hazard models improve accounts of the duration
dependency.
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Explaining the Impact of Party Polarization on the Duration of Sanctions
Focusing on the main results, Figure 3-3 shows the coefficient estimates of the effects of
polarization measures on the duration of economic sanctions. Specifying non-linear nonproportional hazard Weibull models using the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) parameterization
reveals that low levels of polarization can help shorten the sanction duration. 31 Yet at the
medium to high levels of polarization, the increasing level of polarization lengthens the duration
of sanction. This is demonstrated by negative coefficients of first-order polarization followed by
positive coefficients of second-order polarization. The interaction terms, which are positive
significant, between first-order polarization measure and the 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒), as shown in Appendix
A, suggest that the shortening effect of polarization on sanction duration weakens over time. This
means that the probability of sanctions termination declines as time goes on.
On the other hand, the negative significant coefficients of the interaction terms between
second-order polarization measures and the 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒), indicate that the probability of sanction
termination increases over time. This means that as time goes on, the lengthening effect of
polarization on the sanction duration declines, thus sanction termination is increasingly closer.
This is further supported by the large positive coefficients of 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝). As suggested above, a
large value of p (𝑝 > 1) indicates that the hazard rate increases monotonically with time. This
means that as time elapses, the probability of the event occurs at time t increases. Thus, the end
of the sanction becomes closer as time goes on.

31

Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) parameterization expresses the Weibull model in terms of the linear relationship
between the log of survival time, 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇), and the covariates. This allows us to directly interpret the model in terms
of expected failure time or duration time. In contrast, the proportional hazard parameterization expresses the model
in terms of linear relationship between the log of hazard rate and log of baseline hazard plus the covariates. In this
kind of parameterization, we interpret the model in terms of hazard rate.
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Figure 3-3. Coefficient estimates of the impacts of various measures of party polarization on the
duration of legislated sanctions in the House and the Senate.

Figure 3-4 shows the substantive results of the models, which is the changes in the
expected means of sanction duration when the polarization measures change from low to
medium to high levels.32 As the level of the House polarization increased from its minimum
value to its 25th percentile, the expected mean of sanction duration reduced less than one month.
However, when the House polarization increased from its 25 th percentile to its maximum value,
the expected mean of sanction duration increased to 2.3 months. For the Senate, the impact was

32

All the substantive effects are computed by holding all continuous controls to their means and dichotomous
controls to 0. The analysis time is held constant at _t = 1 (Licht 2011).

th
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stronger. Increases in the Senate polarization from its minimum to its 25 percentile were
predicted to shorten the duration of legislated sanction by less than three months. Yet when
polarization changed from its 25th percentile to its maximum, the duration of legislated sanction
was predicted to be more than five months longer.
If we decompose the measures of both the House and the Senate polarization, we can see
that the curvilinear impact of chamber polarization on the duration of sanction applies in all
components of polarization (ideological difference and party cohesion). Similarly, the impacts
were stronger in the Senate than in the House. For example, while an increase in the party DWNOMINATE mean-difference from its minimum value to its 25 th percentile in the House was
expected to reduce the duration of legislated sanction by less than one month, in the Senate, an
increase of the same rate was predicted to reduce the duration of legislated sanction by more than
three months. By the same token, an increase in the House party DW-NOMINATE mean
difference from its 25th percentile to its maximum value was predicted to increase the duration of
legislated sanction by slightly more than one month. Meanwhile, the same amount of increase in
the Senate DW-NOMINATE mean difference was predicted to increase the duration of legislated
sanctions by almost six months.
The same curvilinear trend also was observed in the indicator of party cohesion in both
chambers. Again, the impact of party cohesion on the duration of sanction was also stronger in
the Senate than in the House. This was especially true for the lengthening effect of moderate-tohigh Party Unity Scores. In the House, an increase in the Party Unity Score from its 25 th
percentile to its maximum value was expected to lengthen the duration of sanction by slightly
more than four months. In the Senate, however, an increase of the same range was predicted to
lengthen the duration of sanction by more than eight months.
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Figure 3-4. Impact of polarization on the duration of legislated sanctions.

The results support Hypothesis 1 in that as long as the polarization is still low, a slight
increase in the polarization can facilitate a cooperative effort between parties to negotiate
sanction termination. However, when polarization begins to rise, legislators of different parties
are more difficult to cooperate and negotiate the sanction termination. All three measures of
chamber polarization (combined measure of chamber polarization, parties’ ideological difference
and party cohesion) also reveal that the impact of polarization is stronger in the Senate than in
the House. While the paper does not mean to theorize the different impacts of chamber
polarization on the duration of sanction, the empirical pattern emerging in the data points to the
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importance of the Senate in the foreign policy arena. The results are generally compatible with
research showing the more influential role of the Senate in presidential foreign policy making.

Explaining Chamber Support on the Duration of Sanctions

Turning to the influence of congressional support for the president on the duration of
legislated sanction, the evidence indicates that only the Senate support significantly affects the
duration of legislated sanctions. As seen in Figure 3-5, the coefficient of Senate support is
negative significant, which implies that an increase in the potential support obtained by the
president in the Senate can help him to negotiate the termination of sanctions. The interaction
term of the Senate support and 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒) is positive and also significant, suggesting that the
shortening effect of Senate support on the duration of sanction weakens over time. As the
sanction endures, the support obtained from the Senate offers little help for the chief executive to
end the sanction.
Figure 3-6 visualizes the impact of congressional support in both chambers on the
duration of legislated sanctions. As seen in the figure, a significant reducing effect of Senate
support is substantially higher when the support increases from its minimum to the 25 th
percentile. Although further increase in Senate support helps keep the duration of the sanction
shorter, its reducing effect is relatively slow. In general, the full effect of the Senate support only
helps the president reduce the duration of a sanction by less than one month. On the contrary,
House support does not seem to help the president to negotiate the end of the sanction. An
increase in House support lengthens the sanctions. However, the increasing trend in the impact of
House support on the sanction duration observed in the data is likely to be produced by random
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errors, as indicated by the large p-value for both the main effect and the interaction term with
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒). 33
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Figure 3-5. Models of congressional support on the duration of legislated sanctions.

33

However, as seen in the Appendix B, in the House party cohesion model (using the House Party Unity Scores),
the House support seems to matter in reducing the duration of sanctions. Yet, like the Senate Polarization model, its
reducing effect also weakens over time. This might indicate that only controlling party cohesiveness in the House
can reveal the true effect of the party support in the House on the duration of economic sanctions.

106

Predicted Mean of Sanction Duration
(Months)

1.5

1

.5
0

20

40
60
Congressional Support (Percentile)
House Support

80

100

Senate Support

Figure 3-6. Impact of congressional support on the duration of legislated sanctions.

Generally, like the polarization effect, chamber support effects show that the Senate plays
a more significant role in congressional foreign policy making. Again, the institutional features
of the Senate might offer some explanation for the significant impact of the Senate dynamics on
the duration of legislated sanctions. The results are consistent with the expectation that the
Senate institutional dynamic exerts a stronger impact on the duration of legislated sanctions.
However, another interesting result revealed in the statistical analysis is the impact of
divided control between the president’s party and the opposition in each of the chambers. As
Appendix B shows, the coefficient of divided control for the House Polarization model is in line
with the expectation (positive significant). When the House is controlled by the opposition, the
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president finds it difficult to negotiate termination of the sanction; thus, the sanction will keep
going. Nonetheless, the effect of this divided control weakens over time. In the Senate, however,
the effect of the divided control runs contrary to the expectation. When the Senate is controlled
by the opposition, the duration of sanction reduces significantly. Speculatively, we can argue that
when the Senate is under the control of the opposition, the president is more likely to exploit the
opt-out provisions and capitalize on the discretion provided by the legislated sanctions. This
means that it is very likely that the president will bypass Congress when he anticipates difficulty
in the process of sanction termination. For example, rather than allowing the termination process
to be in the hands of Congress, the president can issue a presidential determination, albeit in
consultation with Congress, which can precipitate the process of sanction termination.

Conclusion
The chapter starts with a question about why some legislated sanctions take longer to
end, while others last for only a short period of time. Because the focus is on legislated sanctions,
that is the sanctions enacted by law, attention to Congress was necessary. Although the president
is often authorized to waive, suspend, or terminate the legislated sanctions, terminating legislated
sanctions involves Congress in one way or another. Due to the congressional role in the
termination process of legislated sanctions, congressional dynamics should contribute to the
terminating process. In this research I expected that chamber polarization and the members’
support lent to the president would affect the duration of legislated sanctions.
Generally, party polarization can complicate the process of sanction termination. When
parties are highly polarized, they tend to obstruct the other’s policy proposals. Thus, status quo is
likely to persist under a highly polarized Congress. Because sanction termination is another form
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of policy change, we should expect that sanction termination will be onerous if Congress is
highly polarized. Under a highly polarized Congress, the opposition will tend to reject the
presidential reports or disapprove of the presidential decision to end a sanction. However, when
polarization in Congress is very low, the sanction termination might be problematic because
intra-party competition inhibits congressional support for the presidential action.
Congressional support obtained by the White House was expected to help the termination
of sanction to occur sooner. When the president expects potential support from Congress, he is
more confident about bringing the process of sanction termination to Congress (consultation with
Congress) and termination of the sanction will be more likely to happen. However, when
congressional support is low, the consultation process will be tough, and the duration of sanction
will be longer.
The statistical analyses conducted to test the hypotheses on the congressional influence
on sanction duration returned supportive results. As expected, there was a non-linear relationship
between congressional polarization and the duration of legislated sanctions. Sanction duration is
longer when Congress is at either of the two extreme ends of the polarization continuum. The
results were robust using all variants of congressional polarization measures. The pattern also
applied across chambers. However, the effect of congressional polarization was stronger in the
Senate than in the House. The institutional features of the Senate helped explain this pattern.
Nevertheless, analysis of the effect of congressional support for the president returned
mixed results. Congressional support seemed to matter only in the Senate. As expected, a higher
level of potential support obtained by the president helped shorten the sanction duration.
Although the effect was not very large and diminished over time, the effect did not seem to be
driven by random errors. The presidential proposal to terminate the sanction was easier in the
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Senate if the president had potential support. In the House, the same pattern was revealed only
when controlling for party cohesion. When the president’s party was cohesive and was the
majority, could the president easily negotiate sanction termination.
Theoretically, the analysis presented in this chapter lends support to some work on the
importance of Congress in foreign policy domain (Lindsay and Ripley 1993; Howell and
Pevehouse 2008; Carter and Scott 2009; Johnson 2006). This research also supports the moderate
polarization hypothesis (Dodd and Schraufnagel 2009; 2012; 2017) and congressional support
literature (Howell and Pevehouse 2005, 2007a). However, the research still has some unexpected
results. For example, while the researcher expected that an opposition-controlled Senate would
lengthen the duration of legislated sanction, the analysis returned a contrary result. While a
speculative answer is offered to account for this, a more comprehensive and in-depth analysis is
required to provide a more robust answer. This surely opens an avenue for future research with
regard to President-Congress relations.

CHAPTER 4
PARTISANSHIP AND FOREIGN AID ALLOCATION: CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE
ON U.S. FOREIGN AID POLICY
Foreign aid has been an instrument of US foreign policy since the end of World War II
(Hook 1995; Lancaster 2007). As it involves public money, Congress plays a significant role in
the business of allocating the amount of foreign aid to the recipient countries. While some
research has been conducted to investigate what congressional factors can affect the allocation of
bilateral aid, most of them focus on one type of aid only, like the Official Development
Assistance (ODA), or treat aid as one package.34 Few scholars have examined different types of
aid to see whether different types of aid are explained by different congressional dynamics. 35
This is unfortunate since foreign aid consists of different types, often serving different purposes.
Therefore, treating foreign aid as a single policy outcome is problematic. In this chapter, I revisit
the foreign aid debate and investigate under what conditions Congress can influence bilateral
allocation of three kinds of foreign aid: development, political, and military.

34

One example is Fleck and Kilby (2006). They use Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee’s data on US aid flows and test whether the ideology of Congress
affects the particular type of aid. However, rather than disentangling the aid components to examine those types of
aid, they used proxies to approximate the different types of aid. For example, to approximate the development type
of aid, they used bilateral aid allocation by a group of small donors such as Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden. They argued that these donors are renowned for their consistency in allocating aid in a more
development-oriented and humanitarian manner ((Fleck and Kilby 2006,212). The, to test whether liberal or
conservative Congresses are more inclined to provide this kind of aid, they just interact the small donor variable and
an aggregate measure of congressional ideology. While the interaction term can indeed represent the effect of the
small donor variable, the use of proxy as the independent variable is problematic because it can lead to a biased
estimate. Because the proxy contains error term, the estimate will tend to be downwardly biased. This discussion is
ubiquitous in any standard econometrics texts such as Bailey (2015); Greene (2012); Gujarati and Porter (2009);
Wooldridge (2013).
35
See for example, Milner and Tingley (2010)
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By breaking down foreign aid into three distinct types, I would like to test whether
different types of aid have different correlates, with some congressional dynamics such as
partisan behavior of Congress members and party control having unique effects on different
types of aid. This chapter first lays out the literature on US foreign aid policy and focuses
especially on domestic political explanations for foreign aid allocation. It is followed by the main
theoretical arguments and the expectations that can be derived from those arguments. In the
methods section, I describe the data and estimation strategy. This is followed by a results section.
In the conclusion, I summarize the main findings and their implications for future research.

Three Models of US Foreign Aid Policy
The politics of US foreign aids is complex and has generated a wealth of related research.
In general, there are three primary theories for explaining why the US gives foreign aid to other
countries. The first theory can be called interest-driven aid. This theory generally argues that
foreign aid is one of foreign policy intruments used to advance the interest of aid providers (the
US) in the targetted countries (Hook 1995; McKinlay and Little 1977; McKinley and Little 1979;
Palmer, Wohlander, and Morgan 2002). Some scholars such as McKinlay and Little (1977;
1979), who investigated US official bilateral economic aid from 1960-1970, found that US
foreign aid policy was consistent with what they called a donor interest model. From 1960 to
1970, the US distributed aid based on political and security interests. For example, the US used
foreign aid as a tool to drive communist states away from the communist bloc. The US also used
aid as a reward to countries willing to build strategic relations with the US. The pattern
continued into the 1980s, even when the East-West tension diminished. As Hook (1995)
observed, “The mid- to late 1980s witnessed rapidly diminishing tensions between the Cold War
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superpowers and, ultimately, the end of the conflict itself. Yet the structure and content of most
U.S. aid programs remained largely intact” (139).
A comparative analysis of foreign aid policy of some industrial countries supports
McKinlay and Little’s findings. Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor (1998) found that US foreign aid
was more likely to go to its allies as well as countries with whom the US had trade relations and
ideological affinity (i.e., capitalist countries). Similarly, examining the US foreign aid during and
after the Cold War, Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) found that the US foreign aid policy was
driven by systemic security, societal, and statist goals. Among the systemic-security goals, the
containment of communism was the main goal of the foreign aid policy. The US was more likely
to send aid to Communist-bordered countries and allies. Among the societal goals, adoption of a
free market ideology was the main consideration for the US government to give aid to a foreign
country. Finally, for the statist goal, democracy and the level of economic development of the
recipients were the factors that shaped the US foreign policy. Yet these factors were found to
affect the US foreign policy only during the Cold War era (1977-1990). Scholars have failed to
find significant impacts of all these variables in the post-Cold War era.
More contemporaneously, scholars have found that political-strategic interests influence
not only the US development and military aid, but also humanitarian aid (Drury, Olson, and Van
Belle 2005; Fink and Redaelli 2011; Kevlihan, Derouen, and Biglaiser 2014). As Drury, Olson,
and Van Belle (2005) report, factors such as alliances and the promotion of democracy are
benchmarks for a target nation to receive US humanitarian aid. For example, the probability of a
US ally receiving humanitarian aid was 67% higher than a non-ally. Although the difference in
the probability of receiving aid between a democracy and non-democracy is not large,
democratic countries are still more likely to receive humanitarian aid (the probability is 5%
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higher than non-democracies). Similarly, examining the data on US humanitarian aid from 1989
to 2009, Kevlihan, DeRouen, and Biglaiser (2014) found the importance of some political factors
such as the democracy status of a country and its foreign policy affinity with the US. These
foreign policy factors are especially obvious in the post-9/11 era.
The second theory used to explain the provision of aid is based on humanitarian grounds.
This theory explains foreign aid policy from the perspective of recipients’ needs. The theory
argues that the US gives foreign aid due to humanitarian factors such as humanitarian crises or
poverty. While most scholars agree that political, strategic and security factors dominate the US
foreign aid decision-making process, recipient need is also an important factor affecting foreign
aid decisions. In almost all foreign aid models, income per capita―an indicator of the level of
development of a country―is always negative and statistically significantly linked to aid (Fleck
and Kilby 2006; 2010; Lai 2003; McCormick and Mitchell 1988; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe
1998). In addition, factors such as life expectancy play a significant role in shaping US foreign
aid decisions (Blanton 1994). Even when it comes to military aid, Poe and Meernik (1995) found
that economic development still factors significantly in the aid provision decision. They reported
that for every thousand dollar increase in a country’s Gross Domestic Product per capita, the
probability of receiving military aid declined approximately eight percent.
The third theory explaining foreign aid has been called domestic political theory. This
theory sees the important role played by domestic political actors in shaping the aid decision
(Fleck and Kilby 2001; Kim 2017; Milner and Tingley 2010). Among the active players in the
politics of foreign aid, Congress might be regarded as the most important one. This is because
Congress, rather than the executive branch, controls public spending, including the allocation of
foreign aid. Thus, it is Congress that makes the decision on how much money to be appropriated
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for countries. Because Congress is the decision-maker on foreign aid, its policy preferences (and
all the other factors that constitute these preferences) are expected to determine the appropriation
of foreign aid. Some research provides empirical support for this conjecture. For example,
Milner and Tingley’s (2010) research suggests that political and economic interests of member
districts strongly affect whether the member votes for or against economic aid. Members coming
from districts endowed with high human capital tend to be pro-economic aid because the aid will
greatly benefit their districts. They also found that the ideology of a district matters in shaping
the vote of the district’s representative. Members from liberal districts are more likely to support
economic aid, while those coming from conservative districts are inclined to support military aid.
The importance of congressional ideology in shaping US foreign aid policy was also
found by Fleck and Kilby (2006; 2010). Examining the annual US bilateral aid budget from 1955
to 2006, they found that bilateral aid appropriations are higher under liberal Congresses than
conservative ones. They estimated that the 1994 “Republican Revolution” lowered appropriation
of aid by $ 1.7 billion (2010, 188). This decline, however, is just a half of that when the
presidency changed from Democrat Jimmy Carter to the more conservative Ronald Reagan in
the 1980s. In other research, these same authors found that liberal Congresses are more
concerned about development issues, while conservative Congresses gave more weight to
commercial interests (2006).
These studies show that Congress can exert some influence on foreign aid decisions.
While most of these researchers have documented the influence of congressional ideology on
foreign aid allocation, rarely do scholars pay attention to the impact of the aggregate partisan
make up of Congress on foreign aid policy. It is this element I am focusing on in this chapter. I
tested whether the partisan behavior of Congress and party preferences regarding foreign aid can
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influence the amount of foreign aid given to the recipient countries. Yet, before proceeding with
the statistical procedure, I lay out some of my own theoretical arguments and the expectations
that can be derived. This is the topic of the next section.

Partisanship, Party Control and US Foreign Aid: A Theoretical Framework
A body of research has found that Democrats and Republicans take different positions on
several important issues (see e.g., Carmines and Wagner 2006; Layman and Carsey 2002;
Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; Leege et al. 2002; Lindaman and Haider-Markel 2002;
Shafer 2003;Hibbs 1987). However, while these different positions are more obvious when it
comes to domestic issues, it is less clear with regard to foreign policy. When it comes to foreign
policy, some scholars are divided about whether party and ideology matter in determining
legislators’ decisions. For example, some research has found that at both the mass and elite
levels, ideology and party do not seem to be good predictors of respondents’ positions on foreign
and defense policy issues (see, e.g., Cronin and Fordham 1999; Fordham 2002; Gowa 1998;
Modigliani 1972; Russett 1990). This is especially true in highly salient political issues like the
use of force (Fordham 2002: 574). However, others find that partisanship and ideology still
shape legislators’ vote choices on some foreign policy issues (Bernstein and Anthony 1974;
Fleisher 1985; Mccormick 1985; McCormick and Black 1983; McCormick and Wittkopf 1992).
A classic study by McCormick and Wittkopf (1992), for example, shows that members of
Congress tend to be divided when they vote for low-politics foreign policy issues such as foreign
aid and trade. It is argued that foreign aid and trade are the two low-politics issues in which
bipartisanship is the least likely to happen, and lower level executive branch officials,
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congressional committees, and subcommittees as well as non-governmental actors have greater
access to the decision-making process.
Notwithstanding inconclusive empirical evidence, tracing the basic ideological
underpinnings of the two parties tempts us to suspect there might be differences between parties.
This conjecture is further bolstered by the fact that the two parties are increasingly more
polarized over time on whole host of issues (Dueck 2010). Some scholars even coined a term
“conflict extensions” to describe this widespread ideological divide between parties (Layman
and Carsey 2002). In addition, compared with the mass public, the elites influencing a party’s
policies are known to be more ideologically oriented (Rosati 2007). Because foreign policy is
formulated by elites, it seems plausible to suspect that parties will have different foreign policy
profiles (Gries 2014)
Although the earlier years of the Cold War saw the emergence of a liberal-conservative
consensus in US foreign policy, the post-Vietnam era shows that the ideological divide between
liberals and conservatives on foreign policy has increasingly become wider. Consequently,
scholars theorized that the two political parties will divide into two camps along a liberalconservative dimension (Destler, Gelb, and Lake 1985; Rosati 2007). As Wiarda (2009, 164-7)
notes, the dramatic change actually occurred during the height of the Vietnam War. During this
time, the more radical antiwar faction successfully captured the Democratic Party machinery and
the majority of the delegates at their 1972 national party conventions. This group nominated the
senator from South Dakota, George McGovern, who supported the antiwar position, nuclear nonproliferation, and detente with the Soviet Union. Although McGovern lost the election, his
candidacy permanently changed the Democratic Party (Wiarda 2009, 164). Control of the
McGovernites in the Democratic Party was increasingly firm by 1976, such that not only did

117
they successfully maintain the idealistic agenda of peace, detente, weapon control, and human
rights, they also were able to nominate Jimmy Carter, a champion of human rights as their
presidential candidate that year.
At the same time, however, the Republican Party was becoming increasingly more realist
in its foreign policy position-taking. While an anti-war turn occurred within the Democratic
Party, the Republican Party maintained its hawkish-realist position as exemplified in the
candidacy of Gerard Ford in 1976. The realist influence became entrenched further in the 1980s
with the rise of Ronald Reagan as the party nominee. The better prospect for realism within the
Republican Party attracted many realist Democrats like Jeane Kirkpatrick, a member of the
Committee on the Present Danger. Although Reagan agreed with the Democratic agenda of
promoting democracy overseas, he saw this from the realist lens, that is, as a way to win allies
and contain the Soviet Union. Reagan’s hawkish-realist stand on foreign policy was continued by
his successor, George H.W. Bush. The hawkish-realist foreign policy approach culminated in the
George W. Bush era when he launched a war on terror that deepened conflict in the Middle-East.
Although the US also engaged in armed conflicts abroad during the Clinton and Obama
administrations, their approaches to foreign policy are not seen by some scholars as realist (e.g.,
Joffe 2016; Walt 2016).
In sum, as Wiarda observes, since the 1970s the Democrats are still reluctant to use force
in international affairs. Democrats are much more inclined toward an international liberal
approach such as diplomacy, the use of international organizations, and support for humanitarian
interventions. In contrast, Republicans are more prone to realism in foreign policy. They are
more willing to accept the use of military force and stand for a hardline defense of the national
interest (Wiarda 2009, 166). Nevertheless, Wiarda does not provide firm empirical support for
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his observations beyond some historical examples. Nor does he make systematic comparison
using detail case studies to support his general argument.
Having said that, Wiarda’s conclusion is not very different from some elite level
observations conducted by foreign policy scholars (Busby and Monten 2008, 2012; Holsti and
Rosenau 1996; Rathbun 2016; Rathbun 2008). For example, Holsti and Rosenau’s (1996)
national survey from 1984 to 1992 shows that Democrats were more likely to take
accommodationist (supporting international cooperation while opposing military
internationalism) stands on foreign policy topics. In contrast, Republicans were more likely to
take internationalist and hard-liner positions (support military internationalism and to some
extent support cooperative internationalism). Similarly, using the Chicago Council on Global
Affairs surveys from 1982-2004 and tracking the party elites’ foreign policy attitudes, Busby and
Monten (2012) find that Republican leaders were overwhelmingly more supportive of
internationalism on defense spending and military power than Democratic elites were. Finally,
the more recent survey of Chicago Council on Global Affairs also found that in most cases,
Republicans are more supportive of the use of force, while Democrats are more likely to favor
peacekeeping missions (Smeltz, Daalder, and Kafura 2014, 14).
What causes Republicans and Democrats to be quite different on many issues, including
foreign policy? Some scholars suggest that the attitudinal differences between Democrats and
Republicans can be traced to their preferred moral values, which over time constitute party traits
(Hayes 2005). Gries’s (2014) survey conducted in 2011 shows that Democrats are more likely to
embrace values such as compassion and empathy. Conversely, Republicans tend to glorify
strength and moralism (Carney et al. 2008; Gries 2014; Hayes 2005). These traits manifest in the
parties’ ideological values. For example, comparing the foreign policy profiles of Democrats and
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Republicans, Gries (2014) found that Republicans generally score higher on nationalism, support
of military force and isolationism. On the other hand, Democrats score higher on
humanitarianism and multilateralism. These findings support Rathbun’s contention that liberal
Democrats tend to support values such as humanitarianism, antimilitarism, and multilateralism,
while conservative Republicans support patriotism, nationalism, and unilateralism (Rathbun
2008). These traits and values held by both liberals and conservatives are consistent with those
embraced by center-left and center-right voters in other democracies (Caprara et al. 2006).
Besides the personality differences between Democrats and Republicans, the two parties
also differ in their ideological positions along the left-right continuum. As the party of the left,
the Democratic Party tends to support government interventions in the economy and supports
international engagement with the international community to champion the cause of economic
justice. Because economic inequality is the main concern of the American left (typically
identified with the Democrats), they are more inclined to support the redistribution of the wealth
from the rich to the poor (Milner and Tingley 2010). On the contrary, the Republican Party, as
the party of the right, tends to oppose government intervention in the economy, even to correct
for market failures. For the conservative Republicans, the market is essentially efficient, and it
can correct itself even though it takes time and can be costly. Yet the cost of government
intervention is judged as greater than the cost of the self-correcting adjustment of the market.
Furthermore, because conservative Republicans are more concerned with stability than
inequality, they tend to oppose redistributive policies such as progressive tax policies (Greene
and Licht 2017).
The different left-right ideological positions of Democrats and the Republicans can have
direct consequences for each party’s position on foreign aid. Because foreign aid entails the
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taxation and direct transfer of wealth from the US to other countries, ideologies supporting
redistributive policies to correct inequality, theoretically, will be more likely to support foreign
aid policy options. By contrast, the ideology in favor of market freedom will be more likely to
oppose it (Milner and Tingley 2010). However, support or opposition to foreign aid will depend
on the type of foreign aid. For aid aimed at humanitarian and development purposes, liberals are
more likely to support aid because they are concerned about inequality and humanitarian issues.
In contrast, conservatives will oppose it because of their aversion to the government intervention
to redistribute wealth.
However, when it comes to military aid, we would expect that conservative would be
inclined to support it because they are concerned about strategic power relationships in the
world. Despite their dislike of government intervention and the transfer of wealth, their concern
about security, theoretically, will lead them to tolerate the government intervention and the
transfer of wealth provided the aid is channeled to programs ensuring US security. On the other
side, the Democrats are more likely to oppose military aid because they do not value security
more than justice and equality. Unlike development or humanitarian aid, military aid does not
help to correct inequalities and improve the living condition of the poor in developing countries.
The transfer of wealth is simply aimed for strategic-military interest that preserves the status-quo
in the recipient countries (Greene and Licht 2017).
Party divergence on the development and military aid notwithstanding, political aid is
where the two parties are expected to converge. Compared to development or military aid,
political aid covers issues of common concern to many Americans, such as democracy, human
rights, and civil liberties. For example, some portion of political aid is channeled to promote
democracy and improve civil freedoms in the recipient country (e.g., Democracy, Human Rights
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and Labor Program in Angola in 2001 amounted to US$ 395,228.00). Some other portion is
channeled to support combat against weapon proliferation (e.g., Stabilization Operation and
Security Sector Reform programs in a number of countries). Thus, political aid addresses issues
of concern for both Democrats and Republicans. Accordingly, I expected that there would not be
significant differences in the preferences of both parties regarding this type of aid.
To recap the arguments presented above, I derived the following hypotheses:


Hypothesis 1: The amount of development aid given to recipient countries will be, on
average, higher when the Democratic Party controls more seats in Congress.



Hypothesis 2: The amount of military aid given to recipient countries will be, on
average, lower when the Democratic Party controls more seats in Congress.



Hypothesis 3: There will be no difference in the amount of political aid given to
recipient countries when the Democratic Party controls more seats in Congress.

Yet owing to partisan differences on foreign aid policy, both parties need to bargain hard
to win their policy position, and under this condition, the level of partisanship present in
Congress will influence policy outcomes. When the level of partisanship is low, both parties
might easily agree the final level of foreign aid should be appropriated. Yet, when partisanship is
high, the negotiation will be tough and both parties may be forced to compromise. The level of
foreign aid might reflect this compromise.


Hypothesis 4: The impact of party control of Congress is moderated by the level of
partisanship. The higher the level of partisanship, the lower the impact the
Democratic Party control of Congress will have on the level of foreign aid.

As observed by many scholars, the institutional features of the House and the Senate are
different. Therefore, we might also expect there will be different chamber influences for
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partisanship and party seats on foreign aid levels. As argued by Souva and Rohde (2007, 116),
the institutional features of the House are more majoritarian. There is less institutional power for
the minority to contain the preferences of the majority. Therefore, the majority can impose its
preference and the final outcome may reflect the policy positions of the majority. The
institutional feature of the Senate, on the contrary, is more individualistic. Filibuster, for
example, allows a single senator to block a legislative proposal favored by the majority. The
absence of germaneness rules also enables a senator to propose legislation on whatever issue is
raised on the floor. These Senate rules weaken the majority’s power, thus complicating majority
party efforts to dictate policy outcomes.
At the constituency level, the House members are closer to their constituents than Senate
members. The biennial election for the House members provides a stronger incentive for the
members to keep in touch with their constituents and this, theoretically, affects their effort to
satisfy constituent demands. Due to their closeness to constituents, House members may be more
concerned about the domestic impact of foreign policy decisions (McCormick and Wittkopf
1992). Senators, by contrast, typically have larger and more diverse constituents who eventually
encourage them to take more moderate positions. In addition, because the Senate has more
constitutionally delegated responsibilities in foreign policy than the House, senators may pay
more attention to the White House than the sub-population of their constituents. Finally, the
longer terms in office also free senators from some of the pressure of interest group (Souva and
Rohde 2007). All these institutional differences allow the senators to be less partisan in foreign
policy decisions than the House members. For all these reasons, I expected the effects of party
seats (Democratic Party seats) and partisanship in the House to be more consequential on the
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levels of foreign aid given to foreign countries than those same considerations in the Senate,
which leads me to hypothesize:


Hypothesis 5: The influence of Democratic Party seats and the level of partisanship
with have larger effects in the House of Representatives than the Senate.

In the following section, I elaborate on the research design and the statistical procedures to test
the hypotheses laid out above.
Research Design
To test the hypotheses, I used the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) data obtained from USAID’s Foreign Aid Explorer.36 The data set consists of all the
programs financed by U.S foreign aid in foreign countries from 1946 to 2017. But for the current
research, I used the subset of foreign aid data from 1960 to 2013. The time dimension of the
research is limited by the availability of most of the economic data available in the World Bank
database, which supplies most of the predictors in the models I tested. The foreign aid data are
broken into three categories of aid: development, political, and military. Categorization of the aid
is loosely based on Tarnoff and Lawson's (2016) aid categorization. The development aid
consists of programs such as the Child Survival & Health program, Development Assistance,
Trade and Development, Millennium Challenge program and Peace Corps program. Political aid
is composed of programs such as Economic Support Funds, Democracy Promotion, the War on
Terror, economic and political reform, combat against drugs, crime, and weapons proliferation.
Finally, military aid consists of Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military

36

The data can be accessed at https://explorer.usaid.gov/data.html
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Education and Training program (IMET), and Peacekeeping funds. I selected these programs and
aggregated their amounts to the annual country-level commitments.
I excluded humanitarian aid such as Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA),
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA), International Disaster Assistance,
International Assistance Program (Transition Initiative), funds channeled through the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Red Cross, the Food Aid/Food for
Peace program, and the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition
program. I also excluded multilateral assistance channeled through international organizations
such as UNICEF, UNDP, MDBs and World Bank. While these types of aid (Humanitarian
Assistance and Multilateral Assistance) are interesting, they were not the focus of the current
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The dependent variables are the proportion of each type of aid to the US Gross National
Income (GNI). It is measured in percentage. This way of measuring aid has been used as the
standard to gauge the levels of foreign aid of donors and their commitment to Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). In this research, the unit of analysis was the country-year amount
of the three types of aid (as the percentage of US GNI). In total, 183 countries were examined for
the period from 1960 to 2013.
The main independent variables were the proportion of Democratic Party seats in both
chambers of Congress and the Party Unity Scores. The variable of Democratic Party Seats was
measured as the percentage of seats controlled by the Democrats in each of the chambers. This
variable was calculated using each Congress as the unit of analysis and chamber specific values
were obtained. The data were obtained from the Vital Statistics of Congress (Ornstein et al.
2017). Meanwhile, the Party Unity Scores measured the internal cohesion of each of the parties
in the roll-call votes. Party Unity Scores were measured as the proportion of all roll-call votes in
a specific Congress where at least 50 percent of the Democrat caucus voted in opposition to at
least 50 percent of the Republican conference (Hare and Poole 2014; Poole and Rosenthal 2007).
Like the party seat variable, Party Unity Scores are also calculated using each Congress as the
unit of analysis and chamber specific values were obtained. The data were obtained from Poole
and Rosenthal’s voteview webpage (Poole and Rosenthal 2015).
To avoid spurious relations in the model, I controlled for several factors that others have
found can affect the variation in the amount of foreign aid given to the recipients. Because each
type of aid has its own purpose, I also used some control variables specific to each type of aid.
For the development aid, I controlled for the recipient’s income per capita, infant mortality ratio,
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population, trade volume with the US, economic openness, human right scores (physical
integrity index), president ideology, US misery index, and US GDP growth rates.
Income per capita measures the average wealth of the recipient’s population. It also
measures the development need of a country for foreign aid. Some scholars observed that the
needs of recipient countries are one of the reasons a donor gave foreign aid to the recipients
(Alesina and Dollar 2000; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998). It was expected that the US would
give more development aid to the countries with low income per capita. This variable was
measured as constant 2010 US$. Due to its skewness, I used logged income per capita to avoid
statistical distortion in the estimation. The variable of income per capita was obtained from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank 2018).
Infant mortality ratio variable measures the general level of health of a country’s
population. It is defined as the number of deaths of infants under one year old per 1,000 live
births. Like income per capita, this variable can also reflect the need of a country for foreign
assistance. The expectation is that the higher a country’s infant mortality rate, the higher the
amount of development aid to be received by the country. The data were obtained from World
Bank’s World Development Indicator (World Bank 2018).
Following Kim (2017), I included the population to control for different impact of aid
due to different population size. It is obvious that the impact of US$ 10 million aid on a country
of 10 million population will be different from that of a country of 100 million population. I used
logged population to avoid statistical distortion due to extreme variation. The expectation was
that the larger a country’s population is, the more aid the US will send to the country. The data
on country population were obtained from World Bank’s World Development Indicator (World
Bank 2018).
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Since the 1970s, the US Congress decided to tie foreign aid commitment to the
recipient’s human right practices (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Martin 1992). Congress
enacted that the amount of foreign aid sent to a country is conditional to the country’s human
practices. Therefore, I expected that countries with bad human right practices would receive less
foreign aid by the US government. To capture the human right practices of a country, I included
variable PHYSICAL INTEGRITY INDEX. This is an additive index constructed from the
torture, extra-judicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance indicators. The final
index ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect
for these rights). The data were obtained from the CIRI Human Rights Index (Cingranelli,
Richards, and Clay 2014).
While trade volume may represent a pragmatic reason for the US decision to give a
country development aid, some scholars have found that this pragmatic reason exists. For
example, Milner and Tingley (2010) found that legislators’ support for development aid
depended on whether the aid economically benefits the district the legislators represent. This
economic motive is openly admitted by former USAID director James Atwood in a Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs
Appropriations on March 20, 1996, that the “USAID has particular importance in expanding new
markets for the US economy…Developing countries are particularly good costumers for our
high-value exports” (cited in Milner and Tingley 2010, 204) This implies that aid is a strategic
tool to open up a recipient’s market for US export. Therefore, I included the variable of trade
volume between the US and the recipient country, and I expected that more aid would be
channeled to countries with which US trade in the previous period was still low. Thus, there
would be negative association between the amount of development aid to a recipient and the
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trade volume between the recipient and the US. The data on trade volume between the US and
the recipients were obtained from the Correlates of War (COW) Trade data – Version 4.0
(Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009)
Related to the US effort to open up a recipient’s market through foreign aid, economic
openness should be one of the important criteria in the US’s decision to give money to a foreign
country. Liberalization of the recipient’s economy enables the US to penetrate the market of the
recipient more freely not only through the trade but also through investment. In addition, because
liberalization is one of the 10 pillars of the Washington Consensus espoused by the US in
developing economies (Williamson 1993), liberalization of recipient markets should be an
important factor to give development aid. This is empirically supported by some research. For
example, Alesina and Dollar (2000, 39) found that economic openness was a significant
determinant for shaping the bilateral aid. For this reason, I expected that the US would increase
its development aid to countries showing good performance in their liberalization policy. I used
the Economic Globalization Index as a measure for the economic openness (Gygli, Haelg, and
Sturm 2018)
To account for the domestic political and economic factors related to variations in the
amount of foreign aid given to the recipients, I controlled for presidential policy preferences and
the economic health. Presidential policy preference is simply measured using Poole and
Rosenthal’s presidential DW-NOMINATE mean scores. These scores, however, are constant
over the entire period of each of the presidents’ administration. It was expected that liberal
presidents would be inclined to support higher development aid to recipient countries.
For the economic impact of foreign aid decision, I controlled for two common economic
measures: GDP growth and the misery index. The former reflects the general health of the
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economy (Krugman and Wells 2013). Higher GDP growth indicates strong performance of the
economy. It was expected that when the economy is in good shape, the US government will
increase its foreign assistance to the recipients, ceteris paribus. Meanwhile, the misery index, an
additive index composed of inflation and unemployment, reflects the economic problems
encountered by the US. It was expected that when the economy is in trouble, the amount of
foreign aid given to recipient countries will diminish. Both data on US economic growth and
misery index (unemployment and inflation) were obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis Economic data (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2018a).
Finally, I also controlled for region. Control for regions was aimed at taking unobserved
heterogeneity among regions. Some regions are dominated by poor countries or suffer protected
conflicts and famine issues (e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa) that eventually shape the decision to
allocate foreign aid. Some other regions might traditionally be the focus of US foreign aid for
strategic reasons. I included six regional dummies (East Asia and Oceania, Middle East and
North Africa, South and Central Asia, Sub-Sahara Africa, Europe and Eurasia, and Western
Hemisphere). Western Hemisphere was the referent category.
For the military aid model, I used several control variables. First, I used the physical
integrity index to account for human rights practices of the recipients. Again, because the US
Congress adopted resolutions that tied US foreign aid to the human rights performance of the
recipients, I expected positive association between the measure of human right practice (physical
integrity index) of the recipient and the amount of military aid provided by the US to the
recipient. Second, to control for American political preference for democratic governance, I
controlled for recipient’s democracy status. The recipient’s democracy status was measured
based on its polity scores ranging from -10 (absolute authoritarianism) to 10 (full democracy).
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The data used here were from Polity IV (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014), which scores a
country’s level of democracy according to indicators such as government composition, elections,
political participation, and so on. Because one of the agenda in foreign aid policy is to promote
democracy (Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Peterson and Scott 2017;
Scott and Carter 2017; Scott and Steele 2011), I expected a positive correlation between foreign
aid and the democratic status of the recipient country (more democratic countries received more
money). However, due to the possibility of endogeneous relations between the democracy index
and foreign aid (Knack 2004), I lagged a country’s democracy status by one year. Thus, it
should have been clear that it was democracy that affected the amount of foreign aid rather than
the other way round.
Third, because military aid is mostly aimed at strengthening allies, the amount of military
aid should be related to the alliance commitment between the US and the recipients (Poe and
Meernik 1995). To capture for this alliance effect, I also controlled the alliance status of the
recipients. The data came from the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP). These
data categorized alliance status into five groups based on the treaty obligations agreed by states
joining the alliance: defense pact, offence pact, neutrality pact, non-aggression pact, and
consultation pact (Leeds 2005). Defense pact refers to a formal commitment of members to help
each other in case one of them is attacked by outsiders. NATO is an example of this kind of pact
(Gibler 2009; Leeds 2005; Leeds et al. 2002). Offense pact is a formal commitment of members
to help each other in attacking a target. This type of alliance typically existed before World War
I. In neutrality pact, countries are formally committed to doing nothing in case a member of the
pact goes to war against another country (be it outsider or another member of the pact). The main
purpose of this pact is to prevent a country (usually a powerful country) from helping another
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country (usually a weaker country) in case there is a conflict or war with a member of the pact.
Non-aggression pact is a formal commitment between countries in which the countries will not
attack each other. An example of this pact is Soviet-Germany Non-Aggression Pact of 1939.
Finally, the consultation pact generally refers to an informal alliance between the US and another
country. This informal alliance generally comes in the form of mutual understanding on some
international issues. But, there is no obligation of one country to do something to other country
under certain situations. Because I was interested in seeing the effect of being American defense
ally only, I dummy-coded the variable where I assigned the value of 1 if the recipient was a
member of US defense ally and the value of 0 otherwise. As the strategic aid argument suggests
(McKinley and Little 1977; 1979), I expected a positive association between the variable of
alliance and the amount of US military aids received by the country.
Fourth, since military aid is also aimed at achieving political and diplomatic interests,
that is, to strengthen US political position in the UN, I also controlled for the political affinity of
the recipients and the US. For this, I used the Affinity of Nations index, which provides a metric
that reflects the similarity of state preferences based on voting positions of pairs of countries
(dyads) in the United Nations General Assembly. The data range from -1 (least similar interest
between the US and the recipient) to +1 (most similar interest between the US and the recipient).
The data were obtained from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017). The expectation was that the
US would give more military aid to the countries supporting the US in UN voting. Because there
is an endogeneity concern about the relationship between the two variables (aid and voting
alignment with the US in the UN), I lagged the variable of the Affinity of Nations index one
year, indicating that aid decision was based on the recipient’s voting record in the UN.
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Fifth, as military aid is often related to conflict situation, I also controlled for the level of
global conflict intensity and the conflict situation of the recipients. The global conflict intensity
measures the level of conflict intensity in every conflict in the world annually. This conflict
intensity is categorized into five levels: dispute, non-violent crisis, violent crisis, limited war, and
war and is assigned the scale of 1-5. I then averaged the intensity level of all conflicts identified
in the data set for each year. The data were obtained from the Heidelberg Institute for
International Conflict Research (Schwank et al. 2017). I expected a positive relationship between
conflict intensity levels and the general level of US foreign military assistance.
Sixth, because military aid consists of peacekeeping aid, the conflict situation in a
country determines the amount of military aid sent to the foreign country. The conflict situation
takes a dichotomous value of 0/1. The value of 0 represents the absence of conflict in a country,
while the value of 1 indicates the presence of conflict in a country. The data were obtained from
the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) Data on Armed Conflicts. 37
Seventh, some research has found that aid was also an instrument of US Cold War
containment (Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998; McKinley and Little 1977; 1979). The US tended
to give aid to countries bordering the communist states during the Cold War era to support the
countries in their effort to prevent the spread of communism (Meernik, Krueger and Poe 1998).
To control for this Cold War containment policy, I included the variable Communist Border that
was coded dichotomously. The value of 1 was assigned to the countries bordering with former
communist states and the value of 0 was assigned to countries not bordering the former
communist states.

37

The data on the country’s conflict situation can be accessed from https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/
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To account for the US economic capacity to give military assistance, I controlled for the
US economic health represented by the US GDP growth and the US economic problem
represented by the misery index. I also controlled for the period of global conflicts: The Cold
War Era and the Global War on Terror. The Cold War Era was a binary category. The value of 1
indicated the period from 1947 to 1991 and 0 was from 1992 onward. The Global War on Terror
period also was given a binary category. I assigned the value of 1 to the period of post 9/11
event. I assigned the value of 0 to the period before the event. Finally, to account for unobserved
factors related to regions of the world, I included six regions in the model: East Asia and
Oceania, Europe and Eurasia, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, South and
Central Asia, and the Western Hemisphere (as the referent category).
Since political aid contains elements of strategic, economic and security issues, I used all
control variables present in both the development and military aid models. In general, the
political aid model is a baseline model to show the null effect of party on foreign aid.
Model
Because I was interested in examining the impact of party preference and partisan
behavior on the amount of foreign aid given to the recipient countries on average, population
average panel model was more appropriate here. 38 And because foreign aid sent to a recipient in

38

Although some scholars used Heckman Selection model to estimate the effect of covariates on the aid levels (e.g.,
Blanton 2005, Drury et al., 2005; Meernik et al., 2005; Scott and Carter 2017), I used a population-average panel
model because the substantive question I was asking is more appropriately addressed using this model. Rather than
focusing the effect of country-specific attributes on the aid levels provided by the US over time, I wanted to see if
the common attributes shared by all the cases (that is, the partisanship and party control in the US) affected the
levels of particular aid in general. I was not interested in seeing, for example, how being a US ally affected the
amount of aid given to, say, Egypt or Israel. Rather, I am interested in seeing how the change in party control affects
the level of aid across all countries over the years. The population-average panel model can be seen as an alternative
to the time series model, which mostly suffer from the problem of small observations (e.g., for the US case, we have
only 53 year-observations).
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a particular year has an effect on the amount the US gave in the following year, there is a
problem of correlated data. For these reasons, I used a Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE).
Not only is a GEE method appropriate for the question I was asking, it also has an advantage for
longitudinal/panel data in that it can model the covariance structure of the correlated responses
within a cluster.
The GEE model uses the marginal approach to correlated data. 39 This approach is
different from the subject-specific method in that subject-specific, sometimes called a
conditional method, models the probability distribution of the dependent variable as a function of
covariates and a cluster-specific parameter. In marginal models, in contrast, we simply model the
marginal (or population-average) expectation of the dependent variable as a function of the
covariates. Thus, the two methods have different logics about the effect of covariates on the
response variable and the nature of within-cluster correlations. 40
According to Diggle, Liang and Zegger (as cited in Zorn 2001, 474), a marginal model,
like GEE, tries to “model … the average response over sub-population that shares a common
value of X.” Consequently, we do not need to include the individual (cluster-specific) effects in
the model like we do in conditional (cluster-specific) models. 41 Nevertheless, intra-cluster
correlation is taken into account by adjusting the covariance matrix of the parameter based on
assumptions about the nature of the relationships among observations within a cluster.

39

The discussion in this section is based primarily on Hardin and Hilbe (2013), and Zorn (2001).
GEE is actually the generalized version of what is known as Pooled Feasible Least Squares (PFGLS) estimator in
econometric literature. PFGLS is a special case of GEE because it applies only to normal Gaussian family. In Stata,
it can be estimated using xtreg with pa option. See Cameron and Trivedi (2010).
41
In conditional model, individual effects are estimated in the model either directly by including the fixed effects of
clusters in the model, like what we do in fixed effect (FE) panel models, or indirectly by assuming that the
unobserved individual effects follow some distribution (typically normal distribution) and estimate its variance
along with other parameters in the model, like we do in a random effect (RE) panel model.
40
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Because marginal models and conditional models take a different approach to estimate
the impact of the covariates on the response variable, the interpretation of the parameter
estimates is also different. In a conditional model, for example, we interpret the coefficient β as
the effect of a change in X on the amount of Y (or probability of Y for the categorical
response) for the same individual i (i.e., for each observation T within the same individual i). In
contrast, in a marginal model, we interpret the population-average coefficient β as the average
effect of a change in X on the amount of Y across the entire population. Based on this
difference, it is clear that for the question in the current research, a GEE model is more
appropriate because this research examined the effects of party control and partisanship on the
level of particular aid in general or across entire population. In other words, it assessed the
general propensity of Democrats and Republicans toward particular forms of foreign aid. It did
not investigate the effect of partisanship on the amount of foreign aid given to a particular nation.
A GEE model is part of the quasi-likelihood methods. Different from full maximum
likelihood methods that require specification of full conditional distribution of the dependent
variable, a quasi-likelihood method only requires the functional forms of the relationship
between the expected value of the dependent variable and the covariates and between the
conditional mean and the variance of the outcome variable. Generally, the formal logic is
borrowed from Generalized Linear Models (GLMs). In fact, GEE is an extension of GLMs
(commonly used for cross sectional data) to the correlated data (Liang and Zeger 1986; Zorn
2001).
Assume that our dependent variable is Y and K number of predictors is X where i
indexes the N units of analysis (the recipient countries) i = {1, 2, … N}, and t indexes the T time
points (year) t = {1, 2, … T}. Written in the form of a column vector of observations on the
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outcome variable for country i, Y = [Y , Y , … Y ], and denoting the expected value of the
dependent variable for country i, E(Y ), as μ , then the general relationship between the mean of
the response variable and the predictors can be written as
g(μ ) = X β

(1)

Where β is the K × 1 vector of parameters; g is known as the link function, that is the function
that relates the expected value of the response variable to the linear term, X β; and X is the
T × K matrix of the predictors. Notice we do not need to use the likelihood function to specify
the joint distribution of the response variable, the covariates, and the parameters as we do in the
class of maximum likelihood methods. Instead we simply use the link function. The use of link
function is determined by the distribution of the response variable. Because the foreign aid
variable is a continuous measure, I used the identity link function so that
μ =Xβ

(2)

The variance V of the outcome variable, Y , is specified as a function g of the mean. In simple
cross-sectional data, we can specify the variance V as

V =

( )

(3)

Where ϕ is the scale parameter. Because GEE is aimed at analyzing correlated data within a
group/unit/panel where T > 1, we need to account for the dependence across T. The solution
provided by Liang and Zeger (1986) is to specify T × T matrix R (α) of the correlation across T
for a given Y . While the unknown parameter α will determine the form of the matrix R (α), the
structure of α is determined by the investigator. The matrix R (α) varies across T but is constant
across clusters. This correlation matrix then changes the variance in (3) into:

137

V =

(

)

( )(

)

(4)

Where A are the T × T diagonal matrix with g(μ ) as the tth diagonal element. This new
variance equation enters into a set of k “quasi-scores” 42 differential equation, which is the
solution offered by Liang and Zeger (1986) to find the quasi-likelihood estimate of β:
U (β) = ∑
Where D =

D V

(5)

(Y − μ ) = 0

and V as in (4). A properly specified model will asymptotically return

E[U (β)] = 0 and Cov[U (β)] = D V

D . Thus, the function U(β) behaves like the first

derivative of the log-likelihood or score function. The estimates of β are obtained by satisfying
the condition that U(β) = 0. As noted by Zeger, Liang, and Albert (1988, as cited in Zorn 2001,
472), I chose β that makes μ(β) as close as possible to the average expectation of Y and
optimally weight each residual Y − μ by the inverse of Cov(Y ).
The main advantage of GEE is that it offers a range of options to specify the withincluster correlation structure. We can define the within-cluster correlation structure based on our
assumption about the data generating process (DGP). Even though we incorrectly specified the
correlation structure, the estimate 𝛽 is still consistent and asymptotically unbiased. However, the
variance of 𝛽 is larger when we incorrectly specify the working correlation structure. Thus, the
estimate of 𝛽 is not accurate if the within-cluster correlation structure is wrong. Nonetheless, we
can correct the standard error by using a robust estimate of variance-covariance matrix of β:
Var β

42

=N ∑

D V

D

∑

D V

SV

D

∑

D V

D

(6)

The quasi-score function is essentially the score function (the first derivative of log-likelihood) applied to quasilikelihood models.
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Where S = (Y − μ )(Y − μ ) is an empirical covariance estimate. For this research, I specified
the autoregressive of order 1 (AR1) of the within-cluster correlation structure defined as R (α) =
ρ|

|

. I assumed that |ρ| < 1.0 and that the resulting vector [1, ρ, ρ , … ] are the same across

observations (T). For safety, I also used robust standard error as specified above for the model.
Missing Data
Generally, there are three categories of missing data (Little and Rubin 2002). The first
category of data is missing completely at random (MCAR). In this case, the probability of data
being missing does not depend on the observed and unobserved data. This kind of missing data
does not pose a serious threat to our inference because our estimates will be unbiased if we run
analysis with listwise deletion. The second type is missing at random (MAR). Here, the
probability of data being missing depends on the observed data. For example, data on economic
or development indicators for the developing countries typically are incomplete. If we can
include the income category of a country in the model, we can examine if the probability of
several variables being missing depends on the income status of a country. If it is so, then we
have a problem of MAR because the probability of some data being missing depends on the
income status of a country, an observed variable. Finally, there is the so-called missing data not
at random (MNAR). In MNAR, the probability of data being missing depends on the unobserved
data. For example, if the probability of several indicators being missing for a particular country
depends on the country itself, then the data are MNAR.
While the first type of missing data is not problematic, the second and third types of
missing data problem are perilous to the inference because they can bias the estimate. However,
the MNAR cannot be detected because the cause is unobserved factors. But, they can be made
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MAR if more data are collected and tested to determine if the probability of their missingness
depends on the observed data we collected. MAR data can be examined by running a simple ttest comparing the mean of the observed variables between the non-missing and missing groups.
If the difference is statistically significant, there is a problem of MAR.
While in many models, missing data are not very problematic, they have serious
consequences for the GEE. This is because GEEs do not specify full conditional likelihood, so
the specification of a working correlation matrix is very much reliant on the arrangement of the
values in the dependent variables. Consequently, missing the past values of the dependent
variable will make the GEE estimates less robust to the misspecification of the working
correlation structure. Under this situation, we have to make sure that the working correlation
structures are correct to maintain the consistency of estimate of β (Zeger and Liang 1986 as cited
in Zorn 2001, 477). The threat of missing data worsens when the extent of the missing data is
high.
Because time-series cross-sectional data on countries are prone to a missing data
problem, we cannot ignore this issue when using GEE. In this research, I found that
approximately 60 percent of data in all three foreign aid models are missing. Because the extent
of missing data is high, I had to deal with it to avoid biased and inconsistent estimates of the
parameters. For this reason, I used a multiple imputation (MI) technique. The main idea of MI is
to estimate a set of plausible values for the missing cells in the vectors of the data using the
distribution of the observed data (White, Royston, and Wood 2011, 377). Thus, rather than
putting a single value into a missing data point in a variable, MI estimates some values using the
distribution of the observed data. In generating these estimated values, random components are
included to reflect uncertainty around the true value. Because there are multiple values for each
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of the missing observations, MI generates multiple data sets. Subsequently, each of the multiple
data sets is analyzed to obtain a set of parameter estimates. Finally, each of the parameter
estimates from every data set are averaged to obtain the overall coefficient estimate as well as
their variances and confidence intervals.
Multiple imputation is based on the assumption the data are MAR. Running a series of ttests comparing the means of observed data for the missing and non-missing groups in the data, I
found a significant difference between the two groups. The intuition also supports the
assumption of MAR. For example, the US tends to give development assistance to lower income
countries. Because most of the missing data belong to developing countries, 43 development
assistance can be a predictor for the probability of data being missing. A series of t-tests
comparing the mean of development aid between missing and non-missing data for some
variables show significant differences in the mean of development aid between missing and nonmissing data. Therefore, the assumption that data are MAR is met.
When data are MAR, multiple imputation should definitely be used because running
model analysis using standard listwise deletion will bias the estimate (see Buuren 2012; Enders
2010). As suggested before, doing multiple imputation entails a three-step procedure. 44 First, we
generate multiply imputed data sets. In this phase, we replace the unknown missing data by m
independent simulated sets of values drawn from the posterior predictive distribution of the
missing data conditional on the observed data. Suppose we have some missing data for a

43

This is not surprising given the lack of knowledge, technology, and infrastructure in developing countries often
impede the collection of reliable data. See (Runde 2017; Wubetie 2017)
44
The description of the MI procedure here is heavily drawn from White, Royston, and Wood (2011)
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variable, 𝑌 . The estimated values replacing the missing data in Y are obtained by the following
algorithm45:
1. Regress the variable Y on all other variables in our model and yield an estimate β and
covariance matrix V. Suppose we obtain the regression model as Y ∗ = Xβ + ϵ, where
ϵ is the residuals from normal distribution.
2. Fill the missing values in Y with the predicted scores (Y ) generated from the
regression models but add the error components. Adding residual components is
important to restore the variability of the imputed values.
3. Estimate the mean and variance of the missing variable, Y . Assume that the posterior
distribution of the mean is normal with the standard deviation

√

, we generate the

new estimate of the mean of Y (for the next N of the same Y ) by adding to the
previously obtained mean of Y the residual value randomly drawn from the normal
distribution (with mean zero and the standard deviation as obtained above) using
Monte Carlo simulation. Adding this residual to the existing mean of Y will generate
a new unique mean of Y which is different from the previous mean. Adding a
residual term to the new covariance matrix element will also produce a new
covariance matrix but with a different residual distribution (usually inverse Wishart
distribution due to the multivariate covariance matrix).

45

The step to generate multiply imputed data sets uses the Bayesian method because it assumes that the parameter
estimate is a random variable following a particular distribution. The logic of generating a sequence of parameter
values to be used in generating the coefficient estimates and the predicted values to fill the missing cells in the data
set uses a Gibbs sampling method commonly used in Bayesian frameworks. See for example Enders (2010). For
Gibbs sampling method, see Gelman et al. (2013)
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4. Using the new mean and variance of Y , estimate a new set of regression coefficients
and fill in the missing data with new predicted scores plus the residual.
5. Repeat the procedure 3 and 4 m-times to obtain m multiply imputed data sets.
Second, we analyzed separate multiply imputed data sets to generate the estimate we
want, i.e., the regression coefficients and their variances. Because we used multiple data sets
(with different values filled into the missing cells in the variable) to fit the regression models, we
had m coefficients of β and their standard errors. In the third phase, we combined the coefficients
and their variances to produce the final estimate and its variance-covariance matrix. We
combined the coefficient estimates from these m MI models using Rubin’s rule:

θ=

∑

θ

(7)

Where θ is the coefficient estimate from the multiply imputed data j and θ is the mean of
all these estimates, which is the final estimate of the regression coefficient. To construct the final
variance-covariance matrix from these m-imputed data sets, we needed to take into account not
only the within-imputation variability but also the between-imputation variability. Thus, we
constructed a final variance-covariance matrix as
𝑉ar(θ) = 𝐖 + 1 +
Where 𝐖 =

∑

(8)

𝐁

Var θ is the within-imputation variance. 𝐁 = ∑

θ − θ /(m − 1) is

the between-imputation variance. In the current research, the imputation procedure was
implemented in R using the Amelia II package (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011). Amelia
assumes that all the variables in the imputation model have a joint multivariate normal
distribution. It runs the procedure using a combination of an EM (Expectation-Maximization)
algorithm and the bootstrapping approach called Expectation-Maximization with Bootstrap
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(EMB). The bootstrap approach is used in generating multiple bootstrapped samples of the
original incomplete data from which an estimated value is randomly drawn to fill in the missing
data.

Figure 4-2. Scheme of MI procedure in Amelia II.

To see the appropriateness of our multiple imputation model, we ran some diagnostics,
the most important of which was to test the convergence of multiple initial values to see whether
the imputation models were affected by the initial values. This test was important because the
imputation models relied on the EM algorithm, which in turn also depended on the likelihood of
the data. Poor likelihood of the data will complicate the ability of the EM algorithm in finding
the global maximum of the likelihood surface and the starting values can begin to affect the
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imputations (Honaker, King and Blackwell 2011, 29-30). Thus, it was important to make sure
46

the different starting values converged to the same single value in the EM chains. I display the
diagnostic test for each of imputation data (development aid, military aid and political aid data)
in Appendix C. As shown in Appendix C, all starting values converged to the single value in all
EM chains.
Another diagnostic test that we can do to make sure the imputations are appropriate is to
compare the distribution (density) between the observed data and the complete data created by a
multiple imputation process. Appropriate imputation models return an approximately similar
shape of the distribution. However, we needed to remember that multiple imputation is not
intended to make up the data. What we did in the multiple imputation was reproduce the
variance-covariance matrix we would have observed had our data not been missing (Multiple
Imputation in Stata n.d.). Thus, we did not need to have an exactly similar shape of the
distribution between the observed data and the complete data produced by multiple imputation. I
present the results of the density comparison for all variables having missing values in Appendix
C. As seen from the graphs, the distributions of observed and complete data in the variables are
approximately similar.

Results and Analysis
Table 4-1 presents the GEE model for the development aid. As seen in Table 4-1, the
impact of partisanship and Democratic Party seats on development aid only applies to the House.

46

Suppose the starting values are close to the local maximum, the EM algorithm can falsely claim this local
maximum as the global one even though there might be a real global maximum farther away. The question is how
do we know that the maximum surface found by the EM algorithm is the real global maximum? The answer is by
running an EM algorithm from multiple starting values and checking for their convergence, that is the diagnosis we
have to do to check our multiple imputation models. See Honaker, King and Blackwell (2011).
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In the House, a percentage point increase in the Democratic party seats was expected to increase
the proportion of development aid as the percentage of GNI, on average, by 0.000005 percentage
point. Although the proportion of an increase is very small, converted into an absolute value, this
yields an increase of around US$ 309,500.00. The impact of partisan behavior in the House is
also quite large. One unit increase in Party Unity Scores is expected to push the proportion of
development aid as the percentage of GNI by 0.000301 percentage point, or translated into the
absolute amount, by around US$ 18.6 million.47
However, the unconditional marginal effect interpretation of the impact of partisanship
and the Democratic Party seats on the proportion of development aid to GNI does not make
sense because it does not include the conditioning variable. For example, because we have never
seen the absence of partisanship since 1960, assuming the partisanship is zero does not make
statistical interpretation realistic. Therefore, it was important to interpret the impact of
Democratic Party seats in the House by considering the level of partisanship. In other words, we
needed to include the interaction effect between partisanship and the Democratic party seats in
the House. As the Figure 4-3 displays, when we hold Party Unity Scores at their mean value
(.49), the positive impact of Democratic Party seats on the proportion of development aid to GNI
provided to recipient countries drops to 0.000001773 percentage point or around US$
109,797.64.48

47

These are the unconditional marginal effect rather than the conditional marginal effect, that is the effect of a unit
change in Democratic seats (or Chamber Party Unity Scores) on the proportion of development aid to the GNI,
assuming that the conditioning variable (i.e., the Chamber Party Unity Scores in the case of measuring the marginal
effect of Democratic seats) is zero. Thus, for example, assuming both parties do not behave partisan at all, then one
percentage point increase in the Democratic party in the House is expected to increase the proportion of
development aid to GNI by around 0.000005 percentage point or more than US$ 309.500.00. The percentage point
is measured as the proportion of aid to the mean of GNI (US$ 6,190 billion).
48
The conditional marginal effect of Democratic Party seats in the House, holding the level of partisanship at its
mean (.49), is computed as
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Table 4-1
Partisanship, Democratic Control and Development Aid: House and Senate
(1)
House Model

(2)
Senate Model

.000301***
(.000102)

.0000711
(.000202)

Democratic Seats (%)

.00000488***
(.00000143)

.00000310
(.00000211)

Chamber PUS x Dem. Seats (%)

-.00000634***
(.00000207)

-.000000980
(.00000402)

Recipient Population

.0000148***
(.00000366)

.0000149***
(.00000356)

Infant Mortality Index[t-1]

.000000208**
(.000000106)

.000000207**
(.000000105)

Logged GDP per Capita [t-1]

-.00000511*
(.00000275)

-.00000483*
(.00000267)

-.00000237***
(.000000681)

-.00000209***
(.000000690)

U.S. Growth [t-1]

.000268***
(.0000877)

.000154***
(.0000590)

President Ideology

.00000694**
(.00000327)

.0000111***
(.00000354)

Main Predictors:
Chamber Party Unity Scores

Controls:

U.S. Misery Index [t-1]

Table continued on next page
%𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑑/𝐺𝑁𝐼 = 0.00000488 + (−0.00000634 x 0.49) = 0.000001773. Converted into the absolute
value, it amounts to US$ 109,797.64. Computed for the low level of partisanship (when Party Unity Scores is at
.29), the impact of one percentage point increase in Democratic Party seats in the House is about US$ 188,321.84.
When the Party Unity Scores is at its highest level (.67), the percentage point impact of Democratic Party seats in
the House drops significantly to around US$ 39,150.63.
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Table cont. from previous page
Human Rights Scores

-6.03e-08
(.000000851)

9.58e-09
(.000000833)

Economic Openness [t-1]

.000000855***
(.000000323)

.000000848***
(.000000322)

Trade Relations with US

-.00000187*
(.00000102)

-.00000173*
(.00000100)

East Asia and Oceania

-.0000467
(.0000333)

-.0000464
(.0000334)

Europe and Eurasia

-.000118***
(.0000212)

-.000118***
(.0000213)

Middle East and N. Africa

-.0000978***
(.0000236)

-.0000981***
(.0000237)

South and C. Asia

-.0000288
(.0000555)

-.0000282
(.0000557)

Sub-Saharan Africa

-.00000567
(.0000291)

-.00000507
(.0000291)

Constant

-.000339***
(.000120)

-.000275**
(.000119)

Observations

8428

8428

# of Countries

157

157

# of Imputation

150

150

4.846***

4.786***

F-statistics
Reference Category: Western Hemisphere
Robust-clustered standard error in parentheses
*
p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Despite the moderation effect of partisanship on the impact of Democratic Party seats on
the development aid in the House, it is precisely at the higher level of partisanship that party
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seats begin to take effect on the proportion of development to GNI provided to the recipient
countries. As the Figure 4-3 reveals, for the House, the effect of Democratic Party seats on the
development aid when partisanship is low is indifferent than zero. The 95% confidence interval
for the parameter estimate of Democratic Party seats when Party Unity Scores are at the one
percentile includes zero. Yet when the Party Unity Scores are at the 50th percentile or above, the
effect of Democratic Party seats on the development aid is significantly different from zero. This
result might not be surprising given the House is the majoritarian institution. When partisanship
is lower, both parties are more likely to collaborate to set the level of development aid to be
provided to foreign countries. Thus, party seats do not have an impact on the level of aid because
both parties tend to agree each other.
Yet when partisanship is higher, both parties have difficulty cooperating to set the level
of foreign aid. Under this situation, both parties tend to be persistent in their own interest and
policy position (on the foreign aid level). As the majoritarian institution, the majority party will
always prevail and the policy outcomes (the level of development aid) will reflect the dominant
party preference (the Democrats). Thus, the party seats will have a more obvious effect on the
level of development aid. Even so, the rate of change in the proportion of development aid to
GNI predicted from the change in Democratic Party seats slows down as the partisanship
becomes stronger. This should not surprise us because foreign aid is part of the appropriation
bills that have to be decided annually. Because the bills have to be decided, both parties have to
compromise their policy positions regarding the level of foreign aid. Although the policy
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outcome will still reflect the preference of the dominant party, the impact of party seats weakens
due to this compromise.49
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Figure 4-3. Partisanship, Democratic seats in Congress and U.S. development aid.

49

The weakening effect is measured from the point at which the level of partisanship begins to affect the
relationship between party seat and the proportion of development aid to the GNI. So, for example, because the level
of partisanship begins to affect the impact of party seat at its 50th percentile, we can compare the effect of
Democratic Party seats on the proportion of development aid to GNI when the Party Unity Scores are at the 50 th
percentile and when Party Unity Scores are at the 75th percentile and with that when Party Unity Scores are at the
95th percentile. Thus, the impact of Democratic Party seats weakens when partisanship is at the 95 th percentile
compared to when partisanship is at, say, the 75th percentile and even more, compared to when the partisanship is at
the 50th percentile.
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Unsurprisingly, the same expectation is not met in the Senate where the 95% confidence
bounds of high-level partisanship overlaps with the 95% confidence bounds of low-level
partisanship. Because the 95% confidence interval of the low-level partisanship includes zero,
this means that the Democratic Party seats have no effect on the development aid at both levels
of partisanship. However, this result should be anticipated given that partisan behavior is
stronger in the House than the Senate. As some scholars suggest, the institutional features of both
chambers are different. The individual nature of the institution of the Senate cancels out the
effect of party seats on foreign aid policy. Furthermore, the diverse constituency represented by a
senator enables the senator to take more moderate position, thus partisanship is less extreme in
the Senate than in the House (McCormick and Wittkopf 1992).
The impact of Party Unity Scores on military aid seems to be significant in both the
House and the Senate as exhibited in Table 4-2. Unconditionally, a one unit increase in the
House Party Unity Scores can be expected to lower the proportion of military aid to the GNI by
0.03 percentage point or around US$ 1.86 billion. In the Senate, the same rate of increase in the
Party Unity Scores lowers the proportion of military aid to the GNI by 0.04 percentage point or
around US$ 2.5 billion. However, the impact of Democratic Party seats is statistically significant
only in the House chamber. Here, a one percentage point increase in the Democratic seat is
predicted to decrease the proportion of military aid to the GNI by 0.0003 percentage point or
US$ 18.6 million. Although the drop in the proportion of military aid to the GNI as a result of a
one percentage point change in the Democratic seat in the Senate is higher, the imprecise
measure (indicated by higher standard error and wider confidence interval) leads it to be
indistinguishable from zero.
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Table 4-2
Partisanship, Democratic Control and Military Aid: House and Senate
(1)
House Model

(2)
Senate Model

-.0294**
(.0128)

-.0404**
(.0196)

Democratic Seats (%)

-.000268**
(.000131)

-.000349
(.000212)

Chamber PUS x Dem.Seats (%)

.000574**
(.000228)

.000776**
(.000362)

Human Rights Scores

-.000551**
(.000278)

-.000549**
(.000276)

Recipient Democracy Status

.0000528
(.0000649)

.0000551
(.0000638)

Voting Affinity of Recipient[t-1]

.00304***
(.00115)

.00288**
(.00118)

Cold War

.00277***
(.000819)

.00258***
(.000831)

Recipient is US Ally

.00517***
(.00149)

.00520***
(.00150)

U.S. Misery Index [t-1]

-.000123*
(.0000652)

-.000157***
(.0000442)

President Ideology

.000326
(.000225)

.000581**
(.000227)

U.S. Growth [t-1]

.00834
(.00709)

.0124
(.00760)

Main Predictors:
Chamber Party Unity Scores

Controls:

Table continued on the next page
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Table cont. on previous page
Post 9/11 period

.000956*
(.000512)

.000804
(.000527)

Global Conflict Intensity

.00107*
(.000563)

.00121**
(.000583)

Communist-bordered State

.00193
(.00120)

.00193
(.00119)

Recipient in Conflict

.000167
(.000818)

.000199
(.000812)

East Asia and Oceania

.00545***
(.00211)

.00547***
(.00212)

Europe and Eurasia

.00253**
(.00101)

.00257**
(.00102)

Middle East and N. Africa

.00876**
(.00363)

.00877**
(.00363)

South and C. Asia

.00218**
(.000850)

.00217**
(.000850)

Sub-Saharan Africa

.00230**
(.000957)

.00230**
(.000957)

Constant

.0111
(.00676)

.0155
(.0112)

Observations

9972

9972

# of Countries

185

185

# of Imputation

150

150

2.100***

2.033***

F-statistics
Reference Category: Western Hemisphere
Robust-clustered standard error in parentheses
*
p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Figure 4-4. Partisanship, Democratic seats in Congress and U.S. military aid.

However, when we interpret the results in terms of their conditional marginal effect, the
declining impact of Democratic seats in the House diminishes as the partisanship becomes
stronger. The sign of the effect is even reversed when partisanship grows. For example, holding
the House Party Unity Scores at their lowest level (.29), the impact of a percentage point increase
in the Democratic Party seats decreases the proportion of military aid to GNI by 0.000102
percentage point (or more than six million dollars). But, when the Party Unity Scores is set at its
mean (.49), the percentage point impact of Democratic Party seats in the House becomes
0.00001326 (an increase of US$ 821,160.02). Notwithstanding the reverse sign, statistical

154
calculation shows that the impact of Democratic Party seats on the military aid vanishes when
partisanship is at its mean level or above as shown in Figure 4-4.
The same trend is also observed in the Senate. The impact of Democratic Party seats in
the Senate on the level of military aid is also statistically significant when partisanship is low.
Holding Party Unity Scores at their lowest level (0.35), a percentage point increase in the
Democratic seats in the Senate is expected to reduce the proportion of military aid to the GNI by
0.0000774 percentage point or around US$ 4.8 million. However, when we hold the Senate Party
Unity Scores at its mean (.5), a percentage point increase in the Democratic Party seats predicts
0.00004 percentage point increase in the proportion of military aid to the GNI or around US$ 2.4
million. Despite its substantial increase in the absolute value, the greater standard errors in the
estimate renders the calculation imprecise. Like the House model, the 95% confidence interval
for the Senate model includes the value of zero when level of partisanship is higher. Thus, the
effect of party seats on the military aid also disappears when partisanship grows.
How can we explain the null effect of this higher level of partisanship on the impact of
Democratic Party seats on the level of military aid? Recall that basically, conservative
Republicans are actually averse to the government intervention in the economy through taxation
and the transfer of wealth. Although they might be concerned about the security and seem to be
willing to spend more money to ensure the stability and security of the nation, their marketoriented ideology does not fit very well with the need for giving aid to foreign nations. But
interestingly, their preference for reduced foreign aid fits well with the Democratic preference
that also supports reduced military assistance. Thus, when partisanship is low, both Democrats
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and Republicans can collaborate to reduce foreign military assistance. However, when
partisanship is getting higher, both parties will persist with their policy positions. A higher level
of partisanship can lead to stalemate. Under this situation, the amount of military aid might be
shaped by the factors outside of the congressional dynamics such as conflict intensity in the
world or the economic situation of the nation.

Table 4-3
Partisanship, Democratic Control and Political Aid: House and Senate
(1)
House Model

(2)
Senate Model

-.00126
(.00389)

-.00207
(.00458)

Democratic Seats (%)

.00000962
(.0000467)

-.00000263
(.0000535)

Chamber PUS x Dem.Seats (%)

.0000363
(.0000844)

.0000454
(.0000953)

.00243***
(.000891)

.00245***
(.000897)

-.00000173
(.00000842)

-.00000200
(.00000830)

Main Predictors:
Chamber Party Unity Scores

Controls:
Recipient is US Ally
Recipient Democracy Status
Table continued on next page

50

Similar logics applies to the case of sanction. As Martin (1992) explains, Democrats and Republicans sometimes
find areas of agreement in sanction policy. Both parties, for example, agreed to impose sanctions on Chile for the
country’s human rights violation. While violation issue was the main concern of Democrats, the cut in assistance to
Chile could help reduce government spending, thus satisfying the Republican interest. Although the Pinochet regime
was liked by the anti-communist Republicans in Congress, compared to the socialist Allende, the Republicans still
supported the sanction for reasons arguably related to their market-oriented preference.

156
Table cont. from previous page
Human Rights Scores

.0000338
(.0000287)

.0000337
(.0000287)

Logged Population

-.000102
(.0000948)

-.000109
(.0000952)

Logged GDP/Capita

-.000307***
(.000103)

-.000300***
(.000101)

Economic Openness

.00000137
(.00000512)

.000000897
(.00000504)

Voting Affinity of Recipient[t-1]

.000679**
(.000326)

.000629**
(.000302)

Cold War

.000465**
(.000188)

.000496***
(.000134)

Post 9/11 period

.000193*
(.0000986)

.0000991
(.0000758)

U.S. Growth [t-1]

.00179
(.00251)

.000839
(.00144)

U.S. Misery Index [t-1]

.0000176
(.0000384)

.0000174
(.0000365)

Trade Volume with US

.0000409
(.0000255)

.0000437*
(.0000259)

President Ideology

-.000106
(.000112)

-.0000903
(.000151)

Communist-bordered State

.00128
(.000833)

.00128
(.000832)

Recipient in Conflict

.000220
(.000232)

.000226
(.000233)

Table continued on next page
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East Asia and Oceania

.00252*
(.00129)

.00254**
(.00129)

Europe and Eurasia

.000904*
(.000502)

.000927*
(.000505)

Middle East and N. Africa

.00473**
(.00200)

.00473**
(.00201)

South and C. Asia

.00237*
(.00125)

.00238*
(.00125)

Sub-Saharan Africa

.000896
(.000648)

.000912
(.000650)

Constant

.000582
(.00319)

.00154
(.00269)

Observations

8428

8428

# of Countries

157

157

# of Imputation

150

150

1.453

1.504

F-statistics
Reference Category: Western Hemisphere
Robust-clustered standard error in parentheses
* p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

Finally, as expected, we do not find a significant impact of both Democratic Party seats
and partisanship on the change in the proportion of political aid to the GNI provided to foreign
countries. As Table 4-3 demonstrates and confirmed by Figure 4-5, the impact of Democratic
Party seats in both the House and the Senate is so small that it is indistinguishable from zero.
This applies to both low and high levels of partisanship. In addition, the very wide confidence
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bounds for the Democratic seats point estimates at varying levels of partisanship, which also
shows our parameter estimates are not precise.
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Figure 4-5. Partisanship, Democratic seats in Congress, and U.S. political aid.

Nonetheless, our failure to find the significant impact of Democratic Party seats and the
level of partisanship in both chambers on the political aid is in line with my prediction. This the
type of aid in which the preferences and interests of both parties tend to converge. While
Democrats are more supportive of a higher level of spending to help foreign countries,
Republicans also endorse this spending on foreign countries as long as it is directed to issues
directly related to the US strategic and political interests such as combatting terrorism and

159
supporting non-proliferation weapons programs. Furthermore, both Democrats and Republicans
tend to support the economic and political stability of the countries (financed through the
Economic Support Fund program) in which the US has strategic interests. In short, political aid
is the type of aid over which both parties are less likely to oppose each other.
Turning to control variable analysis, we can see that most of the control variables we
include in the models reveal the pattern in line with my expectation. For example, a US ally is
more likely to get political and/or military aid on average at US$ 150 million and US$ 320
million, respectively. Development and political aid also tend to be provided to low-income
countries. Yet the impact is quite small for the development aid. On average, for every one
percent drop in income per capita, there will be about a three thousand dollar increase in
development aid. For the political aid, by contrast, the effect is quite large. Every one percent
drop in income per capita helps to boost around US$ 185,782.81 additional aid to the recipient.
As we might expect, the income effect for the political aid is statistically significant, while for
development aid, it is not.
Furthermore, infant mortality rate, economic liberalization of the recipient countries and
the US economic health all shape the decision to give development aid to the foreign countries.
Generally, poor countries indicated by high infant mortality rate will receive higher development
aid. More liberalized economies will also receive more development aid from the US. However,
the aid giving also depends on the US economic situation. When the US economy is in good
shape, more aid can be expected to be given to foreign countries.
Among the politico-strategic factors that shape the decision regarding the military and
political aid, recipient’s voting affinity with the US, along with its alliance relationship with the
US determine the Uncle Sam’s decision to give these types of aid to the country. Countries with
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a record of supporting the US in UN forums will receive more military and political aid. This
evidence supports some work finding that aid has been used as a political tool to buy support for
the US position in the UN (e.g., Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008; Wang 1999). Finally,
the structure of the international system also shapes foreign aid decision. This is especially true
for both military and political aid. During the Cold War, the US gave, on average, more than
US$ 150 million more military aid to foreign countries. During the same period, it also increased
its political aid by more than US$ 28 million. These facts indicate that foreign aid is indeed a
tool to win the super-power rivalry.

Conclusion
This chapter starts with the question of whether there is partisan behavior in foreign aid
decisions. Drawing on some works on partisan politics and ideology, I tested whether Democrats
are more supportive of development aid and averse to military aid. I found some evidence that
they are. Generally, when Democrats control the seats in the House, the amount of development
aid increases, while the amount of military aid tends to diminish. Expectedly, the effects are
stronger in the House than in the Senate because the institutional features of the Senate do not
provide incentives for the senators to behave in a partisan manner in foreign aid policy.
The empirical investigation in this chapter also found that both Democrats and
Republicans are less likely to part company in political aid policy. This is because political aid
contains programs that become the main concern of both parties. While Democrats care about
helping others as well as values such as freedom and justice, the Republicans also care about
security and stability. Because they find all these values in the political aid, they are less likely to
oppose each other.

161
This, however, does not apply in both development and military aid. These types of aid
are distinct and serve different purposes. Development aid is especially intended to help the
recipient increase its welfare. The purpose of this aid is in accord with the ideological values
embraced by Democrats. Thus, Democrats are more likely to support this kind of aid. Military
aid, on the other hand, is intended to help the recipient countries maintain their security. The
values inherent in this type of aid fit well with the ideology of Republicans. Accordingly, the
Republicans are more likely to support this aid.
Because both parties have different policy preferences for types of aid, they tend to
challenge each other in the business of setting up the level of aid. Under this situation, we might
expect that the dominant parties will see their preference realized in the final outcome. However,
the ability of the majority party to shape the policy outcome can only be expected in the House
because of its majoritarian nature. The empirical evidence supports this expectation.
Put in the broader literature of congressional foreign policy, this research again supports
previous findings that Congress does matter in shaping the US foreign policy (Carter, Scott, and
Rowling 2004; Carter and Scott 2009; Howell and Pevehouse 2007a; 2007b; Lindsay 1999;
Lindsay and Ripley 1993; Scott and Carter 2002). The partisan behavior shown by the members
of the two parties does shape what the US foreign policy will look like. The current research also
confirms previous works in that the ideology and partisanship do influence foreign aid policy
(Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007; Trubowitz 1998; Trubowitz and Mellow 2005, 2011). While the
empirical findings shown in this chapter lend some support for the importance of domestic
political factors in explaining American foreign policy, it also has theoretical implications for the
theory of congressional lawmaking in the literature of American politics , that is a compromise
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between the conditional party government theory (Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 2000; Rohde 1991)
and pivotal politics theory (Krehbiel 1998).
As the findings suggest, the development aid model seems to support the conditional
party government theory. The majoritarian nature of the House enables the majority party to
shape policy outcome when partisanship grows. This is what is revealed in the development aid
model. The impact of Democratic party seats on the level of development aid is obvious only
when the level of partisanship is high. On the other side, we also find that the extent of this party
control impact on the level of development and military aid declines as partisanship becomes
stronger. This, in turn, also indicates that too high a partisanship might force the two parties to
compromise to avoid a policy deadlock. Theoretically, this also supports the argument of pivotal
politics.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This dissertation discusses how congressional dynamics, such as party system
polarization, congressional support for the president, the size of partisan majorities,
congressional ideology, and divided party control of the government affect US foreign policy
decision-making. In this dissertation, I show that many of these legislative dynamics
substantively influence the use of foreign policy instruments. However, when I delved into
chamber dynamics, I found that the effects of these unique conditions on foreign policy decisionmaking are not uniform. Some conditions, for instance, exert a strong influence on foreign
policymaking in only the House models, while others have substantial effects on foreign
policymaking in only the Senate models.
Chapter 2 specifically tested the influence of the legislative branch on US military
intervention policy during a foreign policy crisis. We learned that congressional ideology and
support for the president influence the president’s decision to commit troops or command a
military operation. When Congress has been more conservative, the White House is emboldened
to engage in the risky business of military intervention. The impact of ideology on the
president’s decision is systematic and substantive in both chambers of Congress. Meanwhile,
regarding the influence of presidential support in Congress, the findings show that more support
has a statistically significant and substantive influence on the decision to go to war only in the
Senate model. Arguably, the prominent role of the Senate in foreign affairs along with its
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egalitarian institutional features make its support essential and consequential for presidential
decision-making. Given that any single senator can derail policymaking, the more support the
president receives in the Upper Chamber, the more likely a president is willing to commit forces
in the period studied. In the parlance of Keith Krehbiel’s (1998) pivotal theory of lawmaking, the
president needs to assure that he controls the filibuster pivot to ensure there will be no challenge
to his foreign policy decision-making.
In Chapter 3, I show that party system polarization in Congress is consequential for the
duration of legislated sanctions. However, the effect of party polarization on the duration of
economic sanctions is not linear. When the level of party polarization in both chambers is either
very low or very high, the duration of legislated sanctions is longer. This is because cooperation
is fragile when polarization is at its extremes. Too low a polarization complicates the internal
consolidation process that subsequently inhibits the advancement of the policy agenda. Yet too
high a polarization is also problematic because, unless one of the party has a super-majority, the
polarization will impede the inter-party cooperation required to pass legislation ending a sanction
or approve the president’s decision to terminate the sanction.
Like the military intervention models in Chapter 2, I also found the level of support the
president receives from Congress is essential for ending economic sanctions. And just like the
military intervention models, the findings also demonstrate that the effect of congressional
support on the duration of sanctions is only statistically significant in the Senate model, offering
further support for the contention that the Senate plays a more critical role in the president’s
foreign policy decision-making.
In Chapter 4, I found a partisan bias in foreign aid policy and that the level of party
polarization can moderate the influence of this partisan bias on foreign aid policy. Drawing on
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some literature on public opinion and political psychology, I found that the Democratic Party is
more predisposed to support development aid at the expense of military aid. However, the impact
of this partisan bias is only apparent in the House. When the Democratic Party has more
members in the House, the general level of development aid increases, but at the same time, the
level of military aid declines. Nonetheless, the influence of Democratic control in the House on
the level of these types of aid diminishes as the level of partisanship―defined as partisan voting
behavior―increases.
All these findings have several theoretical, methodological, and practical implications for
the study of American foreign policy, in particular, and International Relations more generally.
First, congressional ideology has substantial implications for both foreign security and economic
policies. While Milner and Tingley (2015) claim that conservatives and liberals have less
disagreement on military policy (the use of force) and military aid, giving the president
maximum influence over these policies, this is not always the case. My research suggests that
liberal and conservative policy preferences, even in military policy, will diverge from one
another. Thus, whatever ideology is more dominant in Congress shapes Congress’s
policymaking and affects the president’s foreign policymaking.
Although the finding does not sound surprising, to date, foreign policy scholars have
been remiss in investigating the influence of congressional ideology on the foreign policies that
are ultimately adopted. Most scholarly work on the role of ideology in foreign policymaking
tends to investigate the influence of ideology on direct legislative actions such as congressional
foreign policy roll-call votes (McCormick and Wittkopf 1992; McCormick and Wittkopf 1990;
Milner and Tingley 2010, 2011) or treaty ratification (Auerswald and Maltzman 2003; DeLaet
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and Scott 2006; Peake 2016). The results presented in this dissertation suggest that congressional
ideology also affects the presidents’ decision to use force.
It is also important to note the contribution this dissertation is making regarding chamberspecific findings. This is another area that heretofore has been understudied. It turns out that the
Senate often plays a more significant role in shaping the president’s foreign policy decisions.
The findings in this dissertation confirm the prominent role of the Senate in foreign affairs, as
dictated by the US Constitution. Although McCormick’s (1993) analysis more than two decades
ago indicated that the House Foreign Affairs Committee plays a more active role in shaping
American foreign policy, the empirical findings in the current study suggest that the Senate still
maintains its status as a formidable check on the president in foreign affairs. While the
institutional rules of the Senate play a critical role in forcing the president to take the chamber
seriously, the constitutional roles of the Senate in foreign affairs also greatly enhance its image
as the prominent challenger to the president in foreign policy. In two of the three empirical cases
examined here, Senate support was found to be critical for presidents to achieve their foreign
policy objectives.
A third contribution this dissertation is in regard to the House and the distribution
politics. Specifically, the findings suggest the House plays more active role than the Senate in
policy areas involving distributive politics, such as foreign aid. This is, arguably, because
distributive policies affect constituents directly and this can mobilize them to shape the policy
outcome in their favor. Because the relationship between the House members and their
constituents is closer than that between senators and their constituents, the House members face
more pressure to act on the policy than the Senators. This can make the House dynamics more
influential regarding distributive-related policy.
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Fourth, to some extent, partisanship can have a moderating effect on the influence of
ideology on foreign policy. While ideology can impact the direction of a foreign policy action,
partisanship can moderate the extent to which ideology shapes this foreign policy. This is what is
apparent in Chapter 4 on foreign aid policy. Theoretically, this finding can reconcile two great
congressional party theories in the American politics literature: Conditional Party Government
(Aldrich and Rohde 1998, 2000) and Pivotal Theory (Krehbiel 1998). It is true that higher
partisanship can empower party leaders in Congress and, thus, enables them to manipulate the
policy agenda. And for the majority leaders, this means a chance to skew the policy outcome in
favor of their party’s preference. However, the ability of the majority party to shape this policy
outcome is constrained by the super-majoritarian rules. Thus, unless the majority party controls
more than two-third of the seats in both chambers, the compromise should be the norm for
passing a bill. Otherwise, gridlock will ensue.
Fifth, the results also provide empirical support for the so-called moderate-polarization
thesis (Dodd and Schraufnagel 2009; 2012; 2017). The research argues that the legislative
productivity of Congress can be maximized when it is under moderately polarized conditions.
While this argument has usually been applied to domestic political legislations, the argument
also turns out to apply to foreign policy legislations. Accordingly, as the results suggest, it is
important for Congress to maintain a balance between the internal cohesion within each of the
party while at the same time pursuing inter-party collaboration to keep them productive.
Finally, methodologically, the current research also contributes to a more clarified
difference between party effect and partisan behavior. In most foreign policy research, scholars
tend to confuse the party effect and partisanship. The current research suggests that partisanship
consists of two parts: partisan differences in policy position that can be informed by the party’s
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ideology and partisan behavior, which is whether the two parties really behave differently in
their voting behavior. The latter measure is typically used in the American politics literature to
examine the partisan behavior of legislators or the degree of partisanship in general.
The findings in this dissertation also have some implications for future research on
American foreign policy. First, it is important for scholars to examine the impact of Congress on
American foreign policy by analyzing the chambers of Congress separately. This is because each
of the chambers has its own internal rules and constitutional roles in the foreign policy-making
process that can have different consequences on how each produces foreign policy legislation
and affects the US foreign policy in general. Failure to do this can lead to an oversimplified
analysis of the role of Congress in the US foreign policy process.
Second, while foreign policy scholars have become used to examining the effect of
partisanship on congressional foreign policy behavior, they tend to operationalize partisanship in
terms of partisan differences or party effect. In a more technical language, scholars tend to
explore the impact of partisanship by dichotomously coding the party and regressing their
dependent variables on a dummy-coded party variable. This way of analyzing partisanship can
give a clue about the party’s policy position but not its partisan behavior or the general condition
of partisanship. Using the more common measure of partisanship like Party Unity Scores
typically employed in the American politics literature can help us understand the nature of
partisanship in both chambers and better understand its impact on congressional foreign policy
behavior.
Finally, as the findings suggest, the nature of the policy issues can affect the way each of
the chambers responds to the issues. That is, different chambers can act differently based on the
nature of the issues they are dealing with. This dissertation suggests that distributive policy can
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activate the House but not the Senate. However, to be able to confidently generalize the claim
that the nature of policy issues determines the responses of either of the chambers, we need to
expand our investigation to new cases. Thus, future research can compare the behavior of each of
the chambers for different categories of issues based on the degree of distributive aspects
inherent in the issues.
Nevertheless, this research has some weaknesses. Like typical quantitative analysis, all
the analyses conducted in each of the empirical chapters measure the aggregate effect of
congressional dynamics on the variables of interest (i.e., military intervention during a foreign
policy crisis, the duration of legislated sanctions, and foreign aid). Because all the relationships
are measured aggregately, the analyses might not be sensitive to particular contexts. For
example, the analysis of foreign aid does not capture the context of the turbulent era of the
1960s-70s when both parties had a serious problem of internal cohesion. Although I touch on the
history of the Democratic Party’s leftward movement in the 1970s, leading to the departure of
some conservative Democrats from the party, this context does not manifest in the empirical
analysis of foreign aid. The use of a population average panel model, while being valid for my
research, does not take this historical context into account because the model only measures the
effect of party control and partisanship on the level of foreign aid on average for the whole
period of observation.
In the same vein, in the aggregate model, party tends to be treated monolithically. Again,
historical context is ignored here. As suggested above, both parties are not historically
monolithic due to their internal cohesion, especially the Democratic Party. While disentangling
each of the parties to examine its effect on the outcome of interest is not typically done in the
literature of American politics and American foreign policy, a thought on how to approach this
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issue and bring it into empirical analysis should be invented. One possible solution to overcome
this context-ignorance is disaggregating the analysis into some historical epochs based on the
temporal dimension of interest. Doing analysis this way will allow one to see and measure the
effects of some historical contexts on the relationship between the predictor of interest and the
outcome.
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APPENDIX A
COMPLETE RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 2

Descriptive Statistics
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Military Intervention

N
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Mean
.1204663

SD
.3257171

Min
0

Max
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House Ideology
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-.254978
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-1.478555

2.475312

House Support
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Senate Ideology

544
544

-.1750759
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Senate Support
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-2.146393
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Democratic Majority
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.4877483

0
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Misery Index[t-1]
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10.15203

3.976737

3.356667

21.84

Approval Ratings[t-1]
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54.24768

12.57333
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US Hegemony
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.1844829

.0614627
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.3783714

World Dispute
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15.39548

7
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Cold War
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.7629534

.4255468

0

1

Election
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.3471503
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1

Republican President
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.5220207
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1

Violent Trigger
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.373057
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0

1

Non-Democratic
Actor
US Ally
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Russia/Soviet
Involvement
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.6126943

.4874503
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1

Power Disparity

740

4.45

26.09002

-179
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Total Obs
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Congressional Dynamic and the US Military Intervention: The House and Senate Models
Dependent Variable: Pr(Military Intervention = 1)
House Model
Senate Model
Main Predictors:
Chamber Ideology

1.284***
(0.346)

1.150***
(0.368)

Chamber Support

0.358
(0.316)

0.842**
(0.377)

Democratic Majority

0.0199
(0.555)

-0.277
(0.743)

Misery Index[t-1]

-0.0354
(0.0701)

-0.0539
(0.0768)

Approval Ratings[t-1]

0.0267*
(0.0146)

0.0242
(0.0156)

US Hegemony

-5.420
(16.14)

-15.98
(13.35)

World Dispute

0.0267*
(0.0158)

0.0422*
(0.0243)

Cold War

-0.112
(0.660)

0.248
(0.695)

Election

0.293
(0.288)

0.406
(0.333)

Republican President

-0.761
(1.822)

-0.0929
(1.487)

Violent Trigger

-0.0894
(0.401)

-0.0981
(0.405)

Non-Democratic Actor

1.007***
(0.305)

0.956***
(0.306)

US Ally

0.0513

-0.0227

Controls:
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Russia/Soviet Involvement
Power Disparity
Constant
President FE
Deviance
AIC
BIC
N
Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses
*
p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

(0.328)

(0.325)

2.388***
(0.490)

2.404***
(0.514)

0.00623***
(0.00180)

0.00666***
(0.00190)

-5.530**
(2.774)

-4.384**
(2.165)

Yes

Yes

166.7
210.7
301.5
458

164.0
208.0
298.8
458
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Models with Chamber Polarization and Divided Government
House Model
Model 1
Model 2

Senate Model
Model 3
Model 4

Chamber Ideology

2.460***
(0.705)

2.611***
(0.816)

1.148***
(0.366)

1.161***
(0.376)

Chamber Support

0.171
(0.325)

0.0643
(0.434)

0.843**
(0.409)

0.907**
(0.461)

Chamber Polarization

-17.76**
(8.936)

-18.73*
(9.785)

0.0491
(5.471)

-0.791
(5.545)

Democratic Majority

0.366
(0.535)

0.356
(0.552)

-0.279
(0.728)

-0.201
(0.724)

Misery Index[t-1]
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(0.0777)

-0.0771
(0.0765)

-0.0539
(0.0765)

-0.0515
(0.0757)

Approval Ratings[t-1]

0.0310**
(0.0143)

0.0361*
(0.0216)

0.0242
(0.0155)

0.0216
(0.0175)

US Hegemony

-12.50
(16.91)

-18.33
(23.00)

-15.95
(13.65)

-12.40
(17.35)

World Dispute

0.0258*
(0.0156)

0.0265
(0.0163)

0.0422*
(0.0242)

0.0417*
(0.0232)

Cold War

-0.645
(0.691)

-0.671
(0.693)

0.250
(0.677)

0.208
(0.670)

Election

0.358
(0.316)

0.404
(0.362)

0.406
(0.333)

0.379
(0.343)

Republican President

-5.879*
(3.081)

-5.482*
(2.993)

-0.0824
(1.982)

-0.791
(2.532)

Violent Trigger

-0.0376
(0.393)

-0.0390
(0.396)

-0.0979
(0.406)

-0.0909
(0.404)

Main Predictors:

Controls:

Non-Democratic
Actor

***

1.014
(0.309)

***

1.030
(0.315)

0.956
(0.304)

0.943
(0.307)

US Ally

0.0423
(0.333)

0.0237
(0.346)

-0.0227
(0.325)

-0.00806
(0.323)

Russia/Soviet
Involvement

2.460***
(0.497)

2.516***
(0.508)

2.404***
(0.512)

2.380***
(0.508)

0.00647***
(0.00174)

0.00653***
(0.00172)

0.00666***
(0.00190)

0.00660***
(0.00189)

Power Disparity
divided
Constant
President FE
Deviance
AIC
BIC
N

***

-0.517
(1.049)

***

0.350
(0.842)

9.329
(8.084)

10.90
(9.544)

-4.421
(4.777)

-4.404
(4.941)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

163.3
209.3
304.2
458

163.0
211.0
310.0
458

164.0
210.0
304.9
458

163.8
211.8
310.8
458

Robust-clustered standard errors in parentheses
*
p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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APPENDIX B
COMPLETE RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 3 AND SOME STATISTICAL DIAGNOSIS

Congressional Polarization and Economic Sanction Duration: NPH Weibull Models
HOUSE POLARIZATION MODEL
House
DW-NOMINATE
Party Unity
Polarization
Votes

SENATE POLARIZATION MODEL
Senate
DW-NOMINATE
Party Unity
Polarization
Votes

Main
Predictors:
Chamber
Polarization

-16.82***
(2.005)

-19.85***
(1.474)

-23.38***
(3.424)

-21.42***
(2.065)

-22.88***
(2.422)

-26.78***
(3.045)

Chamber
Polarization x
log(time)

2.672***
(0.317)

3.121***
(0.184)

3.834***
(0.551)

3.482***
(0.285)

3.515***
(0.359)

4.115***
(0.416)

Chamber
Polarization-sq

14.52***
(2.620)

14.32***
(1.434)

26.87***
(4.632)

22.17***
(3.469)

20.88***
(3.053)

28.71***
(4.923)

Chamber
Polarization-sq
x log(time)

-2.319***
(0.403)

-2.266***
(0.197)

-4.399***
(0.748)

-3.589***
(0.485)

-3.224***
(0.455)

-4.435***
(0.704)

Chamber
Support

0.00334*
(0.00189)

0.000698
(0.00114)

-0.00731**
(0.00325)

-0.00841***
(0.00277)

-0.00270
(0.00235)

0.00194
(0.00936)

Chamber
Support x
log(time)

-0.000544*
(0.000324)

-0.000112
(0.000224)

0.00126**
(0.000563)

0.00158***
(0.000509)

0.000588
(0.000407)

-0.000332
(0.00151)
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Controls:
US Ally

-0.120*
(0.0662)

0.00424
(0.0352)

-0.0245
(0.0781)

-0.0192
(0.0550)

0.0111
(0.0480)

0.0822
(0.0538)

High-Politics
Issues

0.0375
(0.0560)

0.0673
(0.0421)

-0.0765*
(0.0439)

0.0734*
(0.0426)

0.0526
(0.0515)

0.0533
(0.0601)

Target Major
Cost

-0.0707
(0.0688)

-0.0785**
(0.0341)

-0.0301
(0.0471)

-0.156**
(0.0627)

-0.0864*
(0.0519)

-0.104
(0.0687)

Target is
Democratic

-0.0644
(0.0401)

-0.0265
(0.0280)

-0.0405
(0.0274)

-0.0308
(0.0279)

-0.0272
(0.0350)

-0.0326
(0.0228)

US GDP
Growth[t-1]

1.069
(1.180)

0.146
(1.344)

-0.309
(0.684)

1.194
(0.957)

0.347
(0.948)

-0.637
(1.510)

US-Target
Trade[t-1]

0.0646***
(0.0139)

0.0166**
(0.00693)

0.0198
(0.0212)

0.0356***
(0.0138)

0.0111
(0.0144)

-0.00718
(0.0129)

Target GDP[t-1]

-0.107***
(0.0208)

-0.0233**
(0.0117)

-0.0434
(0.0294)

-0.0485***
(0.0180)

-0.0141
(0.0214)

-0.0138
(0.0179)

Target
Acquiescence

-0.102*
(0.0619)

-0.0391*
(0.0224)

-0.0872
(0.0547)

-0.00285
(0.0329)

0.0103
(0.0386)

-0.0600
(0.0452)

Honeymoon
Period

-0.00800
(0.0715)

-0.0275
(0.146)

0.0799**
(0.0391)

0.0990*
(0.0510)

0.0825**
(0.0418)

0.00307
(0.0694)
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US Ally x
log(time)

0.0191*
(0.0106)

-0.000602
(0.00555)

0.00397
(0.0124)

0.00310
(0.00866)

-0.00177
(0.00755)

-0.0132
(0.00875)

High Politics
Issue x
log(time)

-0.00657
(0.00943)

-0.0111
(0.00693)

0.0121*
(0.00712)

-0.0122*
(0.00735)

-0.00869
(0.00853)

-0.00905
(0.00988)

Target Major
Cost x log(time)

0.0150
(0.0126)

0.0151**
(0.00627)

0.00645
(0.00779)

0.0314***
(0.0116)

0.0169*
(0.00876)

0.0191
(0.0121)

Democratic
Target x
log(time)

0.0103
(0.00651)

0.00417
(0.00453)

0.00633
(0.00439)

0.00481
(0.00452)

0.00433
(0.00566)

0.00509
(0.00372)

-0.140
(0.203)

-0.000311
(0.232)

0.0613
(0.111)

-0.215
(0.168)

-0.0629
(0.160)

0.116
(0.253)

US-Target
Trade[t-1] x
log(time)

-0.0103***
(0.00218)

-0.00264**
(0.00108)

-0.00315
(0.00338)

-0.00566***
(0.00215)

-0.00175
(0.00228)

0.00116
(0.00207)

Target GDP[t-1]
x log(time)

0.0171***
(0.00318)

0.00373**
(0.00185)

0.00693
(0.00470)

0.00777***
(0.00279)

0.00227
(0.00335)

0.00225
(0.00286)

Target
Acquiescence x
log(time)

0.0143
(0.0106)

0.00558
(0.00372)

0.0129
(0.00880)

-0.000579
(0.00555)

-0.00224
(0.00631)

0.00917
(0.00735)

US GDP
Growth[t-1] x
log(time)
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Honeymoon x
log(time)

0.00254
(0.0118)

0.00553
(0.0235)

-0.0119**
(0.00608)

-0.0176**
(0.00889)

-0.0146**
(0.00727)

0.00000406
(0.0114)

Divided

0.229**
(0.103)

0.131
(0.109)

-0.187*
(0.112)

-0.190***
(0.0736)

-0.0174
(0.0348)

-0.0536
(0.241)

Divided x
log(time)

-0.0356**
(0.0165)

-0.0199
(0.0174)

0.0308*
(0.0186)

0.0335***
(0.0121)

0.00480
(0.00555)

0.00836
(0.0384)

Constant

6.337***
(0.164)

6.440***
(0.164)

6.122***
(0.0387)

6.144***
(0.223)

6.528***
(0.125)

6.528***
(0.204)

Log(p)

5.183***
(0.416)

5.948***
(0.399)

5.576***
(0.474)

5.600***
(0.454)

6.217***
(0.356)

5.897***
(0.413)

-337.8
-285.8
-180.2
429

-442.4
-392.4
-290.9
429

-349.3
-303.3
-209.9
429

-401.0
-349.0
-243.4
429

-502.4
-452.4
-350.9
429

-401.0
-359.0
-273.7
429

Deviance
AIC
BIC
OBS

Robust-cluster standard errors in parentheses
*
p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Test for Hazard Distribution
For the robustness, I first checked the appropriate functional form of the hazard
distribution. This is important because incorrectly specifying the functional form of hazard
distribution can produce incorrect estimates. Although semi-parametric model like Cox
proportional hazard model can be used for safety reason (because we do not need to worry about
the hazard distribution), the results produced by correctly specified distribution of
hazard/survival function were more efficient. This is especially true for a small sample. To test
which distributional form of hazard rate is appropriate, we did some graphical tests (Hamilton
2013, 299).
Test 1: because the exponential model has a flat baseline hazard rate (the risk of an event
occurrence conditional on covariates is the same at all points), the exponential hazard is
ℎ(𝑡) = λ
then 𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑒

( )

𝑡 > 0, λ > 0

. This implies there is a linear relationship between 𝑙𝑛 𝑆(𝑡) and t.51 We can

test this graphically in Stata. The graph shows that the relationship between 𝑙𝑛 𝑆(𝑡) and 𝑡 is not
linear. Thus, we could not use the exponential distribution.

51

This is because 𝑙𝑛 𝑆(𝑡) = −λ(𝑡), where λ is constant.
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Test 2: because the exponential distribution cannot characterize the hazard rates of the data very
well, I resorted to Weibull distribution. In the Weibull distribution, the survivor function is:
𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑒

(

)

.
Lowess smoother

0

logS

-1

-2

-3

-4
0

200

400
analysis time when record ends

600

bandwidth = .8

Testing the Exponential Distribution
If we convert the relationship between survivor function and time into logarithmic form,
then: 𝑙𝑛 − 𝑙𝑛 𝑆(𝑡)
𝑙𝑛 − 𝑙𝑛 𝑆(𝑡)

= 𝑝𝑙𝑛(λ) + 𝑝𝑙𝑛(𝑡). This means that the relationship between

and 𝑙𝑛(𝑡) is linear. When 𝑝 = 1 shows exponential distribution, 𝑝 ≠ 1

indicates Weibull (𝑝 > 1 indicates monotonically increasing hazard rates while 𝑝 < 1 indicates
monotonically decreasing hazard rates). We tested the relationship between 𝑙𝑛 − 𝑙𝑛 𝑆(𝑡)

and

𝑙𝑛(𝑡) graphically. I also compared the visual display of the Weibull candidate graph and the loglogistic candidate graph. To test the appropriateness of the log-logistic model, we can also plot
𝑙𝑛

against 𝑙𝑛(𝑡).
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Comparisons of Weibull and Log-Logistics
Log-Logistic
4

2

2

ln(1-S)/S

ln(-ln(S))

Weibull
4

0

0

-2

-2

-4

-4

4
bandwidth = .8

4.5

5
log(_t)

5.5

6

6.5

4

4.5

5
log(_t)

5.5

6

6.5

bandwidth = .8

Comparing the Appropriateness of Weibull v. Log-Logistic Distribution
Although the two graphs are identical and both of them seem to show a linear
relationship 𝑙𝑛(𝑡), the Weibull graph shows a smoother linear trend. Thus, Weibull distribution
is more appropriate to characterize the hazard rates of our data. Because the Kaplan-Meier
survival graph shows non-proportional hazard, we should use non-proportional hazard Weibull
model.
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Specification Analysis
To see if the specifications of the models (linearity of the models) are appropriate or not,
I ran residual analysis using the martingale-like residuals and plotted them against the main
predictors (measures of polarization). If the plot overlay the straight line at the residuals = 0, then
the specifications of our models are correct. All the plots in the non-linear models shown below
indicate that we have the correct specifications.
Non-Linearity Test
Linear Models
Senate Polarization

1

1

0

0
martingale-like residual

martingale-like residual

House Polarization
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Non-Linear Models
House Polarization

Senate Polarization

martingale-like residual

1

martingale-like residual

1
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-1
.4
bandwidth = .8

.6

(mean) houpolar

.8

1

.4

.5

.6
(mean) senpolar

bandwidth = .8

Non-linearity test.
The straight horizontal line indicates appropriate specification. The left graph is the
House polarization, while the right graph shows the Senate polarization. The upper panels are
linear models, while the lower panels are the non-linear models. Only in the non-linear models
that we find the straight-line requirement for the correct specification.

APPENDIX C
STATISTICAL DIAGOSIS FOR MULTIPLE IMPUTATION MODELS

Testing Missing at Random Assumption
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

Polity2

GDPPC

Population

Trade

Economic
Openness

Physical
Integrity

Vote Affinity

IMR

Development
Aid

-3622998.3***
(-12.17)

-4380468.8***
(-14.66)

-1982597.3**
(-2.83)

-4713671.8***
(-14.81)

-4535897.7***
(-16.94)

-5096911.7***
(-19.52)

-4525547.4***
(-14.88)

-4198912.6***
(-12.15)

Political Aid

-18817585.2***
(-5.15)

-24356809.1***
(-6.63)

-5442107.8
(-0.64)

-29158968.8***
(-7.45)

-23277319.4***
(-7.04)

-22117160.5***
(-6.83)

25123433.7**

-18454656.5***
(-4.35)

*

(-6.71)
Military Aid

***

-50860135.4
(-7.87)

-38840857.4
(-5.96)

***

13038790.4
(0.86)

-47914678.0
(-6.91)

***

-32758943.1
(-5.59)

***

-14994858.2
(-2.61)

**

30427829.6**

-11814818.2
(-1.57)

*

(-4.59)
N

9972

9972

9972

9972

9972

9972

9972

9972

t statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The table above shows that missing at random (MAR) assumption is met. In this test, I create dummy variable for each of the
variables having missing values and assign the value of 1 for the complete cell and the value of 0 when the cell in the variable is
empty. I then run t-test to compare the means of observed non-missing variables used in all the models (in this research, they are the
three types of aid) between non-missing and missing groups of each of the variable of missing values. If the difference in the means of
observed non-missing values between the missing and non-missing groups are statistically significant, then the missing data in the
variables of missing values is missing at random (MAR). As the table above reveals, the mean differences between missing and nonmissing groups in at least one type of aid are statistically significant, thus suggesting that there is MAR in my data. This MAR
assumption provides justification for the use of multiple imputation for the missing values.
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Diagnostic tests for the Multiple Imputation Models.

Development Aid Diagnostics
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Political Aid Diagnostics

Military Aid Diagnostics
In all the three figures, all of our imputation models show that the random multiple starting
values all converge to the single value in all chains of iterations. Thus, our imputation models are
all appropriate.
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Density Comparison

Development Aid (1)
Density Comparison of lnlgdppc

.2

.2

.15

.15
Density

.25

Density

.25

.1

.1

.05

.05

0

0
4

6

8
lnlgdppc

10

12

2

4

6

8

10

12

MI_lnlgdppc

Density Comparison of lnpop

.2

.2
Density

.3

Density

.3

.1

.1

0

0
5

10

15

20

5

10

lnpop

15

20

MI_lnpop

Development Aid (2)
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Development Aid (3)
Density Comparison of ls2un
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Military Aid (1)
Density Comparison of lnlgdppc
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Military Aid (2)
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Military Aid (3)
Density Comparison of ls2un
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Political Aid (1)
Density Comparison of lnlgdppc
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Political Aid (2)
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Political Aid (3)
Density Comparison of ls2un
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Figure C4. Density Comparisons for Some Multiply Imputed Variables

8

228
All figures above exhibit the density comparison between the original missing variables (on the
left) and the complete variables generated using multiple imputation technique (on the right).
The shapes of the density are approximately similar in the all pairs of variable, further suggesting
the goodness of our multiple imputation models.

